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Abstract
Voice biometric systems use automatic speaker verification (ASV) technology for
user authentication. Even if it is among the most convenient means of biometric
authentication, the robustness and security of ASV in the face of spoofing attacks
(or presentation attacks) is of growing concern and is now well acknowledged
by the research community. A spoofing attack involves illegitimate access to
personal data of a targeted user. Replay is among the simplest attacks to
mount — yet difficult to detect reliably and is the focus of this thesis.
This research focuses on the analysis and design of existing and novel coun-
termeasures for replay attack detection in ASV, organised in two major parts.
The first part of the thesis investigates existing methods for spoofing detection
from several perspectives. I first study the generalisability of hand-crafted fea-
tures for replay detection that show promising results on synthetic speech detec-
tion. I find, however, that it is difficult to achieve similar levels of performance
due to the acoustically different problem under investigation. In addition, I show
how class-dependent cues in a benchmark dataset (ASVspoof 2017) can lead to
the manipulation of class predictions. I then analyse the performance of several
countermeasure models under varied replay attack conditions. I find that it is
difficult to account for the effects of various factors in a replay attack: acous-
tic environment, playback device and recording device, and their interactions.
Subsequently, I developed and studied a convolutional neural network (CNN)
model that demonstrates comparable performance to the one that ranked first
in the ASVspoof 2017 challenge. Here, the experiment analyses what the CNN
has learned for replay detection using a method from interpretable machine
learning. The findings suggest that the model highly attends at the first few
milliseconds of test recordings in order to make predictions. Then, I perform
an in-depth analysis of a benchmark dataset (ASVspoof 2017) for spoofing de-
tection and demonstrate that any machine learning countermeasure model can
still exploit the artefacts I identified in this dataset.
The second part of the thesis studies the design of countermeasures for ASV,
focusing on model robustness and avoiding dataset biases. First, I proposed
an ensemble model combining shallow and deep machine learning methods for
spoofing detection, and then demonstrate its effectiveness on the latest bench-
mark datasets (ASVspoof 2019). Next, I proposed the use of speech endpoint de-
tection for reliable and robust model predictions on the ASVspoof 2017 dataset.
For this, I created a publicly available collection of hand-annotations of speech
endpoints for the same dataset, and new benchmark results for both frame-based
and utterance-based countermeasures are also developed.
I then proposed spectral subband modelling using CNNs for replay detec-
tion. My results indicate that models that learn subband-specific information
substantially outperform models trained on complete spectrograms. Finally, I
proposed to use variational autoencoders — deep unsupervised generative mod-
els — as an alternative backend for spoofing detection and demonstrate encour-
aging results when compared with the traditional Gaussian mixture models.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The main topic of this thesis is analysis and design of spoofing countermeasures
for secure voice biometrics. This chapter first explains the motivations and aims
of this work in Sections 1.1 and 1.2. Then the structure of the thesis is described
in Section 1.3. Finally, Section 1.4 summarises the publications associated with
this thesis.
1.1 Motivation
Voice biometric systems use automatic speaker verification (ASV) [Reynolds,
1995] technology for user authentication. The main goal of an ASV system is to
verify the identity of a claimed person using their voice characteristics. Even if it
is among the most convenient means of biometric authentication, the robustness
and security of ASV in the face of spoofing attacks (or presentation attacks) is of
growing concern, and is now well acknowledged by the community [Sahidullah
et al., 2019]. A spoofing attack involves illegitimate access to personal data of a
targeted user. The vulnerability of ASV systems against spoofing attacks is an
important problem to solve because it poses a serious threat to the security of
such systems. When successful, a spoofing attack can grant unauthorized access
of private and sensitive data. Spoofing attack methods include text-to-speech
(TTS) [Masuko et al., 1999], voice conversion (VC) [Pellom and Hansen, 1999]
techniques, impersonation [Lau et al., 2004] and playing back speech recordings
[Wu et al., 2014a]. Section 2.2 provides further background on spoofing attacks.
High-stakes ASV applications, therefore, demand trustworthy fail-safe mech-
anisms (countermeasures) against such attacks. In this thesis, a countermeasure
(CM) is defined as a binary classifier that aims at discriminating bonafide (hu-
man speech) utterances from spoofing attacks. To allow maximum re-usability
across different applications, the ideal CM should generalise across environ-
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Figure 1.1: Countermeasure for spoofing attack detection.
ments, speakers, languages, channels, and attacks. In practice, this is not the
case; CMs are prone to overfitting. This could be due to variations within the
spoof class (e.g. speech synthesizers or attack conditions not present in the
training set), within the bonafide class (e.g. due to content and speaker), or
extrinsic nuisance factors (e.g. background noise).
Like any traditional machine learning classifier, a spoofing countermeasure
(Fig. 1.1) typically consists of a frontend module, a backend module and a de-
cision logic (for the final classification based on a decision threshold). The key
function of the frontend is to transform the raw acoustic waveform to a sequence
of short-term feature vectors. These short-term feature vectors are then used
to derive either intermediate recording-level features (such as i-vectors [Khoury
et al., 2014] or x-vectors [Williams and Rownicka, 2019]) or statistical mod-
els, such as Gaussian mixture models (GMMs) [Patel and Patil, 2015] to be
used for bonafide or spoof class modeling. In contrast to these approaches that
require a certain level of handcrafting especially in the frontend, modern deep-
learning based countermeasures are often trained using either raw-audio wave-
forms [Dinkel et al., 2017] or an intermediate high-dimensional time-frequency
representation — often the power spectrogram [Zhang et al., 2017]. In these
approaches, the notions of frontend and backend are less clearly distinguished.
A summary of deep learning-based methods for spoofing detection is provided
in Subsection 2.4.2 and Table 2.2.
Among four different approaches of spoofing ASV systems highlighted early
in this section, this thesis focusses on replay attacks. The motivations are
twofold. First, replay attack is the simplest form of attack to implement that
does not require any specific expertise either from speech technology or machine
learning. Second, it is equally difficult to detect reliably as this form of attack
involves propagating the recorded speech of a target user to fool an ASV system.
Two publicly available replay datasets, ASVspoof 2017 and ASVspoof 2019 PA
(described in Chapter 3), are used to study replay attacks in this thesis.
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1.2 Aim
The aim of this thesis is to analyse and design existing and novel methods for
replay spoofing detection for secure voice biometrics. To this end, this thesis
focusses on answering the following research questions:
• Can hand-crafted features used in speech processing be used for replay
spoofing detection?
• Are dataset artefacts biasing model predictions?
• Can data-driven ML models be effective in discriminative spoofing at-
tacks? Is the current state-of-the-art model for replay spoofing detection
reproducible?
• Can countermeasures designed using speech endpoint detection (discard-
ing everything before and after the actual speech utterance) ensure ro-
bustness and good detection performance?
• What makes replay spoofing detection hard? How do different factors such
as acoustic environment, recording device and playback device affect the
performance of replay countermeasures?
• Can we use methods from interpretable machine learning to understand
predictions of countermeasure models?
• How do data selection for model training and validation impact model gen-
eralisation? Would combining information from multiple models improve
performance?
• Can information exploited in specific subbands be exploited to discrimi-
nate between bonafide and spoof recordings?
• Can Variational Autoencoders (VAEs), a deep generative model, be used
as a backend classifier for spoofing detection? Can VAEs be used to derive
new feature representations for replay spoofing detection?
The research involved in addressing the above listed questions is presented
in two major chapters: Chapter 4 and Chapter 5.
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1.3 Thesis structure
• Chapter 2 provides the necessary background on spoofing attacks and
methods used for spoofing detection in the literature. It starts with a brief
overview of classical and deep learning-based ASV systems. A detailed
survey of spoofing attacks and different countermeasures based on signal
processing and machine learning methods are presented. The chapter also
summarises the related literature on subband modelling for spoofing detec-
tion. Finally, this chapter provides a detailed background on variational
autoencoders along with the motivation towards using them for spoofing
detection.
• Chapter 3 presents details of the corpus and the evaluation metrics used
in this thesis. Firstly, it provides a detailed summary of the ASVspoof
2017 and ASVspoof 2019 datasets used for the analysis and design of spoof-
ing countermeasures. A brief overview of other publicly available spoofing
datasets is also provided for general awareness. Finally, the chapter ex-
plains the two metrics that are adopted in this thesis to evaluate the
performance of a countermeasure.
• Chapter 4 serves as the basis towards understanding the replay spoofing
problem by investigating existing methods from the literature. Firstly,
signal processing methods used in TTS and VC spoofing detection are
studied. The chapter then summarises issues towards reproducing a state-
of-the-art CNN model, proposes an adapted version of this model, and
analyses it to discover cues on which it focusses for classification. The
chapter also analyses the effect of different factors involved in a replay
attack and their interactions. Then, an in-depth analysis on a bench-
mark dataset highlighting dataset artefacts and their influence on model
decisions is provided.
• Chapter 5 presents novel methods proposed for replay spoofing detec-
tion, with a focus on model robustness and avoiding biases in the datasets.
Ensemble models and dataset partitions are first proposed for improved
generalisation. Speech endpoint detection for reliable performance esti-
mates is proposed. Using this, a frame-level deep countermeasure model
is proposed showcasing its robustness against cues in the dataset. Further,
a joint subband framework that exploits information across different fre-
quency bands of a spectrogram is proposed. Finally, this chapter proposes
VAEs as an alternative backend classifier and as a feature extractor.
• Chapter 6 concludes this thesis. It provides a summary of research find-
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ings related to the analysis and design of replay attack countermeasures in
this thesis. A general discussion on future research directions towards im-
proved countermeasure design and challenges involved are also provided.
1.4 Contributions
The key contributions of the research carried out in this thesis are summarised
below:
Chapter 3
• A qualitative analysis of the ASVspoof v2.0 dataset.
Chapter 4
• A study on the effectiveness of existing signal processing methods for re-
play spoofing detection.
• Demonstration of the challenges in replicating a state-of-the-art deep model
for replay attack detection, a study on alternative deep models, and an
investigation regarding network hyper-parameters.
• An analysis of the developed model using a method from interpretable
machine learning to understand what it has learned to detect spoof record-
ings.
• An analysis of countermeasure model performance under varied attack
conditions, highlighting the difficulty in understanding the influence of
different conditions and their interaction in a replay attack.
• Discovery of dataset-related artefacts in a benchmark replay spoofing
dataset (ASVspoof 2017 v2.0) and a detailed analysis demonstrating aware-
ness on how they influence machine learning models.
Chapter 5
• An ensemble model combining deep and shallow models for effective spoof-
ing detection.
• Dataset partitions for model training and validation for better generalisa-
tion.
• Discovery of dataset-related cues in the latest benchmark spoofing dataset
(ASVspoof 2019 PA) that models exploit in decision making.
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• Countermeasure design using speech endpoint detection for robust perfor-
mance estimates, new benchmark results, and a new frame-level robust
deep countermeasure model.
• Manual and automatic speech endpoint annotations for the ASVspoof
2017 v2.0 dataset.
• A joint subband modelling framework using CNNs for effective spoofing
detection.
• Experimental evaluation on how different subbands contribute in spoofing
detection, and their cross-dataset performance evaluation on an unseen
testset.
• A deep generative model as an alternative backend to traditional shallow
generative models.
• New features for replay spoofing detection using deep generative models.
1.5 Associated publications
This thesis covers work on replay spoofing detection which was carried out by
the author between September 2016 and December 2020 at Queen Mary Uni-
versity of London. The work on variational autoencoders for spoofing detection
(detailed in Section 5.5) was performed during a six-month (May - October
2019) research visit to the Computational Speech group, University of Eastern
Finland, Finland. The majority of the work presented in this thesis has been
presented in international peer-reviewed conferences and journals:
Journal papers
[1] B. Chettri, T. Kinnunen and E. Benetos, “Deep Generative Variational
Autoencoding for Replay Spoof Detection in Automatic Speaker Verifica-
tion”, Computer Speech & Language, vol. 63, September 2020.
[2] B. Chettri, E. Benetos and B. L. Sturm, “Dataset Artefacts in Anti-
Spoofing Systems: a Case Study on the ASVspoof 2017 benchmark”,
submitted to IEEE/ACM Transactions on Audio Speech and Language
Processing.
20
Conference papers
[3] B. Chettri and B. L. Sturm, “A Deeper Look at Gaussian Mixture Model
Based Anti-Spoofing Systems”, in IEEE International Conference on Acous-
tics, Speech and Signal Processing (ICASSP), pp. 5159-5163, April 2018.
[4] B. Chettri, B. L. Sturm and E. Benetos, “Analysing Replay Spoofing
Countermeasure Performance Under Varied Conditions”, in IEEE 28th In-
ternational Workshop on Machine Learning for Signal Processing (MLSP),
September 2018.
[5] B. Chettri, S. Mishra, B. L. Sturm and E. Benetos, “Analysing the Predic-
tions of a CNN-Based Replay Spoofing Detection System”, in IEEE Spo-
ken Language Technology Workshop (SLT), pp. 92–97, December 2018.
[6] B. Chettri, D. Stoller, V. Morfi, M. A. M. Ramı́rez, E. Benetos and B. L.
Sturm, “Ensemble Models for Spoofing Detection in Automatic Speaker
Verification”, in Proc. Interspeech, pp. 1018–1022, September 2019.
[7] B. Chettri, T. Kinnunen and E. Benetos, “Subband Modeling for Spoofing
Detection in Automatic Speaker Verification”, to appear in Odyssey 2020:
The Speaker and Language Recognition Workshop, November 2020.
Other publications
[8] B. Chettri, S. Mishra, B. L. Sturm and E. Benetos, “A Study on Con-
volutional Neural Network Based End-To-End Replay Anti-Spoofing”,
arXiv:1805.09164 preprint, May 2018.
Here we provide a summary of contributions from authors listed in the above
publications. For [5], S. Mishra contributed in writing the technical description
of the SLIME algorithm and also contributed to the discussions on the inter-
vention experiments. For [6], each of the co-authors D. Stoller, V. Morfi, M. A.
M. Ramı́rez contributed in training one deep model (and writing the technical
description of their respective models) that were used in building the ensemble
model. Furthermore, V. Morfi contributed in preparing the proposed partition
for the PA dataset, and D. Stoller helped in reviewing the paper draft. For [8],
S. Mishra helped in reviewing the paper and contributed to the discussion on
replicating a state-of-the-art CNN model.
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In all of the above publications, the thesis author is the main contributor
responsible for the design and implementation of experiments, analysis of results
and writing the papers (as the lead author). Co-authors Dr. T. Kinnunen, Dr.
B. L. Sturm and Dr. E. Benetos have contributed in a supervisory role towards
discussion of research ideas, analysing the results of research experiments, and
helping with reviewing the drafts of the papers. Furthermore, Dr. T. Kinnunen
also contributed in writing the theory section of the journal article in [1].
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Chapter 2
Background
This chapter describes state-of-the-art methods on spoofing countermeasures for
voice biometric systems. Voice biometric systems use automatic speaker veri-
fication (ASV) technologies. Therefore, this chapter first provides background
information on classical and state-of-the-art ASV systems (Section 2.1). Then
Section 2.2 provides a description of various spoofing attacks that are used to by-
pass an ASV system. A summary of the community driven Automatic Speaker
Verification Spoofing and Countermeasures Challenge (ASVspoof) is provided in
Section 2.3, which focusses on promoting anti-spoofing research while releasing
standard evaluation protocols and publicly available databases. Following this,
the next Section 2.4 provides a detailed literature on countermeasures for re-
play spoofing attacks that were studied before the ASVspoof series began along
with published works on the ASVspoof datasets for replay attack. For better
readability, this literature is organized into two categories: traditional methods
(Subsection 2.4.1) and deep learning methods (Subsection 2.4.2). Then the next
Section 2.5 provides a background on various hand-crafted features that have
been used in this thesis. After this, a detailed background on backend classifiers
that have been investigated towards the analysis and design of replay spoofing
countermeasures is provided in Sections 2.6 and 2.7. Section 2.6 provides a
background on discriminative models such as support vector machines and con-
volutional neural networks. Section 2.7 on the other hand provides background
on generative models such as Gaussian mixture models, i-vectors and Varia-
tional Autoencoders. The next Section 2.8 summarises the related works on
subband modelling applied to audio and speech applications including spoofing
detection. Then Section 2.9 describes work on trustworthy machine learning
and its significance on countermeasures for spoofing detection. First, informa-
tion on how artefacts and confounders in a dataset can affect model predictions
is provided in Subsection 2.9.1. Then Subsection 2.9.2 explains a method from
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(a) Speaker enrollment phase. The goal here is to build speaker specific models by adapting
a background model which is trained on a large speech database.
(b) Speaker verification phase. For a given speech utterance the system obtains a verifi-
cation score and makes a decision whether to accept or reject the claimed identity.
Figure 2.1: Components of a typical speaker verification system. Figure adapted
from [Kinnunen and Li, 2010b].
interpretable machine learning called SLIME that is used in this thesis to under-
stand the predictions of a CNN-based countermeasure in Section 4.5. Finally,
Section 2.10 concludes this chapter.
2.1 Automatic speaker verification (ASV)
Automatic speaker verification (ASV) [Reynolds, 1995] systems aim at verify-
ing the identity of a claimed person using their voice characteristics. They are
commonly used in user authentication and surveillance applications. Fig. 2.1
illustrates components of a typical speaker verification system which comprises
speaker enrollment (top) and speaker verification (bottom). The role of a feature
extraction module is to transform the raw speech signal into some representation
(features) that retains speaker specific attributes useful to the downstream com-
ponents in building speaker models. The enrollment phase comprises offline and
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online modes of building models. During the offline mode, background models
are trained on features computed from a large speech collection representing a
diverse population of speakers. The online phase comprises building a target
speaker model using features computed from target speaker’s speech. Usually,
training the target speaker model from scratch is avoided because learning re-
liable model parameters requires a sufficiently large amount of speech data,
which is usually not available for every individual speaker. To overcome this,
the parameters of a pretrained background model representing the speaker pop-
ulation are adapted using the speaker data yielding a reliable speaker model
estimate. During the speaker verification phase, for a given test speech utter-
ance, a claimed speaker’s model and the background model (representing the
world of all other possible speakers) is used to derive a confidence score. The
decision logic module then makes a binary decision: it either accepts the claimed
identity as a genuine speaker or rejects it as an impostor based on some decision
threshold.
ASV systems are broadly grouped into two categories: text dependent and
text independent systems. In text dependent systems [Larcher et al., 2014],
the same speech utterance used during speaker enrollment (or registration) is
used during verification (or testing). This is in contrast with text independent
systems [Kinnunen and Li, 2010b], where as the name suggests, speakers are free
to speak any arbitrary phrase during training and testing. Text independent
systems are in general difficult in contrast to text dependent systems due to
the variability in spoken utterances during the testing phase. We now provide
a high-level discussion on the traditional and current deep learning approaches
to speaker verification.
Traditional methods. By traditional methods we refer to approaches
driven by a Gaussian mixture model - universal background model (GMM-
UBM) [Kinnunen and Li, 2010b] that were adopted in the ASV literature until
deep learning techniques became popular in the field. Mel-frequency cepstral
coefficients (MFCCs) [Davis and Mermelstein, 1980] were popular frame-level
feature representations used in speaker verification. Using short-term MFCC
feature vectors, utterance level features such as i-vectors are often derived which
have shown state-of-the-art performance in speaker verification [Kanagasun-
daram, 2014]. Subsection 2.5 describes further details on the steps involved
in computing MFCCs. The background models such as the Universal back-
ground model (UBM) and total variability (T) matrix are learned in an offline
phase using a large collection of speech data. The UBM and T matrix are
used in computing i-vector representations. Subsection 2.7.2 provides further
details on i-vectors. The training process involves learning model (target or
background) parameters from training data. As for modelling techniques, vec-
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tor quantization (VQ) [Burton, 1987] was one of the earliest approaches used to
represent a speaker, after which Gaussian mixture models (GMMs), an exten-
sion to VQ methods, and Support vector machines (Subsection 2.6.1) became
popular methods for speaker modelling. Please see [Kinnunen and Li, 2010b]
for a detailed overview on traditional methods. The traditional approach also
includes training an i-vector extractor (GMM-UBM, T-matrix) on MFCCs and
using a probabilistic linear discriminant analysis (PLDA) [Ioffe, 2006] backend
for scoring.
Deep learning methods. We now provide a brief summary on deep learn-
ing approaches adopted in ASV. Features are often learned in a data-driven
manner directly from the raw speech signal [Jung et al., 2018] or from some
intermediate speech representations such as filter bank energies [Heigold et al.,
2016]. Handcrafted features, for example MFCCs, are often used as input to
train deep neural network (DNN) based ASV systems [Kenny et al., 2014].
Features learned from DNNs are often used to build traditional ASV systems
[Yaman et al., 2012, Snyder et al., 2017]. Snyder et al. [2017] uses the output
from the penultimate layer of a pre-trained DNN as features to train a tradi-
tional i-vector PLDA setup (replacing i-vectors with DNN features). Yaman
et al. [2012] extracts bottleneck features (output from a hidden layer with a
relatively small number of units) from a DNN to train a GMM-UBM system
which uses the log-likelihood ratio as scoring.
Utterance-level discriminative features, so called embeddings extracted from
pre-trained DNNs have become popular recently, demonstrating good results.
Examples of such embeddings include the d-vector [Variani et al., 2014] and
x-vector [Snyder et al., 2018], and have been used in many works, for exam-
ple [Snyder et al., 2017, Garcia-Romero et al., 2019]. End-to-end modelling
approaches have also been extensively studied in speaker verification showing
promising results [Jung et al., 2018, Muckenhirn et al., 2018, Ravanelli and Ben-
gio, 2018]. In this setting, both feature learning and model training are jointly
optimised from the raw speech input. A wide range of neural architectures
have been studied for speaker verification. This includes feed forward neural
networks, commonly referred as deep neural networks (DNNs) [Variani et al.,
2014, Sztahó et al., 2019], convolutional neural networks (CNNs) [Muckenhirn
et al., 2018], recurrent neural networks [Tang et al., 2019], and attention models
[Rezaur rahman Chowdhury et al., 2018].
Training background models in deep learning approaches can be thought of
as a pretrainng phase where network parameters are trained on a large dataset.
Speaker models are then derived by adapting the pretrained model parameters
using speaker specific data, much like the same way a traditional GMM-UBM
system operates. For example, [Muckenhirn et al., 2018] first trains a DNN to
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Figure 2.2: Possible locations [ISO/IEC, 2016] to attack an ASV system. 1: mi-
crophone point, 2: transmission point, 3: override feature extractor, 4: modify
features, 5: override classifier, 6: modify speaker database, 7: modify biometric
reference, 8: modify score and 9: override decision.
perform speaker identification discriminatively. In the second step, they use the
pretrained model to derive a speaker specific model. They repeat this process
for every speaker using speaker specific data.
As the main focus of this thesis is not on ASV, we have provided only a high-
level introductory overview on ASV to familiarise readers with the basics of voice
biometrics, with pointers to relevant papers for additional details. Please refer
to [Kinnunen and Li, 2010b] and [Sztahó et al., 2019] for further background on
traditional and deep learning approaches for ASV. Furthermore, the reader is
referred to [Kanagasundaram, 2014] for a detailed background on i-vector based
ASV systems.
2.2 Spoofing attacks in ASV
A spoofing attack (or presentation attack) involves illegitimate access to the
personal data of a targeted user. These attacks are performed on a biometric
system to provoke an increase in its false acceptance rate. The security threats
imposed by such attacks are now well acknowledged within the speech commu-
nity [Sahidullah et al., 2019]. As identified in the ISO/IEC 30107-1 standard
[ISO/IEC, 2016], a biometric system could be potentially attacked from nine
different points. Fig. 2.2 summarises this. The first two attack points are
of specific interest as they are particularly vulnerable in terms of enabling an
adversary to inject spoofed biometric data. These two points are commonly
referred as physical access (PA) and logical access (LA) attacks. As illustrated
in the figure, PA attacks involve presentation attack at the sensor (microphone
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in case of ASV) level and LA attacks involve modifying biometric samples to
bypass the sensor. As highlighted in Section 1.1, TTS [Masuko et al., 1999] and
VC [Pellom and Hansen, 1999] techniques are used to produce artificial speech
to bypass an ASV system. These two methods are examples of LA attacks. On
the other hand, mimicry [Lau et al., 2004] and playing back speech recordings
(replay) [Wu et al., 2014b]) are examples of PA attacks.
2.2.1 Mimicry
This form of attack involves an attacker attempting to modify their voice char-
acteristics to sound like a target speaker. In other words, an attacker aims to
transform their lexical and prosodic properties to be able to sound as close as
possible to the target speaker [Lau et al., 2004, Sahidullah et al., 2019]. There-
fore, this form of attack can be highly effective when the attacker’s voice is
similar to the target speaker, as less effort would be required to adjust the voice
of an attacker in contrast to situations where the voice of the attacker is less
similar to the target speaker [Lau et al., 2005]. In other words, the success of
mimicry attacks often depends on the degree or quality of the impersonated
voice, suggesting that professional impersonators may be better at mimicking
a target speaker’s voice than inexperienced impersonators [Mariéthoz and Ben-
gio, 2005]. Furthermore, successful attackers were found to be able to transform
their F0 (fundamental frequency) and sometimes the formants close to the target
speaker [Perrot et al., 2005, Zetterholm, 2007].
While there have been some studies assessing the threat of mimicry to ASV
systems [Hautamäki et al., 2015], the main challenge however is the unavailabil-
ity of large corpora of impersonated speech. Due to this, research on mimicry
attacks is still behind in contrast to TTS, VC and replay attacks for which large
public corpora and standard evaluation protocols (See Chapter 3) are avail-
able, which has promoted growth in anti-spoofing research for these attacks
[Wu et al., 2015c, Kinnunen et al., 2017a, Todisco et al., 2019.]. Therefore, the
true potential threat of mimicry on ASV is still not very clear [Sahidullah et al.,
2019].
2.2.2 Speech synthesis
Speech synthesis or text-to-speech (TTS), is a method to generate speech from
a given text input that sounds as natural and intelligible as possible. It has a
wide range of applications including spoken dialogue systems, speech-to-speech
translation, assisting people with vocal disorders, and automatic e-book reading,
to name a few [Taylor, 2009]. Text analysis and speech waveform generation
are the two main components of a typical TTS system. The text analysis com-
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ponent analyses the input text and produces sequence of phonemes defining the
linguistic specification of the text. Using these phonemes, the speech waveform
generation module produces the speech waveform [Hunt and Black, 1996, Zen
et al., 2009]. However, in end-to-end deep learning frameworks, speech wave-
forms are directly generated from the input text [Gibiansky et al., 2017]. An
early work investigating the impact of synthetic speech on the performance of an
ASV system is [Masuko et al., 1999]. The authors used a hidden Markov model
(HMM) based synthetic speech to fool an HMM-based ASV system, demon-
strating an increased false acceptance rate. Please refer to [Wu et al., 2015b]
and [Sahidullah et al., 2019] for additional background on TTS spoofing and
countermeasures.
2.2.3 Voice conversion
Voice conversion aims at converting the voice of a speaker to that of another.
In the context of ASV spoofing, the source voice corresponds to an attacker
which is converted to that of a target speaker to fool an ASV system. Typ-
ical VC systems operate directly on speech signals of the source and target
speaker using a parallel corpus of the two speakers (speaking the same utter-
ances) on which a transformation function is learned to convert the attacker
acoustic parameters to that of a target speaker [Mohammadi and Kain, 2017].
Applications of VC technologies include producing natural sounding voices for
people with speech disabilities and voice dubbing in entertainment industries to
name a few. Some of the early works demonstrating the impact of voice con-
verted speech to fool an ASV system include that of [Pellom and Hansen, 1999,
Matrouf et al., 2006]. Furthermore, Kinnunen et al. [2012] demonstrated the
impact of converted speech across a wide range of ASV systems. They used a
joint density Gaussian mixture model (JDGMM) based VC system to fool ASV
systems showing increased error rates. Please refer to [Desai et al., 2009, Fang
et al., 2018a, Wu et al., 2015b, Sahidullah et al., 2019] for additional background
on VC.
2.2.4 Replay attacks
A replay spoofing attack involves playing back recorded speech samples of a
target speaker (enrolled speaker) to bypass an ASV system. This type of at-
tack requires physical transmission of spoofed speech through the system mi-
crophone. This is shown as point 1 in Fig. 2.2. Replay is the simplest form of
a spoofing attack that can be implemented using smartphones, and does not
require specific expertise either in speech processing or machine learning tech-
niques. Fig. 2.3 illustrates the difference between a bonafide/genuine speech
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Figure 2.3: Difference between a genuine (bonafide) and a replayed speech.
and a replayed speech signal. Here, bonafide/genuine speech corresponds to
speech spoken by a target speaker during enrollment (or the verification phase)
and is acquired by an ASV system’s microphone. On the other hand, a replayed
speech denotes the speech signal that is obtained by playing back a pre-recorded
bonafide speech which is then acquired by the system’s microphone. The acous-
tic environment for the acquisition of bonafide speech, and the replayed speech
can be the same — situations where an attacker manages to launch the attack
from the same physical space. But, in practice the acoustic space is usually
different (eg. a different closed room/office with no background noise) as an
attacker would not want to risk getting caught while launching such attacks.
Therefore, factors of interest in detecting replay attacks are changes/noise in-
duced in bonafide speech from the loudspeaker of playback device, recording
device and the acoustic environment where the replay attack is simulated.
Section 2.4 will provide an in-depth description of countermeasures for re-
play attacks proposed in the literature before and after the release of standard
spoofing datasets (Section 3) released as part of the ASVspoof open spoofing
evaluations. Before that, the next Section 2.3 will provide a summary of the
ASVspoof challenge series that focusses on promoting anti-spoofing research for
secure voice biometrics.
2.3 ASVspoof challenge
ASVspoof1, the automatic speaker verification spoofing and countermeasures
challenge, is an ASV community driven effort promoting research in developing
anti-spoofing algorithms for secure voice biometrics. As summarised in [Wu
et al., 2015b], a number of research studies had confirmed the vulnerability
of voice biometrics to spoofing attacks, before the ASVspoof series began in
2015. However, these studies were mostly performed on small in-house datasets
comprising limited speakers and spoofing attack conditions. Therefore, research
results were hard to reproduce and understanding the true generalisability of the
1https://www.asvspoof.org/
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reported anti-spoofing solutions in unseen attack conditions was difficult. The
main motivation of the ASVspoof series was to overcome these issues by orga-
nizing open spoofing challenge evaluations, promoting awareness of the problem,
making publicly available spoofing corpora comprising sufficiently varying at-
tack conditions with standard evaluation protocols, and further ensuring trans-
parent research leading to reproducible results.
The first ASVspoof challenge held in 2015 focused on the detection of arti-
ficial speech generated using either speech synthesis (TTS) or voice conversion
(VC) algorithms in a text-independent setting. Clean speech recorded using
high quality microphones was used as bonafide speech and seven VC and three
TTS algorithms were used to produce spoofed speech [Wu et al., 2015c]. The sec-
ond edition of the ASVspoof challenge held in 2017 focussed on text-dependent
replay spoofing attack detection [Kinnunen et al., 2017a]. Section 3.2 describes
details of the dataset used in the ASVspoof 2017 evaluation. The recent edi-
tion held in 2019, ASVspoof 2019, combined both TTS, VC and replay attacks
together, using advanced state-of-the art spoofing algorithms and methods to
generate spoofed speech samples [Todisco et al., 2019., Wang et al., 2019b].
Section 3.3 provides further details on the datasets used in the 2019 challenge.
One key observation that is worth noting from the three ASVspoof challenges
is the paradigm shift in the use of modelling approaches for spoofing detection.
Gaussian mixture models (GMMs), which is a generative model, were popular
during the first ASVspoof challenge in 2015 as evident from the winning system
of this challenge which is a GMM-based system [Patel and Patil, 2015]. However,
the 2017 and 2019 spoofing challenges were mostly dominated by data-driven
discriminatively trained deep models [Lavrentyeva et al., 2017, 2019]. Section
2.4 provides further details. The main task, however, in all the three editions of
the ASVspoof challenge was to build a standalone countermeasure model (anti-
spoofing algorithm) that determines if a given speech recording is bonafide or
a fake recording (spoofed). As for the performance evaluation, the equal error
rate (EER) was used as a primary metric in the 2015 and 2017 edition. As for
the 2019 edition, a recently introduced tandem detection cost function (t-DCF)
metric [Kinnunen et al., 2018] was used as a primary metric and EER as the
secondary metric. Section 3.5 provides details on these metrics.
As this thesis focusses on replay attacks, we refer readers to [Wu et al., 2015c,
2017] for additional details on the ASVspoof 2015 challenge and results. Subsec-
tion 4.3.1 provides a summary of the top performing systems of the ASVspoof
2017 challenge and we refer the reader to [Kinnunen et al., 2017a] for more
details. For the 2019 evaluations and the results please refer to [ASVspoof
2019 evaluation plan, Todisco et al., 2019.].
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2.4 Countermeasures for replay spoofing attacks
As defined in Section 1.1, a spoofing countermeasure comprises a frontend fea-
ture extractor and a backend classifier. This section now provides a detailed
background on different features and modelling approaches that have been stud-
ied in the literature for replay spoofing detection. In order to increase the read-
ability, we organize this literature in two Subsections 2.4.1 and 2.4.2. Subsection
2.4.1 groups related works that use traditional hand-designed features and ma-
chine learning techniques. Subsection 2.4.2 contains a summary of published
literature that uses deep learning either for feature extraction (and uses shallow
backend classifiers such as GMMs, SVMs), for classification as a backend model
(using hand-crafted features or time-frequency representations of audio as its
input) and end-to-end learning where features and classifiers are learned jointly
from the training data.
2.4.1 Traditional methods
One of the earliest works studying the impact of playing back recorded speech
to fool an ASV system was by [Lindberg and Blomberg, 1999]. This study was
performed in a text-dependent setting using a Swedish database for telephone
speaker verification. They concatenated pre-recorded digits and simulated re-
play attacks demonstrating increased false acceptance rates of the system for
both male and female speakers. Replay attacks in a remote telephonic appli-
cation setting were studied in [Shang and Stevenson, 2010]. If a test utterance
was found to be very similar to the ones present in the database, then it was
considered a replay attack as no speaker can reproduce the exact same utterance.
The study by [Lipeng et al., 2008] used differences in channel characteris-
tics as a cue for replay detection. They first trained a bonafide channel model
using bonafide audio recordings of mute voices. During testing, a test speech
recording is considered replayed if its channel characteristics are found to be
different than the channel model. Wang et al. [2011] also used a similar idea for
detecting replay attack. The recording devices and playback devices induce dif-
ferent channel noise in a replayed speech which would be different for bonafide
speech recordings. Using this idea, they used support vector machines to model
the channel noise difference between bonafide and replayed speech recordings
and demonstrated a reduction in the error rate of the GMM-UBM ASV system
under replay attack. The vulnerabilities of replay attacks in a far-field recorded
speech setting were studied in [Villalba and Lleida, 2010]. The authors demon-
strated an increased error rate of a joint factor analysis (JFA) based ASV system
when these recorded speech samples were replayed.
One of the first studies on spoofing detection (including replay attack) us-
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ing a publicly available spoofing corpus was by [Ergünay et al., 2015]. The
dataset, called AVspoof (audio-visual spoofing database) which is different from
ASVspoof (Section 3 describes these datasets), consisted of spoofed speech de-
rived using replay, TTS and VC attacks. Using two state-of-the-art ASV sys-
tems, the authors demonstrated the vulnerability of ASV systems with increased
error rates in the face of spoofing attacks.
Since the release of the benchmark anti-spoofing datasets ASVspoof 2015
[Wu et al., 2015c], ASVspoof 2017 [Kinnunen et al., 2017a] and ASVspoof 2019
[Todisco et al., 2019.] as part of the ongoing ASVspoof challenge series (Sec-
tion 2.3), there has been considerable research on presentation attack detection
[Sahidullah et al., 2019], in particular for TTS, VC, and replay attacks. Many
anti-spoofing features coupled with a shallow model (such as GMMs or SVMs)
have been studied and proposed in the literature. We briefly discuss them here.
Constant Q cepstral coefficients (CQCCs) [Todisco et al., 2017], among other
features, have shown state-of-the-art performance on TTS and VC spoofed
speech detection tasks on the ASVspoof 2015 dataset [Wu et al., 2015c]. They
have been adapted as baseline features in the recent ASVspoof 2017 and ASVspoof
2019 challenges. Further tweaks on CQCCs have been studied in [Yang et al.,
2018a] showing some improvement over the standard CQCCs. Following the
widespread adoption of CQCCs in spoofing detection, [Tak et al., 2020] have
attempted to understand the effectiveness of CQCCs through a subband anal-
ysis with a GMM classifier. The work of [Wang et al., 2017] combines different
hand-crafted features with the means and variances of CQCCs to derive a high-
dimensional utterance level feature representation. The authors use an SVM
classifier for class discrimination.
Jelil et al. [2017] proposed anti-spoofing features based on source and in-
stantaneous frequency and used a GMM for class discrimination. Teager energy
operator (TEO) based spoof detection features have been studied in [Patil et al.,
2017]. Speech demodulation features using the TEO and the Hilbert transform
with a GMM classifier have been studied in [Kamble et al., 2018]. Motivated
from TEO, Kamble and Patil [2018] proposed a variable length energy separa-
tion algorithm using instantaneous amplitude as features coupled with a GMM
for replay detection. Furthermore, [Kamble and Patil, 2019] have analysed the
impact of reverberation noise on replay spoofing detection using Teager energy
features with a GMM backend. Features derived from a source-filter vocal tract
model and mel-scale relative phase features with a GMM backend have been
studied by Li et al. [2018]. Suthokumar et al. [2018] proposed two utterance
level features computed from the modulation spectrum (modulation centroid
frequency and modulation spectrum energy) and short term frame based fea-
tures with a GMM backend classifier for replay spoofing detection. Spectral
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centroid based frequency modulation features have been proposed using a GMM
in [Gunendradasan et al., 2018].
M S and Murthy [2018] proposed the use of decision level feature switching
between mel and linear filterbank slope based features, demonstrating promising
performance on the ASVspoof 2017 v2.0 dataset. Features based on compressed
integrated linear prediction residuals coupled with a GMM were proposed by
[Jelil et al., 2018]. Investigation of several different hand-crafted features that
showed good results on synthetic and voice converted speech detection was per-
formed by Font et al. [2017]. Although they use the similar set of features that
we used in our work in Section 4.2, our objective and feature configuration is dif-
ferent. We used the default feature configuration that was used by [Sahidullah
et al., 2015]. Furthermore, both of these works were part of the ASVspoof 2017
challenge submission. Ensemble models combining scores of several different
classifiers (GMMs, SVMs) trained on hand-crafted features (CQCCs, MFCCs
and PLPs) have been studied in [Ji et al., 2017].
Motivated from models of the human cochlea, features have been proposed
for replay spoofing detection in [Patil et al., 2019, Gunendradasan et al., 2019].
Patil et al. [2019] proposed cochlear cepstral features derived from energy Separation-
Based Instantaneous Frequency Estimation with a GMM classifier. Gunen-
dradasan et al. [2019] proposed an Adaptive-Q Cochlear Model from which am-
plitude modulation features were extracted and GMMs were trained for spoofing
detection. Another line of work investigating instantaneous frequency for replay
detection is that of [Alluri and Vuppala, 2019]. They proposed three instanta-
neous cepstral features (single frequency cepstral coefficients, zero time win-
dowing cepstral coefficients, and instantaneous frequency cepstral coefficients)
with a GMM for spoofing detection. They have only reported the performance
of their proposed features on the development set of the ASVspoof 2019 PA
dataset, so it is not clear if their proposed features show good generalisation on
unseen test conditions.
Replay spoofing detection based on the blind estimation of the magnitude of
channel responses has been studied by [Avila et al., 2019]. Wickramasinghe et al.
[2019b] proposed features based on spatial differentiation on the filter outputs
of a parallel filter bank for spoofing detection using a GMM classifier. They
further proposed to use adaptive bandpass filters and derived three different
sets of features with a GMM classifier as a replay spoofing countermeasure
[Wickramasinghe et al., 2019a].
The impact of spoofing countermeasures across different phonemes has been
studied by [Suthokumar et al., 2019] on the ASVspoof 2017 v2.0 dataset. They
developed phone-specific GMMs using rectangular frequency cepstral coeffi-
cients (explained in Section 2.5) and demonstrated that more discriminative
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information is offered by phoneme groups such as fricatives, nasals, stops and
pause phonemes. Liu et al. [2019a] have used attention-based adaptive filters to
automatically select only those frequency bands/regions that are most discrim-
inative for spoofing detection. Both phase and magnitude information is used
along with a GMM classifier for spoofing detection.
Table 2.1 provides a high-level summary of countermeasures for replay at-
tacks using traditional methods.
2.4.2 Deep learning methods
Within the context of spoofing detection, deep learning models have been pro-
posed either for feature learning [Qian et al., 2016, Lavrentyeva et al., 2017,
Nagarsheth et al., 2017, Sriskandaraja et al., 2018, Sailor et al., 2018, Gomez-
Alanis et al., 2019b, Chang et al., 2019, You et al., 2019, Gomez-Alanis et al.,
2019a], as a backend classifier [Yang et al., 2018b, Li et al., 2017, 2019b, Lai
et al., 2019b, Bia lobrzeski et al., 2019, Zeinali et al., 2019, Williams and Rown-
icka, 2019, Alzantot et al., 2019, Cai et al., 2019, Das et al., 2019, Yang et al.,
2019b, Lavrentyeva et al., 2019, Jung et al., 2019, You et al., 2019, Bakar and
Hanilçi, 2018, Lai et al., 2019a, Jung et al., 2020, Shim et al., 2019, Yang et al.,
2019a], or in an end-to-end setting to model raw audio waveforms directly
[Dinkel et al., 2017, Muckenhirn et al., 2017b].
Multi-task learning (MTL) [Caruana, 1997] and transfer learning frameworks
along with attention models [Goodfellow et al., 2016] have also been explored
for spoofing detection tasks. MTL is a branch of machine learning that aims
at learning more than one tasks in parallel for improved model generalisation,
and it has been investigated in [Li et al., 2019b, Bia lobrzeski et al., 2019, Platen
et al., 2020, Jung et al., 2020, Yang et al., 2019a, Chang et al., 2019] for replay
spoofing detection. Transfer learning is a machine learning method that uses the
parameters (weights) of a well-trained model for a particular task to initialise
a model for a target task. In such a setting either all the model parameters
are updated, or only the last few layers are updated while freezing the initial
layers of the model (the process is often called finetuning the model) [Goodfellow
et al., 2016]. Transfer learning and data augmentation approaches for spoofing
detection have been investigated in [Chang et al., 2019, Shim et al., 2019, Cai
et al., 2019] and [Bia lobrzeski et al., 2019, Yang et al., 2019b] respectively.
Attention models on the other hand refer to machine learning techniques that
are designed to focus more on those parts of the input that are more relevant
and useful for solving a problem [Goodfellow et al., 2016]. Some of the works
in spoofing detection using attention models include [Tom et al., 2018] and [Lai
et al., 2019a].
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Furthermore, some of the well known deep architectures from computer vi-
sion such as ResNet [He et al., 2015a] and light CNN (LCNN) [Wu et al., 2015a]
have been widely adopted in spoofing detection demonstrating promising per-
formance on the ASVspoof challenge datasets. For example, the ResNet model
has been used in [Chen et al., 2017, Cai et al., 2017, Tom et al., 2018, Lai et al.,
2019b, Alzantot et al., 2019, Cai et al., 2019, Yang et al., 2019b, Jung et al.,
2019, Lai et al., 2019a, Platen et al., 2020, Shim et al., 2019] and, the light
CNN model was explored in [Lavrentyeva et al., 2017, Bia lobrzeski et al., 2019,
Zeinali et al., 2019, Gomez-Alanis et al., 2019b, Lavrentyeva et al., 2019].
The recently proposed SincNet [Ravanelli and Bengio, 2018] architecture
for speaker recognition was used for spoofing detection in [Zeinali et al., 2019].
Similarly, x-vectors [Snyder et al., 2018] which were originally proposed for
speaker recognition, have been studied for spoofing detection in [Williams and
Rownicka, 2019]. Furthermore, attention-based models have been studied by Lai
et al. [2019a] and Tom et al. [2018] on the ASVspoof 2017 and ASVspoof 2019
datasets respectively.
Lavrentyeva et al. [2017] used the LCNN model on time-frequency repre-
sentation (spectrogram) inputs to learn discriminative features on which GMM
models were trained for spoofing detection. This model demonstrated the best
performance as a stand-alone system in the ASVspoof 2017 challenge. Sec-
tion 4.3 provides further details on this model and the challenges associated
in reproducing the model. Nagarsheth et al. [2017] trained a deep CNN using
tandem features (concatenation of CQCCs and high frequency cepstral coeffi-
cients) to learn different spoofing attack configurations in the training set. Using
the trained network, they extract embeddings and an SVM classifier is trained
for spoofing detection. Sriskandaraja et al. [2018] trained deep Siamese neural
networks (CNNs) that take as input a pair of speech utterances and produces
a similarity score, indicating whether the two inputs originate from the same
class. They use the network to extract features on which GMMs are trained
for spoofing detection. Sailor et al. [2018] proposed the use of convolutional
restricted Boltzmann machines (RBMs) to learn temporal modulation features
for spoofing detection. Gomez-Alanis et al. [2019b] used light convolutional
gated recurrent neural networks as deep feature extractors to robustly repre-
sent speech signals as utterance-level embeddings and shallow models such as
SVMs, linear discriminant analysis (LDA) and probabilistic linear discriminant
analysis (PLDA) were used for spoofing detection.
Chang et al. [2019] explored representation learning and transfer learning
methods to train a DNN for embedding learning and SVMs are trained on
these embeddings for spoofing detection. You et al. [2019] proposed a replay
device feature (RDF) extractor on the basis of the genuine-replay-pair training
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database in the Constant-Q-Transform (CQT) domain. The RDF feature ex-
tractor is proposed based on the CQT transform and Bi-LSTM neural networks
to model device specific properties for efficient replay attack detection. The
DNN classifier is then trained on RDF features for spoofing detection. This
work was performed on the ASVspoof 2017 v2.0 dataset which has balanced
training examples between the bonafide and spoof classes. Gomez-Alanis et al.
[2019a] used gated recurrent convolutional neural networks as a feature extrac-
tor to derive utterance-level embeddings which are then used to train a spoofing
detector using shallow models (GMMs and SVMs).
Using the Constant-Q-Transform, Yang et al. [2018b] proposed different
types of features such as short-term spectral statistics information, octave-band
principal information and fullband principal information. They trained a DNN
on the individual features and fused feature (combining all three) for replay
spoofing detection, and showed improved performance with the fused features.
The influence of various factors such as speaker identity, speech content and
playback & recording device towards model overfitting have been studied in [Li
et al., 2017]. The authors proposed an F-ratio probing tool for this, and GMMs,
SVMs and DNN classifiers were investigated. Their analysis showed that device
is the most influential factor contributing towards the risk of overfitting. [Li
et al., 2019b] proposed a framework using time delay neural networks that inte-
grates multiple types of features (MFCCs, CQCCs, filter banks, spectrograms)
and trains the network in a multi-task setting for spoofing detection.
Using CQCCs and log power spectrogram features [Lai et al., 2019b] trained
Squeeze-Excitation Network [Hu et al., 2018], ResNet and their variants in a
multi-class setting for spoofing detection. Bayesian neural networks (BNNs) for
spoofing detection have been studied by [Bia lobrzeski et al., 2019]. Along with
BNNs they also investigated the LCNN model on spectrogram inputs. Using
data augmentation they trained these models in a multi-tasking setting for im-
proved generalisation and model robustness. Zeinali et al. [2019] investigated
the use of VGG and LCNN model architectures for spoofing detection on the
ASVspoof 2019 PA dataset using MFCCs, CQCCs and the spectrogram as input
features. Williams and Rownicka [2019] used SCMC features concatenated with
x-vector attack embedding to train a CNN for spoofing detection (ASVspoof
2019 PA dataset). Alzantot et al. [2019] investigated three different variants of
a residual convolutional neural network using different feature representations
such as MFCCs, spectrogram and CQCCs for replay spoofing detection. ResNet
models utilizing various input features such as IMFCCs, CQCCs, power spectro-
grams along with data augmentation have been studied for spoofing detection
in [Cai et al., 2019].
Different variants of CQCC features were investigated by [Das et al., 2019]
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using GMM and DNN backends for spoofing detection. Yang et al. [2019b]
used Log-constant Q transform (CQT) and a latent vector from a pretrained
variational autoencoder as input features to train a spoofing detector that used
ResNet and LCNN architectures. Lavrentyeva et al. [2019] proposed changes in
their original LCNN architecture that was used in the 2017 evaluations [Lavren-
tyeva et al., 2017]. In this work they used the LCNN model in an end to end
setting where they used output activations as a score, unlike prior work in
[Lavrentyeva et al., 2017] where they trained GMMs on top of learned features
from the LCNN model. Furthermore, they proposed the angular margin based
softmax activation for training a robust deep LCNN classifier in [Lavrentyeva
et al., 2019]. On both the tasks of the ASVspoof 2019 challenge their proposed
model secured the second rank.
Jung et al. [2019] investigated ResNet and CNN-gated recurrent neural net-
works for spoofing detection using high resolution magnitude spectrogram (2048
FFT bins) inputs. The influence of complementary information such as phase
information and power spectral density on the detection performance was also
studied. Bakar and Hanilçi [2018] used long term average spectrum features to
train a DNN for replay spoofing detection and suggested that high-frequency
components convey more discriminative information. Lai et al. [2019a] used an
attention mechanism-based filter that enhances discriminative features prior to
a ResNet-based classifier for spoofing detection.
Self-supervised learning approaches leveraging freely-available out-of-domain
data (audio recordings from YouTube) for pretraining a DNN to learn acoustic
configurations have been investigated in a recent paper by [Shim et al., 2019].
Their proposed framework operates on two stages. First, a DNN is trained
to learn acoustic configurations by optimizing the model to detect the similar-
ity between a given pair of segments (which is extracted initially by splicing
the original utterances into different segments). Second, they apply transfer
learning using the pre-trained DNN weights on the spoofing detection tasks
demonstrating improved performance.
Motivated from the successful application of CQT, [Yang et al., 2019a]
proposed a multi-level transform framework using DNNs to capture relevant
information for spoofing detection by exploiting the octave power spectra of
long-term CQT. Tom et al. [2018] used a pre-trained ResNet model (originally
trained on images) using an attention mechanism to learn a feature mask from
the input which is a group-delay feature matrix. Then, they apply the learned
feature mask on the original group delay feature matrix and the pre-trained
ResNet model is finetuned for the spoofing detection task. Interestingly, their
model demonstrates 0% EER on both the development and evaluation sets of
the ASVspoof 2017 v1.0 dataset. Wickramasinghe et al. [2018] proposed to use
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Figure 2.4: MFCC/IMFCC feature extraction pipeline. The flip block applies
to IMFCC only.
long-term temporal envelopes of subband signals using a frequency domain lin-
ear prediction (FDLP) framework for spoofing detection. Domain adversarial
training for spoofing detection has been studied in [Wang et al., 2019a] using
an adapted version of the LCNN model architecture.
Using a multi-task DNN framework, Jung et al. [2020] attempts to un-
derstand the impact of various factors such as ‘Room Size’, ‘Reverberation’,
‘Speaker-to-ASV distance, ‘Attacker-to-Speaker distance’, and ‘Replay Device
Quality’ on replay spoofing detection (on the ASVspoof 2019 PA dataset). Fur-
thermore, another line of work utilizing a multi-task learning framework and
Siamese Neural Networks for replay spoofing detection is that of [Platen et al.,
2020]. They investigated training this framework on a variety of input features
such as log filter bank outputs and group delay matrix.
It is also worth noting that the best performing models on the ASVspoof
challenges used fusion approaches, either at the classifier output or the feature
level [Lai et al., 2019b, Lavrentyeva et al., 2019, 2017, Lai et al., 2019b], indi-
cating the challenges in designing a single countermeasure capable of capturing
all the variabilities that may appear in wild test conditions in a presentation
attack. Table 2.2 provides a summary of deep learning based countermeasures
for replay spoofing attack detection. As Table 2.2 summarises, there is a sub-
stantial body of prior work on deep models in ASV anti-spoofing, even if it is
hard to pinpoint commonly-adopted or outstanding methods. Nonetheless, the
majority of the approaches rely either on discriminative models or on classical
(shallow) generative models.
2.5 Signal processing methods
This section briefly describes signal processing methods that showed good per-
formance on the detection of TTS and VC spoofing attacks [Sahidullah et al.,
2015]. These methods have been applied in this thesis for replay spoofing detec-
tion to study how well they generalise on acoustically different attack conditions.
Mel-frequency cepstral coefficients (MFCCs). MFCCs are popular frontend fea-
tures designed initially for automatic speech recognition [Davis and Mermel-
stein, 1980] and adopted for speaker recognition applications [Kinnunen and
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Figure 2.5: LFCC/RFCC feature extraction pipeline. LFCCs use triangular
filters and RFCCs use rectangular filters.
Li, 2010a]. These features are based on a model of human auditory percep-
tion. Fig. 2.4 summarises the steps involved in extracting this feature. A
pre-emphasis filter is first applied to the speech signal to boost energy in the
higher frequency components. This is followed by slicing the speech signal into
overlapping frames through framing and windowing operations. As for win-
dowing, Hanning or Hamming windows are generally used to smooth the edges
(boundary after the split). The discrete Fourier transform (DFT) [Dickinson
and Steiglitz, 1982] is then applied on the windowed frames to extract informa-
tion in the frequency domain. The output from the DFT (magnitude spectrum)
is first squared and Mel scaled triangular bandpass filters are applied on DFT
power spectrum. The main motivation of using Mel filters is to mimic how hu-
mans perceive sounds. These filters are linearly spaced below 1000 Hz and are
spaced logarithmically above this frequency [Lerch, 2012]. Furthermore, they
give less emphasis on higher frequency components (widely spaced filters) to
reflect human hearing sensitivity at higher frequencies. Next, a log compression
on the mel-scaled power spectrum is applied. The final step involves taking the
discrete cosine transformation to decorrelate the mel-spectral feature vectors
yielding the desired MFCCs. Usually the first few coefficients are retained as a
feature representation per frame.
Inverted Mel-frequency cepstral coefficients (IMFCCs). IMFCCs were first in-
troduced for speaker recognition applications by Chakroborty et al. [2007], and
they have been successfully applied for detecting synthetic and voice converted
speech [Sahidullah et al., 2015]. The feature extraction pipeline of IMFCCs is
the same as in MFCCs, as depicted in Fig. 2.4 with one key difference. Unlike
MFCCs which put higher emphasis in lower frequency regions, the mel-scaled
filters are flipped to emphasise more on the higher frequency components. In
other words, mel-scaled filters are now linearly spaced above 7000 Hz frequen-
cies and are spaced logartihmically below this frequency. In practise, this effect
can be incorporated by simply adding a flip block, as highlighted in blue in Fig.
2.4, that inverts the output of the DFT before applying Mel scaled triangular
bandpass filters on it.
Linear frequency cepstral coefficients (LFCCs). LFCC frontends, initially intro-
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Figure 2.6: SCMC feature extraction pipeline.
Figure 2.7: CQCC feature extraction pipeline.
duced for speaker recognition, have been widely adopted in spoofing detection
reporting a good performance [Sahidullah et al., 2015]. Fig. 2.5 illustrates the
pipeline for LFCC feature extraction, which is similar to that of the standard
MFCCs with one key difference. Here the filters are placed in equal sizes fol-
lowing a linear scale unlike MFCCs that use mel scale spacing.
Rectangular frequency cepstral coefficients (RFCCs). The RFCC features have
shown good results in detecting artificial speech produced through TTS and VC
algorithms [Sahidullah et al., 2015]. The steps involved in extracting RFCCs
are very similar to that of LFCCs with the key difference being the filter shape.
RFCCs as the name suggests use rectangular shaped filters spaced at a linear
scale. Fig. 2.5 summarises the RFCC feature extraction pipeline.
Furthermore, Fig. 2.8 provides a visual summary of different filters used dur-
ing the extraction of the hand-crafted features discussed so far.
Subband centroid magnitude coefficients (SCMCs). SCMC [Min Karen Kua
et al., 2010] features were first introduced by Sahidullah et al. [2015] for spoof-
ing detection demonstrating a good detection performance for TTS and VC
spoofing attacks. Fig. 2.6 illustrates the steps for extracting SCMC features.
The first four steps are the same as used in computing RFCCs. This is followed
by the computation of the spectral centroid magnitude from the magnitude
spectrum, which is defined as the weighted (frequency of each magnitude com-
ponent is used as weights) average magnitude for a given subband. This step is
followed by the standard log non-linearity and DCT giving the desired SCMC
features.
Constant Q cepstral coefficients (CQCCs). This feature was proposed by Todisco
et al. [2016, 2017] for TTS and VC spoofing detection and is now widely adopted
as a default spoofing detection feature following its good performance on these
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Figure 2.8: Illustration of filters used in extracting RFCC, LFCC, MFCC and
IMFCC features.
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tasks. Unlike other cepstral features discussed so far which use the short time
Fourier transform (STFT), the CQCC feature extraction process uses a constant
Q transform (CQT) which provides variable time and frequency resolution. It
provides higher frequency resolution at lower frequencies and higher time resolu-
tion at higher frequencies in contrast to STFT that use fixed time and frequency
resolutions. Fig. 2.7 summarises the steps involved in extracting CQCC fea-
tures. The CQT spectrum is first obtained from the given speech signal from
which the power spectrum is computed. This is followed by the application of
a log non-linearity. A uniform resampling operation is then applied to convert
the non-uniform frequency scale of CQT to a linear frequency scale, followed by
the conventional DCT operation resulting in the desired CQCC features.
All of the above described hand-crafted features have been used in Sec-
tion 4.2. Furthermore, CQCCs have also been studied in Sections 4.4, 4.6, 5.3,
and 5.5. MFCCs and IMFCCs have also been studied in Sections 4.4.
2.6 Discriminative models
This section provides a description of discriminative models that have been used
as a backend classifier for spoofing detection in the literature and in this thesis.
2.6.1 Support vector machine
The support vector machine (SVM) is a supervised learning algorithm that
aims at solving classification problems, and is well-known for binary classifica-
tion problems. Using kernel trick [Campbell et al., 2006], it maps the original
input into a high-dimensional space to learn a decision boundary (hyperplane)
separating the two classes while maximizing the margin of separation between
the two classes. Such a decision boundary is often referred to as the optimal
hyperplane and the data points closest to this hyperplane are called support
vectors.
SVMs were one of the popular classifiers used in speaker recognition [Camp-
bell et al., 2006, 2007]. It has been adopted for spoofing detection problems
recently [Sahidullah et al., 2015, Delgado et al., 2018]. Training an SVM for
spoofing detection requires labelled training examples for both the bonafide
and spoof classes. Usually, bonafide classes are labelled with a +1 and -1 is
used for the spoof class. In the context of speaker verification, +1 corresponds
to a target speaker and -1 to the background speaker (representing the world
population). From these labelled training features, the optimizer aims to learn
a separating hyperplane in the high-dimensional space by maximizing the mar-
gin of separation between the two classes. The classifier discriminant function
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[Campbell et al., 2006] is written as
f(x) =
N∑
i=1
αitiK(x,xi) + b (2.1)
where xi are the support vectors, ti corresponds to the class output labels
that could be either +1 or -1,
∑N
i=1 αiti = 0, and αi > 0. These parameters
along with the bias term b are estimated from the training data through some
optimisation process [Campbell et al., 2006]. Here the kernel function K(.,.) is
defined as a mapping of the input feature space into a high dimensional kernel
space, expressed as
K(x,y) = φ(x)Tφ(y) (2.2)
where φ(.) represents a mapping from the input space to a high dimensional
space. The non-linear data in the input space that was difficult to classify
becomes linearly separable in a higher dimensional space and hence classification
becomes easier.
2.6.2 Convolutional neural networks
A CNN is a class of neural network architecture that was primarily designed for
visual recognition applications [LeCun et al., 1999], but, recently they have been
successfully adopted in various audio and speech technology applications. Ex-
amples include ASR [Huang et al., 2019], acoustic scene classification [Samarth
R Phaye et al., 2019], sound event detection [Chan et al., 2020], language recog-
nition [Bartz et al., 2017], and speaker recognition [Muckenhirn et al., 2018].
CNNs have also been widely studied for spoofing detection [Zeinali et al., 2019,
Gomez-Alanis et al., 2019b, Lavrentyeva et al., 2017, Nagarsheth et al., 2017].
Dominant systems in the ASVspoof challenges used CNNs as standalone sys-
tems or in ensemble setting producing impressive results [Lavrentyeva et al.,
2017, Lai et al., 2019b].
CNNs follow the concept of weight sharing, where all the neurons in a partic-
ular feature map share the same weight parameters. Another important concept
is local connectivity, where not every neuron in the previous layer is connected
to every neuron in the following layer. A neuron is connected to only a small
subset of the input representation. This helps control the trainable parameters
of the network and makes it computationally efficient which otherwise would be
difficult if fully connected (FC) networks were used to train on high-dimensional
image data.
Unlike feed forward or fully connected neural networks where every neuron
in any given layer (except the input layer) receives inputs from every unit of the
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previous layer, CNNs follow the concept of weight sharing where every neuron
does not receive the whole inputs from the previous layer, rather it only sees
a proportion of the input. The main motivation for this design is two-fold.
First, to control the number of trainable parameters (which otherwise would be
enormous when high dimensional image data were flattened into a single vector
and trained using a FC network). The second motivation comes from the way
receptive fields work in the visual cortex [LeCun et al., 1999]. A CNN contains
the following building blocks: convolutional, activations (non-linearity), pooling
(sub sampling), and classification.
Convolutional (Conv) layer is the main building block of CNNs. It takes
in an input signal and applies a filter over it. In other words, it performs a
dot product between the input and a kernel (filters) to obtain the convolved
or modified signal. This layer comprises a set of independent kernels or fil-
ters initialised randomly and is learned during training. Each kernel/filter is
independently convolved with the input image producing a set of feature maps.
Activation functions are mainly used to introduce non-linearity in the learn-
ing process enabling models to capture non-linear relationships in the data.
Although there exist several activation functions [Goodfellow et al., 2016] in the
literature that are used in training deep models, we provide a brief review of
two of these activations that are directly relevant to this thesis.
• Rectified linear unit (ReLU) [Nair and Hinton, 2010]. It is a widely used
activation function in training deep models and is often used as a default
activation function. It is defined as:
f(x) = max(0, x) (2.3)
For every input x, ReLU performs a simple thresholding operation allow-
ing positive values to pass through while replacing negative values with
a 0. A number of changes were introduced on ReLU and new activation
functions have been proposed in the literature. These include the expo-
nential linear unit (ELU) [Clevert et al., 2015], leaky ReLU [Maas et al.,
2013], parametric rectified linear unit (PReLU) [He et al., 2015b], and
scaled exponential linear unit (SeLU) [Klambauer et al., 2017].
• Max-Feature-Map (MFM). MFM non-linearity was originally introduced
by Wu et al. [2015a] to train a deep neural network called Light CNN
(LCNN) for face recognition. The authors claim that the MFM design
was motivated to help select optimal feature maps during model training.
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It is defined as:
ykij = max(x
k
ij , x
k+N2
ij )
∀i = 1, H, j = 1,W , k = 1, N/2,
(2.4)
where x is a 3D input tensor of shape H ×W ×N and y corresponds to
output tensor having a shape H×W× N2 . Here, H, W and W corresponds
to height, width and channel depth for a tensor. The LCNN model with
MFM activation demonstrated the best performance during the ASVspoof
2017 challenge evaluations [Lavrentyeva et al., 2017]. Section 4.3 provides
a summary of the LCNN model used in the challenge.
Pooling layer is an important property that is used to down-sample the orig-
inal input reducing its dimensionality. This operation is performed by applying
a pooling filter of small dimension (usually 2×2) onto a feature map and trans-
forms them to a single scalar either by taking the maximum value or average
of these pooling filters. The classification layer usually takes the output of the
last convolutional layer and performs classification tasks using a series of fully
connected layers.
Usually, with CNNs, the Conv layers are considered as feature extractors
which aim to learn discriminative features, and the output from the last Conv
layer which is a flattened vector is fed to a fully connected layer for the final
classification task.
In this thesis, CNNs have been used extensively in all the sections of Chap-
ters 4 and 5, and SVMs have been studied in Sections 4.2, 4.4, 4.6, and 5.3 as
a backend classifier for spoofing detection.
2.7 Generative models
This section provides the background on three different generative models:
Gaussian mixture models, i-vectors and variational autoencoders, that have
been studied for spoofing detection in the literature and in this thesis.
2.7.1 Gaussian mixture model (GMM)
A Gaussian mixture model, denoted by Λ, is defined as a weighted sum of C
component density functions:
p(x|Λ) =
C∑
k=1
wkN (x|µk,Σk), (2.5)
where C is the number of Gaussian components, wk is the prior probability or
mixture weight of the kth component, and N (x|µk,Σk) is a d-variate Gaussian
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density function with mean µk and covariance matrix Σk, defined as:
N (x|µk,Σk) =
1
(2π)d/2|Σk|1/2
exp
{
−1
2
(x− µk)T Σ
−1
k (x− µk)
}
(2.6)
Here, the mixture weights wk > 0 satisfy the constraints
∑C
k=1 wk = 1.
Training. Training a GMM involves estimating the model parameters Λ =
{wk,µk,Σk}Ck=1 that maximize the average log likelihood of the data. This is
performed by applying the expectation maximization (EM) algorithm [Bishop,
2006] on a training dataset X = {xt}Tt=1. The average log-likelihood of X with
respect to model Λ is given as:
LLavg(X|Λ) =
1
T
T∑
t=1
log p(X|Λ) = 1
T
T∑
t=1
log
C∑
k=1
wkN (xt|µk,Σk), (2.7)
Testing. For a given test utteranceX consisting of T feature vectors (x1, . . . ,xT ),
the GMM computes a mean log-likelihood score using (2.7). The higher the
value, the higher is the probability that Λ generated the data.
In the automatic spoofing detection task, two GMMs are usually trained
one each for the bonafide and spoof classes. During testing, for a given test
utterance X, using (2.7) we compute the average log-likelihood difference as the
final score:
LLR = LLavg(X|Λbona)− LLavg(X|Λspoof ) (2.8)
where Λbona and Λspoof represents the bonafide and spoof GMMs. The larger
the LLR value is, the more confidence the model has that the test utterance X
is a bonafide utterance.
2.7.2 i-vectors
An i-vector is a fixed-dimensional utterance-level representation derived from
a variable-length speech signal through factor analysis [Dehak et al., 2011].
This representation aims at capturing the long-term characteristics in a speech
signal, such as speaker and channel properties. It models both speaker and
channel variabilities into a single low-rank space called total variability space,
and is defined by the equation:
s = m+ Tφ (2.9)
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Figure 2.9: Block diagram illustrating a Variational Autoencoder.
where s is a speaker and channel dependent GMM mean supervector2, m is
a UBM supervector which is speaker and channel independent, T is a rectan-
gular matrix of low rank (total variability space) and φ is an identity vector,
commonly referred to as i-vector.
Initially, i-vectors were proposed for speaker recognition applications and
were state-of-the-art features until discriminatively trained deep learning-based
x-vectors [Snyder et al., 2018] were introduced recently. Channel compensation
methods are often applied on i-vectors to minimize the channel effects before
using them for speaker modelling. They have been widely used in other speech
technology applications as well. For example, in automatic speech recognition,
i-vectors are often provided as an additional input along with other acoustic
features (eg. MFCCs) which helps improve the robustness of acoustic models
[Gupta et al., 2014]. They have also been recently explored in spoofing detection
applications [Novoselov et al., 2016a, Delgado et al., 2018]. For more details on
i-vectors please refer to [Dehak et al., 2011] and [Kanagasundaram, 2014]. We
used the MSR identity toolkit [Sadjadi et al., 2013] for computing i-vectors.
2.7.3 Variational Autoencoders (VAEs)
Variational Autoencoder (VAE) [Kingma and Welling, 2013] is a deep generative
model that aims at uncovering the data generation mechanism in the form of
a probability distribution. The VAE is an unsupervised approach that learns
a low-dimensional, nonlinear data manifold from training data without class
labels. VAEs achieve this by using two separate but jointly trained neural
networks, an encoder and a decoder as illustrated in Fig. 2.9. The encoder
forces the input data through a low-dimensional latent space that the decoder
uses to reconstruct the input.
2A supervector is a high dimensional vector obtained by stacking the mean vectors from all
the Gaussian components of a UBM. A UBM is essentially a GMM trained on a large speech
corpus comprising many thousands of speakers.
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Given a D-dimensional input x ∈ RD, the encoder network maps x into a
latent vector z ∈ Rd (d  D). Unlike in a conventional (deterministic) au-
toencoder, z is not a single point; instead, the encoder imposes a distribution
over the latent variable, qφ(z|x), where φ denotes all the parameters (network
weights) of the encoder. The default choice, also in this work, is a Gaussian
qφ(z|x) = N (z|µφ(x), diag
(
σ2φ(x)
)
), where µφ(x) and diag
(
σ2φ(x)
)
are de-
terministic functions (the encoder network) that return the mean and variance
vector (i.e., diagonal covariance matrix) of the latent space given an input x.
The decoder network, in turn, takes z as input and returns a parameterized
probability distribution, which is another Gaussian. The decoder distribution is
pθ(x|z) = N (x|µθ(z), diag
(
σ2θ(z)
)
), where µφ(z) and diag
(
σ2θ(z)
)
are deter-
ministic functions implemented by the decoder network, and where θ denotes
the decoder network parameters. Random observations sampled from the de-
coder distribution (with fixed z) should then bear resemblance to the input
x. In the standard VAE, the only sampling that takes place is from the vari-
ational posterior distribution of the latent variable. Conceptually, however, it
is useful to note that the decoder also produces a distribution of possible out-
puts, rather than a single point estimate, for a given (fixed) z. These outputs
will not be exactly the same as x due to the dimensionality reduction to the
lower-dimensional z-space, but each of the individual elements of the z-space
represents some salient, meaningful features necessary for approximating x.
VAE training. The VAE is trained by maximizing a regularized log-likelihood
function. Let X = {xn}Nn=1 denote the training set, with xn ∈ RD. The training
loss for the entire training set X ,
L(θ,φ) =
N∑
n=1
`n(θ,φ), (2.10)
decomposes to a sum of data-point specific losses. The loss of the nth training
example is a regularized reconstruction loss:
`n(θ,φ) = −Ez∼qφ(z|xn)
[
log pθ(xn|z)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Reconstruction error
+ KL
(
qφ(z|xn) ‖ p(z)
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Regularizer
, (2.11)
where E[·] denotes the expected value and KL(·‖·) is the Kullback-Leibler diver-
gence [Cover and Thomas, 2001] – a measure of difference between two prob-
ability distributions. The reconstruction error term demands for an accurate
approximation of x while the KL term penalizes the deviation of the encoder
distribution from a fixed prior distribution, p(z). Note that the prior, taken
to be the standard normal, p(z) = N (z|0, I), is shared across all the training
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exemplars. It enforces the latent variables z to reside in a compatible feature
space across the training exemplars.
In practice, to derive a differentiable neural network after sampling z, VAEs
are trained with the aid of the so-called reparameterization trick [Kingma and
Welling, 2013]. Thus, sampling z from the posterior distribution qφ(z|x) is per-
formed by computing z = µφ(x)+σφ(x)ε where ε is a random vector drawn
from N (z|0, I), µ and σ are the means and variance of the posterior learned
during the VAE training, and  denotes the element-wise product.
VAEs and GMMs as latent variable models. Given the widespread use of
GMMs in voice anti-spoofing studies, it is useful to compare and contrast the
two. Similar to the VAE, the GMM is also a generative model that includes
latent variables. In the case of GMMs, x is a short-term feature vector, and z is a
one-hot vector with C components (the number of Gaussians), indicating which
Gaussian was ‘responsible’ for generating x. Let zk = (0, 0, . . . , 1, 0, . . . , 0)
T be
a realization of such one-hot vector where the k-th element is 1. The conditional
and prior distributions of GMM are:
p(x|z = zk,Λ) = N (x|µk,Σk)
p(z = zk,Λ) = wk,
(2.12)
where Λ = (µk,Σk, wk)
C
k=1 denotes the GMM parameters (means, covariances
and mixing weights). By marginalizing the latent variable out, the log-likelihood
function of a GMM as defined in (2.7) is used as a score when comparing test
feature x against the GMM defined by Λ.
Both are generative approaches, and common to both is the assumption of
the data generation process consisting of two consecutive steps:
1. First, one draws a latent variable zn ∼ pgt(z) from a prior distribution.
2. Second, given the selected latent variable, one draws the observation
from a conditional distribution, xn ∼ pgt(x|zn),
where the subscript ‘gt’ highlights an assumed underlying ‘true’ data generator
whose details are unknown. Both VAEs and GMMs use parametric distribu-
tions to approximate pgt(z) and pgt(x|zn). In terms of the ‘z’ variable, the main
difference between GMMs and VAEs is that in the former it is discrete (cate-
gorical) and in the latter it is continuous. As for the second step, in GMMs, one
draws the observation from a multivariate Gaussian distribution corresponding
to the selected component. In VAEs, one also samples the reconstructed obser-
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vation from a Gaussian, but the mean and covariance are not selected from an
enumerable set — they are continuous and are predicted by the decoder from a
given z.
Both GMMs and VAEs are trained with the aim of finding model parame-
ters that maximize the training data log-likelihood; common to both is that no
closed-form solution for the model parameters exists. The way the two mod-
els approach the parameter estimation (learning) problem differs substantially,
however. As in any maximum likelihood estimation problem, the training ob-
servations are assumed to be i.i.d., enabling the log-likelihood function over the
whole training dataset to be written as the sum of log-likelihoods over all the
training observations. This holds both for VAEs and GMMs. Let us use the
GMM as an example. For a single observation x, the log-likelihood function is:
log pΛ(x) = log
∑
z
p(x, z|Λ) =
∑
z
Q(z)
p(x, z|Λ)
Q(z)
= log Ez∼Q(z)
[
pΛ(x, z)
Q(z)
]
≥ Ez∼Q(z)
[
log
pΛ(x, z)
Q(z)
]
=
∑
z
Q(z) log
pΛ(x, z)
Q(z)
(2.13)
where Q(z) is any distribution, and where the inequality in the second line is
obtained using Jensen’s inequality [Cover and Thomas, 2001] (using the con-
cavity of the logarithm). The resulting last expression, known as the evidence
lower bound (ELBO), serves as a lower bound of the log-likelihood which can be
maximized more easily. The well-known EM algorithm [Dempster et al., 1977]
is an alternating maximization approach which iterates between updating the
Q-distribution and the model parameters Λ (keeping the other one fixed when
updating the other one). An important characteristic of the EM algorithm is
that, in each iteration, the posterior distribution Q(z) is selected to make the
inequality in (2.13) tight, making the ELBO equal to the log-likelihood. This
is done by choosing Q(z) to be the posterior distribution PΛ(z|x) (using the
current estimates of model parameters). Importantly, this posterior can be com-
puted in closed form. The EM algorithm is guaranteed to converge to a local
maximum of the log-likelihood. It should be noted, however, that as the like-
lihood function contains local maximae [Jin et al., 2016], global optimality is
not guaranteed. The quality of the obtained GMM (in terms of log-likelihood)
depends not only on the number of EM iterations, but on the initial parameters.
In contrast to GMMs, the posterior distribution of VAEs cannot be evaluated
in closed form at any stage (training or scoring). For this reason, it is replaced
by an approximate, variational [Bishop, 2006] posterior, qφ(z|x), leading to the
ELBO training objective of Eq. (2.11). As the true posterior distribution cannot
be evaluated, the EM algorithm cannot be used for VAE training [Kingma and
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Welling, 2013]. The ELBO is instead optimized using gradient-based methods.
Due to all these differences, it is difficult to form an exact comparison between
the VAE and GMM models. One of the main benefits of VAEs over GMMs is
that they can handle high-dimensional inputs — for example, raw spectrograms
and CQCC-grams consisting of multiple stacked frames — allowing the use of
less restrictive features.
In this thesis, GMMs have been used in Sections 4.2, 4.4, 4.6, 5.2, 5.3, and
5.5. And, i-vectors have been used in Sections 4.2, 4.4, 4.6, 5.2, and 5.3. VAEs
have been studied in Section 5.5.
2.8 Subband modelling
A subband represents a sub-part of the speech signal frequencies, which are usu-
ally extracted to perform some specific task. For example, extracting MFCCs
for speech recognition application involves use of lower frequency subbands (typ-
ically between 100 to 3500 Hz) and discarding other frequencies as they do not
carry relevant information for the task in hand. However, for certain appli-
cations higher frequency bands may be useful, for example spoofing detection.
This section discusses the relevant background on subbands and its application
on various speech applications.
The impact of subbands on model performance has been investigated on a
wide range of ML tasks in the literature. For instance, Besacier and Bonastre
[2000] used a subband approach to extract relevant features, each modelled
using Gaussians for speaker verification. Kingma and Ba [2008] investigated the
dependencies of different frequency bands and speaker characteristics in a speech
signal for speaker verification applications. Recently, Samarth R Phaye et al.
[2019] demonstrated improved performance using different subbands for building
acoustic scene classification models. They used a sub-spectrogram, obtained by
cropping a mel-spectrogram at different bands, to train a convolutional neural
network (CNN) for learning band-specific features.
In the context of spoofing detection, the most relevant studies include [Sriskan-
daraja et al., 2016, Witkowski et al., 2017, Garg et al., 2019, Nagarsheth et al.,
2017, Lin et al., 2018, Soni et al., 2016]. Sriskandaraja et al. [2016] investi-
gated different subbands to find the most informative bands useful for spoofing
detection tasks. Using the Kullback-Leibler divergence (at model-level) and
classification-level analysis, they identified 0-1 kHz, 2.5-5.5 kHz and 7-8 kHz as
the most informative subbands for their dataset. Features were then extracted
from these bands to train a classifier (Gaussian mixture model — universal back-
ground model), demonstrating improved performance over traditional full-band
models. Witkowski et al. [2017] investigated the importance of different sub-
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bands for spoofing detection on the ASVspoof 2017 dataset. They extracted
five different types of features from these subbands to train a GMM backend
classifier. They found the high frequency range of 6-8 kHz to be the most infor-
mative. Another similar line of work was performed by Garg et al. [2019] using
CQCC and MFCC features for replay spoofing detection on the ASVspoof 2017
dataset, reporting similar findings as in [Witkowski et al., 2017]. The high fre-
quency bands, 6-8 kHz, was found to offer more discriminative information for
replay attack detection on this dataset.
Nagarsheth et al. [2017] proposed high-frequency cepstral coefficient (HFCC)
features extracted from a high-frequency spectrum (above 3.5 kHz). They com-
bined HFCCs with CQCCs and trained a deep neural network as a feature
extractor. A support vector machine classifier was trained on deep features,
outperforming the baseline GMM models on the ASVspoof 2017 dataset. An-
other interesting work in subband modelling is by Soni et al. [2016]. They
trained a subband autoencoder (SBAE) for feature extraction by restricting the
connections between units in the input and the first hidden layer of the encoder.
By imposing such constraints they claim that models learn band-specific fea-
tures useful in spoofing detection, demonstrating a substantial gain in detection
performance on the ASVspoof 2015 dataset. Another line of study that inves-
tigates subband features for spoofing detection is by [Lin et al., 2018]. Using
the subbands that provide discriminative information, the authors design new
filters for feature extraction. Experimental results on the ASVspoof 2017 v1.0
dataset indicate that the 0-1 and 7-8 kHz subbands offer the most discriminative
information.
To sum up, previous studies indicate that certain frequency subbands are
potentially more informative to the detection of spoofing attacks, even though no
standardized approach show how that unevenly distributed information across
the frequency axis should be utilised. Our current work (Section 5.4) is different
from the prior works mentioned above because most of them aim at hand-
crafting or learning features [Soni et al., 2016] based on the relevance of specific
subbands for spoofing detection. However, our work described in Section 5.4
aims to learn band-specific features by discriminatively training a CNN on a
spectrogram input for spoofing detection.
2.9 Towards trustworthy countermeasures
Analysing spoofing detection systems is one of the objectives of this thesis.
In this direction, this section reviews related works on the trustworthiness of
machine learning models for spoofing detection. Firstly, a high level definition
of what “trustworthiness” means in this thesis is provided, and a background on
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how artefacts and confounding factors in a dataset impact model trustworthiness
is explained in Subsection 2.9.1. Then, the next Subsection 2.9.2 explains a
method (called SLIME) from the interpretable machine learning literature that
is used in this thesis (Section 4.5) to analyse the predictions of a CNN-based
countermeasure for replay spoofing detection.
2.9.1 Artefacts and their influence in machine learning
Following the Ethics Guidelines for Trustworthy AI prepared by the High-Level
Expert Group on Artificial Intelligence (AI HLEG) of the European Commis-
sion AI-HLEG [2020], this thesis considers technical robustness, fairness and
accountability as key criteria for any ML countermeasure model to be deemed
trustworthy. These criteria suggest that the results produced by a trustworthy
countermeasure should be independent of the variables/factors that are sensitive
but not related to the actual problem.
The performance of any data-driven ML task highly depends on the train-
ing data fed to the learning algorithm. The model learns to make decisions by
exploiting the underlying patterns within the training data [Bishop, 2006]. As
demonstrated in [Sturm, 2013, Tommasi et al., 2015, Rosset et al., 2010], such
models may easily exploit irrelevant cues, artefacts or confounders (if present)
during the training optimisation. Unless explicitly accounted for during training
and inference, they can introduce biases3 in model decisions raising questions
on their reliability, and often contribute in achieving good results and overesti-
mating the actual performance on a test set. Such issues can occur in a wide
range of ML tasks [Sturm, 2013, Tommasi et al., 2015, Rodŕıguez-Algarra et al.,
2019, Rosset et al., 2010, Stowell et al., 2019]. Sturm [2013] shows how faults
in GTZAN, a popular dataset for musical genre classification, overestimated
classification accuracy. Rosset et al. [2010] found patient IDs to provide strong
predictive cues about a patient’s likelihood to have cancer. They incorporated
this as a feature to train their model demonstrating improved performance.
Rodŕıguez-Algarra et al. [2019] demonstrate how top performing music labeling
systems were exploiting characteristics from the music signal that could not even
be heard. In [Charalambous and Bharath, 2016], the accuracy of a gait recogni-
tion system was found to drop when confounding factors were removed during
training. Mendelson et al. [2017] describes how biases introduced as a result of
dataset selection influenced the performance of an Alzheimer’s disease classifi-
cation system. Stowell et al. [2019] studies reducing the effects of confounders in
the dataset that bias performance to build robust automatic acoustic individual
3“the inclination or prejudice of a decision made by an Artificial Intelligence system which
is for or against one person or group, especially in a way considered to be unfair” [Ntoutsi
et al., 2020]
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identification systems. Even in computer vision applications, [Tommasi et al.,
2015] have analysed the effect of biases across several datasets. Furthermore,
[Kaufman et al., 2011] describes that data leakage can often lead to overestima-
tion of model performance, producing too-good-to-be-true results. One relevant
work in anti-spoofing in this regard is that of Tom et al. [2018] who reported
0% EER on both the development and evaluation sets of the ASVspoof 2017
v1.0 dataset.
Their trustworthiness is therefore called into question and some can behave
much like a “horse” in machine learning [Hernandez-Orallo, 2019, Sturm, 2014],
i.e. a model that provides excellent results using cues not relevant to the actual
problem [Sturm, 2016, Rodŕıguez-Algarra et al., 2019]. As highlighted in [Ros-
set et al., 2010], such biases can occur as a result of data collection, compilation,
aggregation and partition. Such biases can have a severe impact on the trust-
worthiness of ML applications, and for domains such as finance, medicine and
security (including ASV anti-spoofing) this can be catastrophic. Therefore, it
is beneficial to perform an in-depth dataset analysis [Torralba and Efros, 2011,
Chen and Asch, 2017], detect the presence of artefacts or confounders [Stowell
et al., 2019], ensuring models do not exploit irrelevant factors during training,
and therefore yield reliable performance estimates.
In this thesis, a study on dataset artefacts and how they impact ML coun-
termeasure decisions has been carried out in Subsection 4.2.3 (on version 1.0 of
the ASVspoof 2017 dataset), Section 4.6 (on version 2.0 of the ASVspoof 2017
dataset) and Subsection 5.2.5 (on the ASVspoof 2019 PA dataset). The details
on the two spoofing datasets are provided in Chapter 3.
2.9.2 Understanding model predictions
The ability to provide explanations for model predictions is a key factor towards
fairness and accountability of any machine learning model. There exist several
methods to understand the global or local behaviour of ML models [Montavon
et al., 2018, Mishra, 2020]. While global methods aim at understanding what
information a neuron or a group of neurons in any hidden layer has learned
during model training, local methods on the other hand aim at generating ex-
planations by highlighting input features that contributed the most for model
predictions.
Activation maximization [Erhan et al., 2009] and feature inversion [Mahen-
dran and Vedaldi, 2015] are two popular interpretable machine learning (IML)
methods focussed on global analysis of pre-trained ML models. Activation max-
imization aims at generating synthetic input examples that maximizes the acti-
vation of desired neurons in a deep neural network (DNN) [Erhan et al., 2009].
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Figure 2.10: Temporal segmentation of an input spectrogram (xi) into 10 uni-
form segments (Ti), each of duration 400 ms.
Feature inversion on the other hand aims at learning a mapping function to
transform learned features (for example deep features — output from any hid-
den layer) back to the original input space. Learning such mapping helps to
understand the information preserved by various layers which in turn helps to
understand important features used by the model to form predictions [Mahen-
dran and Vedaldi, 2015, Mishra, 2020].
There exist many methods for analysing ML models locally, for example sen-
sitivity analysis and function decomposition [Mishra, 2020]. We describe one
IML method called Sound LIME (SLIME) [Mishra et al., 2017] that is used
in this thesis, and is based on sensitivity analysis. SLIME is an algorithm to
analyse the local behaviour of any (deep or shallow) machine listening model.
SLIME is based on the LIME algorithm [Ribeiro et al., 2016], which refers to Lo-
cal Interpretable Model-Agnostic Explanations. Ribeiro et al. [2016] introduced
the LIME algorithm and demonstrated its applicability to image recognition
and text classification models.
SLIME extends LIME to machine listening systems by defining an inter-
pretable sequence Xi for an input instance xi (e.g., a time-frequency representa-
tion). An interpretable sequence is composed of elements, called interpretable
components, that are in some way related to the classification of xi. SLIME
defines three types of interpretable sequences (temporal, spectral, and time-
frequency) depending on the way it segments xi into interpretable components.
For example, a temporal sequence X ti consists of temporal segments that SLIME
generates by segmenting xi (uniformly or non-uniformly) along the temporal
dimension as shown in Fig. 2.10. SLIME maps an input instance xi to its inter-
pretable representation x∗i ∈ {0, 1}|Xi|. In order to generate a local explanation
for the prediction f(xi) where f : Rn → R is a classifier, SLIME first gener-
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ates N artificial samples (z∗i ) by perturbing the interpretable representation.
SLIME perturbs x∗i by randomly setting the interpretable components to zero.
For example, for the instance in Fig. 2.10, if we set the temporal segments T1,
T4 and T7 to zero, then a possible z∗i is given as (0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 1).
Later, SLIME maps each perturbed representation z∗i to the feature space with
an assumption that such a mapping exists. In other words, SLIME assumes that
for each z∗i there exists a corresponding zi in the feature space. Finally, SLIME
uses the perturbed representations z∗i and their corresponding predictions f(zi)
to approximate f with a linear model g in the interpretable space τ = {0, 1}|Xi|.
The explanation to the prediction f(xi) is given by the weights w of the linear
model g(z∗) = wT z∗; z∗ ∈ τ . Formally, SLIME generates an explanation by the
optimisation
min
g∈G
L(f, g, ρxi) + ∆(g) (2.14)
where L is a loss function (squared error between the original prediction f(zi)
and the model approximation g(z∗i )), ρxi measures the distance between the in-
put instance xi and the generated sample zi, and ∆(g) measures the complexity
of g (e.g., sparsity).
2.10 Discussion
This chapter provided a detailed survey on necessary background on spoofing
attacks in voice biometrics which is driven by an ASV technology. For this, the
chapter provided a brief background on ASV as a starting point of discussion.
Although the focus of this thesis is on replay attacks, we briefly described other
three forms of spoofing attacks (mimicry, speech synthesis and voice conversion)
that have been studied in the literature in Section 2.2. The work in this thesis
uses datasets that are released as part of the ASVspoof series — an ASV-
community driven automatic speaker verification spoofing and countermeasures
challenge focussed on promoting anti-spoofing research for secure ASV. To that
end, Section 2.3 described an overview of the ASVspoof series.
After this, the chapter provided a detailed survey on published works towards
replay spoofing attacks using the ASVspoof datasets and the ones before the
ASVspoof series began in 2015. The description has been separated into two
groups for better readability. Subsection 2.4.1 summarised traditional methods
which used classical signal processing methods for feature extraction and shallow
classifiers for modelling. In contrast, Subsection 2.4.2 provided background on
deep learning based countermeasures for replay attack detection. To be precise,
all works that used deep learning either for feature learning, or as a classifier,
or for end-to-end modelling were summarised in this subsection. Following this,
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Sections 2.5, 2.6, and 2.7 provided a detailed background of different signal
processing methods, discriminative backend classifiers and generative backend
classifiers that are used in this thesis for replay spoofing detection. A survey
on subband modelling applied to audio and speech applications including ASV
anti-spoofing was provided in Section 2.8.
Finally, this chapter also provided a survey on trustworthy machine learn-
ing and discussed the importance of trustworthy countermeasures for spoofing
detection (Section 2.9). A summary on how dataset artefacts and confounders
influence decisions of a machine learning model was provided in Subsection 2.9.1.
An overview of SLIME, a method from the interpretable machine learning lit-
erature was provided in Subsection 2.9.2 and will be used later in Section 4.5.
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Chapter 3
Spoofing corpus and
evaluation metrics
3.1 Introduction
This chapter describes the corpus and the evaluation metrics used to study
replay spoofing countermeasures. The thesis mostly uses the publicly avail-
able datasets released by the ASV community as part of the ongoing bi-annual
ASVspoof challenge (as described in Section 2.3). Firstly, Section 3.2 describes
the ASVspoof 2017 dataset. This is the first publicly available replay spoofing
dataset designed by playing back bonafide audio utterances and re-recording
them in real ‘wild’ acoustic conditions. It will be extensively used in both
Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 for the analysis and design of replay spoofing coun-
termeasures. Both version 1.0 and version 2.0 of the ASVspoof 2017 dataset
are described in Subsections 3.2.1 and 3.2.2, respectively. Furthermore, Sub-
section 3.2.3 provides results of qualitative analysis performed on version 2.0 of
the dataset bringing interesting insights that might help understanding a coun-
termeasure trained on this dataset. Then Section 3.3 describes the ASVspoof
2019 dataset which was released after the 2019 challenge evaluation. This eval-
uation focused on two sub-tasks: logical access (LA) and physical access (PA)
spoofing attack conditions. These sub-tasks along with the LA and PA datasets
are discussed in Subsections 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 respectively. Furthermore, a brief
description of the real ASVspoof PA test set is provided in Subsection 3.3.3.
Then Section 3.4 provides a brief discussion on other publicly available spoofing
datasets. The next section (Section 3.5) describes different metrics used in this
thesis for evaluation of countermeasure model performance. These metrics are
adopted from the evaluation metrics used in the ASVspoof challenges. Finally,
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Table 3.1: Phrases used in the ASVspoof 2017 dataset.
Phrase Id Description
S01 My voice is my password
S02 Ok google
S03 Only lawyers love millionaires
S04 Artificial intelligence is for real
S05 Birthday parties have cupcakes and ice cream
S06 Actions speak louder than words
S07 There is no such thing as a free lunch
S08 A watched pot never boils
S09 Jealousy has twenty-twenty vision
S10 Necessity is the mother of invention
this chapter concludes with a summary in Section 3.6.
3.2 ASVspoof 2017 dataset
3.2.1 Version 1.0
The ASVspoof 2017 challenge evaluation1 used version 1.0 of the dataset with
the same name. It is derived from RedDots [Lee et al., 2015] which is a text
dependent speaker verification dataset. Part 01 of the RedDots corpus com-
prised 10 common short phrases, as detailed in Table 3.1, were used to simulate
replay attacks. Several of these short utterances were first concatenated using
a segment marker to obtain a long utterance, which were then played back and
recorded through different types of playback and recording devices [Kinnunen
et al., 2017b]. Dual-tone multi-frequency (DTMF) sound was used as a segment
boundary marker. Such playback and re-recording was performed in diverse
acoustic conditions to capture realistic replay attack conditions. The DTMF
marker was later used to retrieve individual replayed utterances. The database
is divided into three subsets: training, development and evaluation and is sum-
marised in Table 3.2. The speakers in the three subsets are non-overlapping
and there are only male speakers in this corpus. Meta-data such as class la-
bels, speaker ID, phrase ID and replay configurations2 are available only for
the training and development sets. A total of 15 playback devices (P01-P15)
and 16 recording devices (R01-R016) were used to develop v1.0 of the corpus.
Acoustic environment details used to simulate such attacks is not publicly avail-
able. Furthermore, only the class labels and phrase IDs are available for the
evaluation set. See [Kinnunen et al., 2017a] for a summary of the ASVspoof
1https://www.asvspoof.org/index2017.html
2Replay configuration: a unique combination of recording device (R), playback device (P)
and acoustic environment (E).
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Table 3.2: The ASVspoof 2017 v1.0 dataset statistics. * in hours. RC: replay
configuration.
Subset #Speakers #RC # Bonafide #Spoofed Duration*
Train 10 3 1508 1508 2.22
Dev 8 10 760 950 1.44
Eval 24 110 1298 12922 11.95
Table 3.3: Same as in Table 3.2 but for the ASVspoof 2017 v2.0 dataset.
Subset #Speakers #RC # Bonafide #Spoofed Duration*
Train 10 3 1507 1507 2.22
Dev 8 10 760 950 1.44
Eval 24 57 1298 12008 11.94
Table 3.4: Acoustic environments used in the ASVspoof 2017 v2.0 dataset.
ID Environment Quality ID Environment Quality
E01 Anechoic room High E14 Office 02 Medium
E02 Balcony 01 Low E15 Office 03 Medium
E03 Balcony 02 Low E16 Office 04 Medium
E04 Home 07 Medium E17 Office 05 Medium
E05 Home 08 Medium E18 Office 06 Medium
E06 Canteen Low E19 Office 07 Medium
E07 Home 01 Medium E20 Office 08 Medium
E08 Home 02 Medium E21 Office 09 Medium
E09 Home 03 Medium E22 Office 10 Medium
E10 Home 04 Medium E23 Studio High
E11 Home 05 Medium E24 Analog wire 01 High
E12 Home 06 Medium E25 Analog wire 02 High
E13 Office 01 Medium E26 Analog wire 03 High
2017 evaluation and [Kinnunen et al., 2017b] for further details on v1.0 of this
dataset.
3.2.2 Version 2.0
Post-evaluation, as described in Subsection 4.2.3, some issues with v1.0 of the
dataset were identified that biased model performance. It was demonstrated
that the knowledge of a simple class-dependent cue — silence frames of zeros
present in some of the bonafide files but missing in spoofed ones, in the v1.0
dataset can easily compromise class decisions. These findings were reported to
the challenge organisers (see Section 4.2.3), and an updated version 2.0 [Delgado
et al., 2018] dataset fixing these anomalies was subsequently released by the
organisers. Table 3.3 summarises the v2.0 dataset statistics. Two training
audio files T 1001658.wav and T 1000150.wav that do not contain any speech
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Table 3.5: Playback devices used in the ASVspoof 2017 v2.0 dataset.
ID Playback devices Quality
P01 All-in-one PC speakers Medium
P02 Creative A60 speakers Medium
P03 Genelec 8020C studio monitor High
P04 Genelec 8020C studio monitor (2 speakers) High
P05 Beyerdynamic DT 770 PRO headphones High
P06 Dell laptop internal speakers Low
P07 Dynaudio BM5A speaker High
P08 HP Laptop internal speakers Low
P09 VIFA M10MD-39-08 speaker High
P10 ACER netbook internal speakers Low
P11 BQ Aquaris M5 smartphone Low
P12 Logitech low quality speakers Medium
P13 Desktop PC line output High
P14 Labtec LCS-1050 speakers Medium
P15 Edirol MA-15D studio monitor High
P16 Lenovo Ideatab S6000-H tablet Low
P17 Logitech S120 multimedia speakers Low
P18 MacBook pro internal speakers Low
P19 Altec lansing Orbit USB iML227 portable speaker Medium
P20 Samsung GT-I9100 smartphone Low
P21 Samsung GT-P6200 tablet Low
P22 Behringer Truth B2030A studio monitor High
P23 Focusrite Scarlett 2i2 audio interface line output High
P24 Focusrite Scarlett 2i4 audio interface line output High
P25 Genelec 6010A studio monitor High
P26 AKG K242HD Headset High
were removed. Also, 914 corrupted spoofed recordings were removed from the
evaluation set in the v2.0 dataset as can be seen from the table. Furthermore,
a number of changes were applied in terms of replay configurations (RCs). A
total of 26 different acoustic environments (E01 - E26), 26 playback devices
(P01 - P26) and 25 recording devices (R01 - R25) were used to compile v2.0
of this dataset. However, only 61 unique RCs are used in v2.0 of the dataset
from a space of 26× 26× 25 possible combinations after grouping together the
overlapping configurations.
As presented in Table 3.3, the training set has three RCs. There are no
overlapping RCs between the training and development sets. However, one RC
(E21 P03 R01) from the evaluation set is present in the training set. The devel-
opment set has ten RCs out of which seven RCs (E16 P07 R06, E16 P07 R05,
E16 P07 R07, E06 P09 R06, E06 P09 R05, E06 P09 R07, E18 P05 R03) overlap
with the ones in the evaluation set. It is worth noting that though there are
some overlaps in terms of RCs, however, the speakers are disjoint across different
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Table 3.6: Recording devices used in the ASVspoof 2017 v2.0 dataset.
ID Recording devices Quality
R01 Zoom H6 handy recorder High
R02 BQ Aquaris M5 smartphone Low
R03 Low-quality headset Medium
R04 Nokia Lumia 635 smartphone Low
R05 Røde NT2 microphone High
R06 Røde smartLav+ microphone High
R07 Samsung Galaxy S7 smartphone Low
R08 Desktop PC microphone input High
R09 Zoom H6 recorder with Behringer ECM8000 mic. High
R10 Zoom H6 recorder with MSH-6 microphone High
R11 Zoom H6 recorder. with XY microphone High
R12 iPhone 5c smartphone Low
R13 iPhone 7 plus smartphone Low
R14 iPhone 4 smartphone Low
R15 Logitech C920 webcam Medium
R16 miniDSP UMIK-1 microphone High
R17 Samsung Galaxy Trend 2 smartphone Low
R18 Samsung GT-I9100 smartphone Low
R19 Samsung GT-P6200 tablet Low
R20 Samsung Trend 2 smartphone Low
R21 AKG C3000 microphone High
R22 SE electronic 2200a microphone High
R23 Focusrite Scarlett 2i2 interface line input High
R24 Focusrite Scarlett 2i4 interface line input High
R25 Zoom HD1 handy recorder High
sets. Delgado et al. [2018] grouped the replay configurations of the evaluation
set into three categories depending on the level of threat they present to an
ASV system. (1) Low, signifies the use of a low quality RD, PD and noisy
AE (eg. balcony) to simulate a replay attack. (2) Medium, signifies the use
of a medium quality RD, PD and a medium noise AE (eg. office). (3) High,
indicates the use of a high quality RD, PD and a low noise AE (eg. studio).
Low quality replay recordings (with high background noise, reverberation) are
assumed to pose the least threat to ASV systems in contrast to high quality
replay recordings. Tables 3.4, 3.5 and 3.6 summarises the environment, record-
ing devices and playback devices used to simulate replay attacks and create the
ASVspoof 2017 dataset. For further details please refer to [Delgado et al., 2018].
3.2.3 Qualitative analysis of v2.0
It was found that the issues on the ASVspoof 2017 dataset were not addressed
completely in the updated version. As highlighted in Section 4.5, v2.0 may
still have some issues. Therefore, this section performs qualitative analysis on
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all the audio recordings in the training and development sets of version 2.0 of
the dataset. As for the evaluation set, this analysis was only performed on
the bonafide recordings. Due to the large number of spoof recordings (about
13, 000) in the evaluation set, manual inspection on them was not possible.
These findings are categorised into two classes: unexpected/unnatural and ex-
pected/natural, and are described next.
Expected/Natural
Though some of the observations described here are natural for a dataset, these
insights might help in understanding model behaviours.
• Mispronunciation and/or incomplete sentence. Mispronounced words and
incomplete sentences are found in some audio recordings. The words are
missing either in the beginning or at the end of an utterance. The training
and development sets have 11 and 98 such audio files and 2 files in the
evaluation set (bonafide class).
• Unwanted noise/speech. Different from a burst click sound (BCS3), audio
recordings containing short duration noise or speech (different from 10
phrases used in the corpus) in the start and/or at the end of an utterance
is found. The training set has 11 such files (4 bonafide and 7 spoof), the
development set has 70 (28 bonafide and 42 spoof), and 8 bonafide files
are found in the evaluation set.
• Sentence S02 - “Ok Google”. It is one of the phrases used in the ASVspoof
2017 dataset with an average duration between 0.7 - 0.8 seconds. We find
165, 136 and 1282 audio examples of S02 in the training, development
and evaluation sets with more than 1.5 seconds duration. This suggests
that more than half of the contents of each recording contain noise or
nonspeech.
Unexpected/Unnatural
The observations described here as unnatural or unexpected for a dataset could
be due to errors/faults made during data collection and compilation. As demon-
strated later in Section 4.6.3, some of them have a profound impact on model
decisions raising concerns on the validity of results reported in the literature
[Lavrentyeva et al., 2017, Tom et al., 2018, M S and Murthy, 2018, Suthokumar
et al., 2018].
3BCS is defined as an abrupt click sound.
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• Pattern difference. This thesis uses the term pattern difference (applied to
the ASVspoof 2017 v2.0 dataset) as the presence or absence of nonspeech4
in the first 300 milliseconds between bonafide and spoof recordings. As
Section 4.6.3 demonstrates, this pattern difference has a profound impact
on model decisions. About 60.45%, 73.55% and 69.1% of the bonafide
audio files in the training, development and evaluation5 sets respectively
have nonspeech. On the contrary, 68.74% and 41.05% of the spoof files
in the training and development sets respectively have speech occurring
within the first 300 ms.
• Burst click sound (BCS). This thesis uses the term BCS to define an
abrupt click sound (low or loud) found in the start of audio recordings.
About 36.36%, 23.55% and 41.06% of bonafide audio files in the training,
development and evaluation sets were found to contain BCS in the start.
On the contrary, 2.45% spoof files in the training set have BCS. No spoof
class audio files in the development set have such BCS, and we do not
have ground truth annotations for spoofed signals in the evaluation set.
• Dual-tone multi-frequency signaling (DTMF) sound. About 45.58% (687
out of 1507) of spoof audio files in the training set and 16.63% (158 out of
950) in the development set were found to contain a DTMF sound (low or
loud) within the first 200-250 ms. The DTMF sound often overlaps with
the actual spoken speech. We find 33.77% (232 out of 687) spoof files and
6.96% (11 out of 158) in the training and development sets contain such
overlapping sounds. On the contrary, the bonafide class audio files do not
have such DTMF sounds.
• Silence. We find some bonafide audio recordings with more than 10 ms
zero valued silence in their start. There are 19.11% (288 out of 1507) such
bonafide files in the training set, 1.97% (15 out of 760) in the development
set and 10.09% (131 of 1298) in the evaluation set. Furthermore, in the
training set we find 23.61% (68 out of 288) files have more than 70 ms
silence and 12.85% (37 out of 288) with more than 100 ms silence in the
start. In contrast no spoof class files are found to have such zero valued
silence.
• Corrupted audio files. Bonafide files T 1000788.wav and D 1000581.wav,
and spoof files T 1002296.wav and E 1011601.wav do not contain any
speech. The prefixes T, D and E used in audio files denote training,
development and evaluation sets respectively.
4We use the nonspeech term to imply noise, music or silence samples in the start.
5Since we could not inspect a large number of spoof test files we do not have pattern
difference statistics on them.
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Table 3.7: ASVspoof 2019 LA dataset statistics.
Subset #Speakers #Bonafide #Spoofed
Training 20 2580 22800
Development 20 2548 22296
Evaluation 67 7355 63882
The filelists corresponding to above findings are provided in https://zenodo.
org/record/3601188#.XmzuknX7TCI.
3.3 ASVspoof 2019
The ASVspoof 2019 dataset was released as part of the third ASVspoof chal-
lenge evaluation held in 2019. It comprises two subtasks: Logical access (LA)
and physical access (PA). The LA subtask involves spoofing attacks mounted
by injecting synthetic/converted speech directly into an ASV system pipeline
bypassing its microphone. The PA subtask on the other hand involves physical
transmission of impersonated or playback speech through the systems’ micro-
phone. Examples of LA attacks include TTS and VC. Replay and mimicry
are examples of PA attacks. However, the ASVspoof 2019 PA subtask includes
only replay attacks. Two sub-datasets for the LA and PA conditions were made
available publicly6 by the ASVspoof organisers. As in previous ASVspoof chal-
lenge editions, the main task in this challenge is to build a standalone spoofing
detection system. However, with the introduction of the tandem detection cost
function (t-DCF) [Kinnunen et al., 2018] metric explained in Section 3.5.2, ASV
system scores were provided to every participants making joint evaluation of
ASV and spoofing countermeasures possible. Therefore, unlike previous chal-
lenges, this challenge made use of t-DCF as a primary evaluation metric and
equal error rate (EER) as the secondary metric. Section 3.5 provides further
details on evaluation metrics.
The ASVspoof 2019 database for LA and PA is derived from a standard
multi-speaker speech synthesis database called voice cloning toolkit database7.
A total of 46 male and 61 female speakers were used to collect clean bonafide
speech recordings without any background noise or channel effects. Spoofed
speech is then derived from them by applying advanced state-of-the-art TTS, VC
algorithms (for the LA dataset) and simulating replay attacks under controlled
simulation conditions (for the PA dataset).
6https://datashare.is.ed.ac.uk/handle/10283/3336
7http://dx.doi.org/10.7488/ds/1994
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Table 3.8: ASVspoof 2019 PA dataset statistics.
Subset #Speakers #Bonafide #Spoofed
Training 20 5400 48600
Development 20 5400 24300
Evaluation 67 18090 116640
3.3.1 Logical access (LA) spoofing dataset
Here, LA attack simply refers to TTS and VC attacks. The main difference
between the 2019 and 2015 editions’ TTS and VC datasets is in the use of algo-
rithms for creating them. The ASVspoof 2015 dataset was created using state-
of-the-art TTS and VC algorithms available until 2015. However, since 2015, the
TTS and VC communities both have made a substantial progress showcasing
models capable of producing synthetic and converted speech that are virtually
indistinguishable from real human speech. The ASVspoof 2019 LA dataset is
therefore created to bridge this gap and study TTS and VC based spoofing
algorithms using advanced state-of-the-art methodologies developed since 2015
[ASVspoof 2019 evaluation plan]. Table 3.7 summarises the ASVspoof 2019 LA
dataset. Both the training and development sets consist of 8 male and 12 female
speakers [Todisco et al., 2019., ASVspoof 2019 evaluation plan].
Furthermore, it should be noted that the main focus of this thesis is on
replay attacks, and therefore, most of the work is based on the ASVspoof 2017
and 2019 PA dataset. The LA dataset was used only during our participation
in the ASVspoof 2019 challenge evaluation (Section 5.2).
3.3.2 Physical access (PA) spoofing dataset
Understanding the replay spoofing attack problem using the ASVspoof 2017
edition dataset was quite challenging due to the methodology adopted for data
collection and compilation [ASVspoof 2019 evaluation plan]. It was created
from real playback and re-recording of bonafide utterances from RedDots [Lee
et al., 2015] in a somewhat uncontrolled setup [Todisco et al., 2019., ASVspoof
2019 evaluation plan]. To overcome these issues and perform better analysis
towards understanding the replay spoofing problem, the ASVspoof 2019 PA
dataset was created using simulations in a much more controlled setup. Re-
play attacks were simulated using a variety of replay and recording devices
under carefully controlled room acoustic and replay configurations as detailed
in [ASVspoof 2019 evaluation plan]. Here, PA attack simply refers to replay
spoofing attacks. Table 3.8 summarises the PA dataset. As in LA, the train-
ing and development sets consist of 8 male and 12 female speakers [Todisco
et al., 2019., ASVspoof 2019 evaluation plan]. However, the numbers of audio
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examples in the training and development sets are comparatively larger than in
LA.
3.3.3 Real PA dataset
While the ASVspoof 2019 PA dataset was created using simulated replay at-
tacks, the ASVspoof 2019 real PA dataset consists of audio recordings developed
under real replay conditions. The real PA dataset consists of 2, 700 audio files
with 540 bonafide and 2, 160 spoof recordings [Todisco et al., 2019.]. The re-
played recordings were developed using: 10 different recording devices and 7
different playback devices of low and high qualities; three different types of
acoustic environments: medium size office, large office and a meeting room;
four different noise conditions to add additive noise: very quiet, quiet fan, low
AC noise, and window open; close and far distances between ASV-talker and
attacker-talker8. This testset is primarily developed for studying the generalis-
ability of countermeasure models in unseen real-world test conditions.
3.4 Other spoofing corpora
For completeness, this section will now provide a brief description of the other
spoofing datasets that are available publicly but not used extensively in this the-
sis. Firstly, the realistic replay attack corpus (ReMASC), a new replay spoofing
dataset, is described in Subsection 3.4.1. Then the Subsection 3.4.2 discusses
the AVspoof dataset which is the first publicly available corpus containing replay
attack samples created in a controlled recording and playback setting. Another
publicly available spoofing dataset is ASVspoof 2015 that was released in 2015
as part of the first ASVspoof competition [Wu et al., 2015c]. This chapter does
not provide much details here because this thesis focusses on replay spoofing
attacks and the ASVspoof 2015 dataset was designed to study logical access
(TTS, VC) spoofing attack conditions. Please see [Wu et al., 2015c] for more
details on the ASVspoof 2015 challenge and the dataset.
3.4.1 ReMASC
ReMASC - a realistic replay attack corpus [Gong et al., 2019] is a publicly avail-
able corpus for replay spoofing attack research in voice controlled applications.
It consists of both bonafide and replayed recordings collected under realistic
use-case scenarios. The dataset contains recordings collected using a variety
of microphone arrays recorded in different acoustical environmental conditions,
8Details taken from “README.PA.read.txt” file released along with the real PA dataset.
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with various types of background noise and different positions between speakers
and VC systems. More details on this dataset can be found in [Gong et al.,
2019]. The current dataset version consists of two disjoint sets. The first set
has about 2, 000 replayed recordings covering all recording conditions for quick
evaluation (in a cross-dataset setting) of countermeasure models. The second
set consists of about 27, 000 recordings which can be used to design countermea-
sure models and further analyse how different playback devices and microphones
impact model performance.
3.4.2 AVspoof
The AVspoof (audio visual spoofing) dataset is the first publicly available cor-
pus that includes replay spoofing attacks [Ergünay et al., 2015]. It contains
bonafide speech samples recorded from 44 speakers (31 males and 13 females)
using one laptop and two smartphones. For controlled dataset creation the au-
thors made an assumption that an ASV system is deployed in a laptop. The
replayed samples were then generated in three different settings. First, the orig-
inal bonafide samples were replayed using a laptop with internal speakers and
external high quality (HQ) speakers, and also with two smartphones (Samsung
Galaxy S4 and iPhone 3G). Second, the synthesized speech produced using TTS
was replayed using a laptop and HQ speakers to an ASV system (installed in
the laptop). Thirdly, voice converted speech was replayed with a laptop with
HQ speakers. See [Ergünay et al., 2015] (Table 1) for further details on the
distribution of replayed and bonafide samples. It should be noted that both
bonafide and replayed utterances were compiled in a controlled setting. This
is one reason why this thesis does not use this dataset, rather it focusses on
ASVspoof datasets due to its popularity and incorporation of much more wild
replay attack conditions. However, for completeness, this thesis includes the
details of the AVspoof dataset here.
3.5 Evaluation metrics
So far this chapter has provided an overview of publicly available replay spoof-
ing datasets that will be used in this thesis. Now, to evaluate the performance
of countermeasure models it is important to define appropriate evaluation met-
rics. To this end, the thesis adopts the two metrics used in the ASVspoof chal-
lenges: equal error rate (EER) and tandem detection cost function (t-DCF).
Section 3.5.1 and Section 3.5.2 provide further details on these metrics.
Unless otherwise stated, the EER is used as a primary evaluation metric in
this thesis. Furthermore, the EER and t-DCF metrics are computed using the
71
scripts released by the organisers of the ASVspoof 2019 challenge.
3.5.1 Equal error rate
The equal error rate (EER) metric is used to evaluate the ability of spoofing
countermeasure models to discriminate bonafide and spoofed utterances from
each other. EER was the primary evaluation metric of the ASVspoof 2017
challenge, and a secondary metric of the ASVspoof 2019 challenge. EER is the
error rate at an operating point where the false acceptance (false alarm) and
false rejection (miss) rates are equal. The false acceptance rate (FAR) and the
false rejection rate (FRR) are respectively defined as:
FAR =
FP
FP + TN
(3.1)
FRR =
FN
TP + FN
(3.2)
where TP, TN, FP, and FN denote true positive, true negative, false positive
and false negative counts respectively. It should be further noted that a reference
value of 50% EER indicates the chance level.
3.5.2 Tandem detection cost function
In addition to EER, this thesis uses the tandem detection cost function (t-
DCF) [Kinnunen et al., 2018] metric to evaluate countermeasure (CM) perfor-
mance. Unlike EER, which evaluates countermeasure performance in isolation
from ASV, the t-DCF metric evaluates countermeasure and ASV performance
jointly under a Bayesian decision risk approach. Let s and t represent detection
thresholds for a CM and an ASV system respectively. The t-DCF metric is
defined as:
t-DCF(s, t) = Casvmiss · πtar · Pa(s, t)
+ Casvfa · πnon · Pb(s, t)
+ Ccmfa · πspoof · Pc(s, t)
+ Ccmmiss · πtar · Pd(s)
(3.3)
where, πtar, πnon, πspoof represents target, nontarget and spoof prior proba-
bilities; Pa(s, t), Pb(s, t), Pc(s, t) and Pd(s) represent 4 different error probabil-
ities represented as a function of detection thresholds and defined as follows.
Pa(s, t): CM does not miss human speech, and ASV falsely rejects the target;
Pb(s, t): CM does not miss human speech, and ASV falsely accepts the nontar-
get; Pc(s, t): CM falsely passes on a spoof sample, and ASV does not miss the
target; Pd(s): CM misses human speech; C
asv
miss: cost of ASV system rejecting a
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target trial9; Casvfa : cost of ASV system accepting a nontarget trial; C
cm
fa : cost
of CM accepting a spoof trial; Ccmmiss: cost of CM rejecting a human trial.
The same t-DCF cost and prior parameters as used in the ASVspoof 2019
evaluation [Todisco et al., 2019., ASVspoof 2019 evaluation plan], with the x-
vector probabilistic linear discriminant analysis (PLDA) scores provided by the
organisers of the same challenge is used in this thesis. The ASV system is set
to its EER operating point while the (normalized) t-DCF is reported by setting
the countermeasure to its minimum-cost operating point. A reference value 1.00
of (normalized) t-DCF indicates an uninformative countermeasure. For further
details please see [Kinnunen et al., 2018].
3.6 Summary
This chapter provided a detailed description of the spoofing datasets and evalu-
ation metrics available publicly for promoting anti-spoofing research. The work
described in Chapters 4 and 5 mostly uses the ASVspoof 2017 and 2019 datasets.
Furthermore, for completeness, the chapter also included a brief description of
datasets not used in this thesis but available publicly. Along with the database
description, this chapter also summarised the results of a qualitative analysis
on ASVspoof 2017 v2.0 that has provided interesting insights into the dataset.
These insights will be later used in Section 4.6 to understand how they influence
decisions made by countermeasure models. Finally, this chapter provided a de-
scription of two different performance metrics that will be used in this thesis to
evaluate countermeasure performance.
9Trial: is simply a test speech utterance passed to a CM or an ASV system.
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Chapter 4
Analysis of spoofing
countermeasures
4.1 Introduction
This chapter presents a series of studies on the analysis of existing features, clas-
sifiers and methods for replay spoofing detection. It aims at serving as the basis
towards understanding the replay spoofing attack problem by first exploring
existing methodologies and techniques from the literature. The work reported
in this chapter mostly uses the ASVspoof 2017 dataset, as the ASVspoof 2019
dataset was released towards the completion of this thesis. Section 3 describes
these datasets.
Firstly, in Section 4.2 several existing hand-crafted features, coupled with
a GMM classifier, that showed promising performance on the ASVspoof 2015
dataset for the detection of converted and synthetic speech, are considered.
Their generalisability towards replay spoofing attack detection is investigated
using the ASVspoof 2017 v1.0 dataset, followed by the analysis of the best per-
forming GMM countermeasure model. This work is a result of our participation
in the ASVspoof 2017 challenge, and was published in [Chettri and Sturm, 2018].
Following the impressive performance by Lavrentyeva et al. [2017] in the
ASVspoof 2017 challenge, Section 4.3 focusses on replicating their best per-
forming light CNN (LCNN) model. It also investigates alternative network ar-
chitectures and further studies how performance varies across different network
parameterisations. This work was published in [Chettri et al., 2018b]. The next
Section 4.4 then analyses different replay attack conditions and their impact
on both frame-level and utterance-level countermeasure models. This work was
published in [Chettri et al., 2018c]. Subsequently, Section 4.5 develops a CNN
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countermeasure model whose architecture and input representation is adapted
from the LCNN model of the ASVspoof 2017 challenge. The SLIME algorithm
(described in Section 2.9.2) is then applied to understand what the CNN model
has learned to make spoofing decisions. This work was published in [Chettri
et al., 2018a].
Following the findings about potential dataset artefacts on the ASVspoof
2017 v2.0 dataset presented in Section 3.2.3, the next Section 4.6 performs an in-
depth study through various interventions towards understanding the impact of
different dataset artefacts (see Section 3.2.3) on both frame-level and utterance-
level countermeasure models. Finally, this chapter concludes with a summary
in Section 4.7.
4.2 Generalisability of hand-crafted features
4.2.1 Introduction
This section describes the work towards studying the effectiveness of six differ-
ent hand-designed features and machine learning approaches for the automatic
detection of replayed speech on the ASVspoof 2017 v1.0 dataset. These features
have shown good performance on the detection of synthetic and voice converted
spoofed speech applied to the ASVspoof 2015 dataset. Replay attacks, however,
are in principle very different from these artificial speech attacks: while they
have the same objective — to bypass an ASV system — they are acoustically
different. Therefore, it is not obvious whether one should expect the extensive
prior results reported in [Sahidullah et al., 2015] on the ASVspoof 2015 data to
generalise at all to the detection of replay attacks. Thus, our primary scientific
contribution in this section is to thoroughly assess performance of these features
for replay spoofing detection using the ASVspoof 2017 v1.0 dataset. The work
described here is a result of our participation in the ASVspoof 2017 evaluations
(described in Section 2.3), and our post-evaluation findings which were pub-
lished in [Chettri and Sturm, 2018]. Motivated from [Sahidullah et al., 2015],
this section focusses on using a Gaussian Mixture Model (GMM) as a backend
classifier. Subsection 4.2.2 provides a brief description of six different features
investigated and the backend GMM classifier. The performance of these sys-
tems on the replay attack problem applied to the ASVspoof 2017 v1.0 dataset
is then discussed. The next Subsection 4.2.3 then aims at understanding the
best performing GMM countermeasure model and brings interesting findings
to light. It is demonstrated that GMM performance can depend on a simple
class-dependent cue in the dataset: initial silence frames of zeros appear in the
bonafide signals but are missing in the spoofed versions. Furthermore, it is
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shown that using this cue, model predictions can be easily fooled. Finally, this
section investigates whether this problem can be mitigated by a simple prepro-
cessing on the audio signals. Subsection 4.2.4 then provides a summary of the
work done in this section.
4.2.2 Experimental design and evaluation
This section provides a brief description of different features considered, the
backend GMM classifier, and the dataset and performance metrics used for
performance evaluation. A brief description of the ASVspoof 2017 challenge
baselines is also provided.
Feature extraction
We explore the use of six different hand-crafted features: MFCCs, IMFCCs,
RFCCs, LFCCs, SCMCs and CQCCs. While the first five features are based on
the short-time Fourier transform (STFT), CQCCs use the constant-Q transform.
Section 2.5 provides more details on these features. As for feature extraction,
we use the publicly available scripts provided by the ASVspoof 2017 challenge
organisers for computing CQCC features [Todisco et al., 2017]. For computing
the other five STFT-based features, we use the publicly released scripts by
Sahidullah et al. [2015]. All our systems use 40-dimensional features obtained
by concatenating 20 delta and 20 acceleration coefficients, including energy1.
We do not use voice activity detection or normalisation.
Model
We use a Gaussian mixture model (GMM) backend to evaluate the generalis-
ability of hand-crafted features for replay spoofing attack detection. Given a
speech utterance s, the main goal is to build a system that determines if it is
bonafide speech or a replayed recording. Each system except the CQCC2, one
extracts a series of Hamming-windowed frames of 20 ms duration with 50% over-
lap, and transforms it into a series of T feature vectors, X (s) := (x1, . . . ,xT ).
The system then computes a mean log-likelihood score by
Λ(s) :=
1
|X (s)|
∑
xt∈X (s)
log
p(xt|θbonafide)
p(xt|θspoof )
(4.1)
1Our choice of feature configuration was optimised on the development set, and we do not
use static features.
2CQCC features are extracted using the same feature parameterisation as in Todisco et al.
[2017].
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Table 4.1: GMM performance (EER%) on the ASVspoof 2017 v1.0 development
and evaluation sets. B1: baseline. na: not available.
IMFCC MFCC LFCC RFCC SCMC CQCC B1
Dev 8.5 7.17 3.33 5.15 5.46 1.51 na
Eval 17.43 26.02 17.61 16.67 14.82 17.78 24.77
where p(x|θbonafide) is the probability density characterizing genuine speech fea-
tures, and p(x|θspoof ) is that of spoofed speech features. The larger Λ(s) is, the
more confidence the model has that s is genuine. We estimate p(x|θbonafide) and
p(x|θspoof ) by a GMM using the expectation maximization algorithm [Bishop,
2006] on pooled training data. We optimise the number of mixture components
on the development dataset and chose 512 for MFCC, LFCC and CQCC; 128
for IMFCC and RFCC; and 256 for SCMC features.
Dataset and evaluation metric
This study uses the ASVspoof 2017 v1.0 dataset (described in Section 3.2.1) that
was released as part of the second ASVspoof challenge evaluation (Section 2.3)
and the EER metric for performance evaluation as described in Section 3.5.1.
Baseline
Two baseline GMM systems based on CQCC features were provided by the
ASVspoof 2017 challenge organisers. Both use 90-dimensional features obtained
by combining the 0th and 29 static coefficients, their delta and acceleration
coefficients. The first baseline (B1) uses both training and development data
for GMM training while the second baseline (B2) uses only the training data.
However both GMMs used 512 mixture components. Since we use pooled data
in this work, we only include B1 in our further discussion.
Results
Table 4.1 shows the results of our six frame-based GMM systems on both the
development and evaluation sets, and the baseline B1 system. Our CQCC fea-
ture based GMM outperforms the baseline performance by a large margin. This
suggests that static features may not offer substantial discriminative informa-
tion useful for replay attack detection in contrast to the use of dynamic features.
Except for the one using MFCCs, all systems outperform the 24.77% baseline
performance on the evaluation data [Kinnunen et al., 2017a] by a large mar-
gin. IMFCC features give more emphasis on high frequency information than
MFCCs, and seem to have more discriminability. LFCC and RFCC systems
equally emphasise all frequency bands and have similar performance. Both
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Figure 4.1: Spectrograms (first row) and frame-wise log likelihood score differ-
ence (second row) between bonafide and spoof GMMs for (a) genuine correct;
(b) spoofed correct, and (c) genuine incorrect audio examples taken from the
development set.
CQCC and SCMC features show good generalisability on the replayed speech
detection task, but the latter show the best result on the evaluation data. This
suggests that the distribution of energy expressed by SCMC features is the most
discriminative and generalisable of these six kinds of features.
4.2.3 Analysis
We now take a closer look at the best GMM system which is based on SCMC
features to discover the cues that influence its prediction. We look at how the
log-likelihood scores for the bonafide (genuine) and spoofed (replayed) GMM
models are distributed across frames. We pick a bonafide and spoofed example
from the development set that the system confidently and correctly classifies:
“D 1000601.wav” produces Λ(s) = 14.66; “D 1001012.wav” produces Λ(s) =
−0.96. We also select the genuine signal “D 1000300.wav” that is confidently
misclassified with a score Λ(s) = −0.21. For easy reference we define these
signals as genuine correct, spoof correct and genuine incorrect. Figure 4.1 shows
for each signal its spectrogram (first row) and the frame-wise distribution of
log-likelihoods (bottom row) in each model. We observe a marginal difference
between genuine and spoofed model scores across frames for genuine incorrect
and spoof correct, respectively. However, we see significantly different behavior
for genuine correct. The decision for this signal is dominated by its first few
frames. We find that many genuine audio files in this dataset contain initial
silence frames with zeros which do not appear in the spoofed version. As can be
seen in Figure 4.1 second row, the spoofed model assigns a very small probability
to such a frame, thus pushing the decision toward the bonafide class. As a
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Table 4.2: Performance (EER%) of GMMs after adding the genuine signature
to every utterance in the development and evaluation set.
IMFCC MFCC LFCC RFCC SCMC CQCC
Dev 34.54 33.48 34.92 28.92 46.74 2.27
Eval 34.46 35.95 38.23 34.22 44.44 18.71
consequence, this has a large influence on the classifier decision (Equation 4.1).
To further confirm that GMM decisions are influenced by this silence cue
favouring the bonafide class, we perform intervention3 experiments on all frame-
based GMM systems. Furthermore, for completeness and to study how this cue
affects models trained at utterance-level, we train two such models. First, we
train support vector machines (SVMs) using i-vectors which are computed us-
ing SCMC features. Second, we train a convolutional neural network (CNN)
on power spectrograms using the architecture adapted from the LCNN [Lavren-
tyeva et al., 2017] model that showed the best performance in the ASVspoof
2017 evaluations.
Frame-based model intervention
We find that genuine correct begins with 60 ms of zeros, except four samples
containing non-zero values. Therefore, we define this 60 ms segment of gen-
uine correct as a “genuine signature” and add it onto the beginning of the two
other signals, spoofed correct and genuine incorrect. As expected, the model
now scores both in favor of being genuine: Λ(s) = 6.85 and Λ(s) = 11.63 for
spoofed correct and genuine incorrect respectively. When we repeat this process
for all test files in the development and evaluation set and re-evaluate all our
GMM systems we see a dramatic increase in the EER of all systems except
for the CQCC one. The IMFCC system that showed 8.5% and 17.43% EER
before gives 34.54% and 34.46% EER on the development and evaluation sets
respectively. We observe a similar trend for the LFCC and RFCC systems. Our
best performing SCMC system now gives the worst performance. We observe
a very small increase in the EER for CQCCs: from 17.78% to 18.81% on the
evaluation set in comparison to other five features. Thus, the CQCC features
that give higher frequency resolution for lower frequencies and a higher tempo-
ral resolution for higher frequencies seem to be robust against such presentation
attacks — augmenting silence in the start of test signals.
Our above analysis casts doubts on the reliability of the evaluation results
of the ASVspoof Challenge: are the other participating systems benefiting from
3This thesis defines Intervention as a process that updates the original audio signal either
by adding or removing audio samples. This is mainly performed to understand the influence
of certain dataset related artefacts/biases on model predictions.
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Table 4.3: Performance (EER%) for two cases of preprocessing. Approach 1:
remove the first 60 ms during testing from all the test files. Approach 2: same as
in Approach 1 but retrains the bonafide GMM applying the same preprocessing.
Approach1 Approach2
Dev Eval Dev Eval
IMFCC 8.78 19.18 8.66 19.10
MFCC 8.54 31.79 8.5 31.9
LFCC 4.01 21.46 4.41 21.06
RFCC 7.05 19.85 7.43 20.1
SCMC 6.4 17.98 6.39 17.7
CQCC 2.14 19.79 1.97 19.35
this signature, which will not exist “in the wild”? How prevalent is this signature
in the data? Can we improve the reliability of this challenge by simply deleting
the first 60 ms of each test audio file, and using the same trained models? To
this end, we propose two simple preprocessing approaches. The first approach
(Approach 1) involves removing the first 60 ms samples from all test files. The
second approach (Approach 2) is similar to the first one but this also involves
retraining the bonafide GMM removing the initial 60 ms samples from all the
training audio files. Table 4.3 shows the results of this intervention experiment.
As can be seen, applying Approach 1 on all the test files increases the EER
of each system tested in Table 4.1, but not by a large amount. Furthermore,
applying Approach 2, we observe a small increase in the EER of each system.
These results suggest that the signature is not very prevalent throughout the
data, but that it is prevalent enough to allow a simple means of bypassing an
otherwise good performing replay attack spoofing detection system.
Utterance-based model intervention
The previous models we trained and tested on the ASVspoof 2017 v1.0 dataset
are all frame-level. Will systems using utterance-level features suffer from the
same vulnerability? We now investigate two models: GMM and SVM, built
using features learned from a CNN and i-vectors [Dehak et al., 2011]. We do
not optimise these models for the best performance.
For the CNN-based features, we use the parameterisation and network archi-
tecture from [Lavrentyeva et al., 2017] for training the CNN with the following
changes. First, we use a 3 seconds log power spectrogram computed using 2048
FFT points, window size of 128 ms and a 10 ms hop size. We truncate or copy
original audio samples to obtain a fixed 3 seconds spectrogram for every audio
file in the dataset. Second, we use a convolutional layer in place of a network-
in-network layer. Third, we use 64 neurons in the fully connected layer. Fourth,
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we replace the max-feature-map by an exponential linear unit [Clevert et al.,
2015] activation and train our network. Appendix A provides further details on
the model architecture. The trained network extracts 64-dimensional feature
vectors for every audio file in the dataset. We then train bonafide and spoofed
GMM models using 8 mixture components4. Unlike the GMMs trained earlier,
this GMM is trained at utterance-level as each audio file is represented by a
single 64-dimensional vector. It should be noted that our input pipeline for
spectrogram computation uses a preprocessing step that ensures the smallest
value in the spectrogram is no less than 1e-7. Thus the network will implicitly
take care of the genuine signature (zero-valued samples).
We use 40-dimensional delta-acceleration SCMC features to train a 256 mix-
ture universal background model and total variability matrix with 200 factors
on the pooled data. We extract 200-dimensional i-vectors for the entire dataset.
We then use the training set i-vectors to train a linear SVM using the Scikit-
learn [Pedregosa et al., 2011] library.
Table 4.4: Performance (EER%) of utterance-based models before and after
injecting the genuine signature to all the test files in the development and eval-
uation set. * trained using CNN features. ** trained using i-vectors
GMM* SVM**
Dev Eval Dev Eval
Before 9.06 32.65 21.88 20.9
After 9.24 32.69 21.81 20.5
Table 4.4 shows the performance of these two utterance-based models before
and after we add the “genuine signature” to the test files. As i-vector extraction
involves stacking mean vectors from the mixture components, the effect of the
zero valued samples is taken care of automatically and thus we do not see any
impact on performance after adding the genuine signature. Similarly, the CNN
has a max-pooling layer that chooses a maximum from a given block of convolved
input, thus the artefacts are taken care of in the first convolutional layer, thereby
eliminating the impact of the genuine signature on the predictions. As expected,
the experimental results in Table 4.4 clearly indicate that systems trained on
utterance-based fixed length feature representations using the ASVspoof 2017
v1.0 dataset are resilient against such presentation attacks.
4This choice is motivated from Lavrentyeva et al. [2017] where they used 1-mixture com-
ponent to train GMM on 32 dimensional CNN features (extracted per utterance). We tried 1,
2, 4 and 8 mixture components and found the best performance using 8 mixture components
on the development set.
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4.2.4 Discussion
This section investigated the generalisability of six different hand-designed fea-
tures for the automatic detection of replay spoofing attacks using the ASVspoof
2017 v1.0 dataset. Though these features reported good performance for the de-
tection of synthetic and voice converted speech on the ASVspoof 2015 dataset,
they showed poor performance on the ASVspoof 2017 dataset due to the acous-
tically different problem in hand. Among different features investigated in this
section, the SCMC feature based GMMs showed the best replay attack detec-
tion performance on the ASVspoof 2017 v1.0 dataset. Deeper analysis (Sec-
tion 4.2.3) of this system led us to interesting observations. We found the
presence of recording artefacts (initial silence frames containing zeros) in some
genuine audio files in the dataset that are missing from the replayed version.
As a consequence, spoofed models assign a very low likelihood to such frames
during testing. We demonstrated how knowledge of such cues can compromise
system predictions. Though such data-intrinsic behavior may not appear in real-
world scenarios, our work showed the severe impact it can have on the EER for
frame-level GMM systems. We investigated two intervention approaches to help
mitigate against such manipulation attacks. Comparing Table 4.2 and Table 4.3
we see that our proposed approaches not only helped reduce the error rates of all
frame-based GMMs, but they are now more trustworthy. Finally, Section 4.2.3
investigated two utterance-based countermeasure models and shows that they
do not suffer from such manipulation. A bigger question we have yet to answer
is what is causing the large difference between the EER on the development and
evaluation datasets, which we aim to address in the next section.
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4.3 CNNs for spoofing detection
4.3.1 Introduction
The previous Section 4.2 studied the generalisability of hand-crafted features
that showed good detection performance for spoofed speech produced using
text-to-speech and voice conversion techniques, but poor performance for re-
play spoofing attack detection. This indicates that crafting features incorpo-
rating human knowledge might not be easy due to the acoustically different
problems, suggesting that data-driven techniques might be more helpful for the
replay spoofing detection problem. Many competing systems in the ASVspoof
2017 evaluations used deep learning-based countermeasures for replay spoofing
detection. For example, the top two systems [Lavrentyeva et al., 2017] and
[Nagarsheth et al., 2017] used deep CNNs as feature extractors to learn discrim-
inative features. Then shallow classifiers such as GMMs and SVMs were trained
on them to discriminate between bonafide and spoofed recordings. Among three
sub-systems used in score fusion by [Lavrentyeva et al., 2017] as a primary sys-
tem submission in the 2017 challenge, the best performance was achieved by
the light CNN (LCNN) model reporting an EER of 7.34% on the evaluation
set of the ASVspoof 2017 v1.0 dataset. The success of CNNs in the ASVspoof
2017 challenge inspires the work reported in this section. Our ultimate goal
here is to understand why the LCNN showed remarkable performance towards
replay attack detection on this dataset which no other participants could reach
a performance even close to 10% EER during the 2017 evaluations. A precursor
to analyse such model is to train one that performs ‘fairly’ (better than the
baseline) in the evaluation set. The main focus of this section is therefore on
replication of the LCNN model which we aim to use later in Section 4.5 for
analysis. Related background on CNNs is provided in Subsection 2.6.2.
To this end, this section reports the experiments and challenges to design a
deep countermeasure model that is trained and evaluated on the ASVspoof 2017
v1.0 dataset. Firstly, this section provides a brief motivation of this work with
a summary of best deep models published on this dataset. Secondly, Subsec-
tion 4.3.2 describes our efforts in replicating the state-of-the-art LCNN model
in an end-to-end setting. We found that our CNN-based model generalises well
on the development set, but consistently underperforms in the evaluation set.
Thirdly we explain our experiments to find a suitable architecture that gen-
eralises well to the unseen data in Subsection 4.3.3. We explored a number of
architectures including the second best deep model of the challenge [Nagarsheth
et al., 2017]. But the performance on the evaluation dataset is always poor. This
raises several interesting questions about the possible differences in the dataset
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and why they are more evident in an end-to-end setting and what are the possi-
ble ways to tackle this problem. We also propose a novel CNN architecture for
the spoofing detection task with far fewer trainable parameters. Furthermore,
we also investigate the effect of network parameterisation on performance in
Subsection 4.3.4. Subsection 4.3.5 then provides a summary of the work done
in this section.
It should be noted that all the models are trained and tested on the ASVspoof
2017 v1.0 dataset (see Section 3.2.1) and use the EER metric for performance
evaluation (see Section 3.5). Next, we provide a short description of the pub-
lished deep learning systems from the ASVspoof 2017 challenge evaluations.
Best published deep learning systems
Below we provide a summary of deep learning based systems that have been
evaluated on the ASVspoof 2017 v1.0 dataset.
• System A [Lavrentyeva et al., 2017]: This system used score-level fusion
of three sub-systems. The first is a GMM trained on features extracted
from a CNN — which in turn is trained on log-power spectrograms. The
second is an i-vector based SVM system where i-vectors were extracted
from LPCC. And the third is an end-to-end CNN-RNN system trained on
log-power spectrograms.
• System B [Nagarsheth et al., 2017]: The authors train a CNN as a fea-
ture extractor using tandem features — combining CQCCs with High
Frequency Cepstral Coefficients (HFCCs5). They train this network in a
multi-class setting to model different spoofing attack configurations seen
in the training and development set. Then for every audio recording in
the dataset they extract feature embeddings using the pretrained CNN. A
binary SVM classifier is then trained on these embeddings to discriminate
between the bonafide and spoofed classes.
• System C [Chen et al., 2017]: This system employed score-level fusion of
three sub-systems. The first is a GMM trained on the CQCC features. The
second and third systems are residual neural networks (ResNets) trained
on the MFCC and CQCC features respectively.
• System D [Cai et al., 2017]: This system used score-level fusion of three
sub-systems. The first is a GMM trained on CQCC features (the baseline
model from the challenge). The second is also a GMM system trained on
CQCCs but uses augmented data during training (for the spoofed GMM).
5[Nagarsheth et al., 2017] apply a high pass filter with a cutoff frequency of 3500 Hz to
discard fundamental and harmonic speech frequencies and extract HFCC features.
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Table 4.5: Performance (EER %) of the best deep learning systems on the
development and evaluation sets.
System Dev Eval
A [Lavrentyeva et al., 2017] 3.95 6.73
B [Nagarsheth et al., 2017] 7.6 11.5
C [Chen et al., 2017] 2.58 13.29
D [Cai et al., 2017] 3.52 16.39
E [Alluri et al., 2017] 2.21 17.82
LCNN [Lavrentyeva et al., 2017] 4.53 7.34
The authors apply different parametric reverberators and phase shifters
to create simulated replay data. The third system is a residual neural
network trained on spectrograms.
• System E [Alluri et al., 2017]: This system used score-level fusion of a
GMM and a Bi-directional long short term memory network (BLSTM).
The authors use their proposed Single Frequency Filter Cepstral Coef-
ficients (SFFCC) based delta-features to train the GMM and BLSTM
models.
• LCNN [Lavrentyeva et al., 2017]: This is one of the sub-systems of A that
uses features extracted from a CNN to train a single-component GMM
to model spoofed and bonafide classes. This stand-alone system has con-
tributed the most among other sub-systems in system A reporting an EER
of 7.34% on the evaluation set (Table 4.5).
Table 4.5 summarises the results of these systems on the development and
evaluation sets. We observe a remarkable performance by system A, the state-
of-the-art [Lavrentyeva et al., 2017]. The top two systems (A and B) show
similar levels of generalisation6 on the development and the evaluation sets
which however contradicts with the performance shown by the other systems C,
D and E.
Motivation
Usually the success of deep learning systems is attributed to the availability of
large training data. However, within the context of the ASVspoof 2017 v1.0
(see Section 3.2.1), where the training data is significantly less than the test
data, training a deep neural network to be able to achieve good generalisation
can be challenging. Therefore we outline the following questions that motivate
the work in this section.
6The gap between the EER on the development and the evaluation datasets is nearly the
same.
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• Using only the available training and development data, is it possible to
train an end-to-end CNN that generalises well to the evaluation dataset?
• Why is there a huge performance gap between the development and eval-
uation datasets? Could one reason be due to the high imbalance in the
number of utterances between the two above mentioned sets?
• Lastly, given such a small training data (about 2.22 hours), can we design
a deep architecture with fewer trainable parameters that neither underfits
nor overfits on training data?
This work tries to seek answers to the above questions and discusses the
possible outcomes. The next section will describe our experiments towards
replicating the LCNN model.
4.3.2 Replicating the state-of-the-art LCNN
Here we describe our efforts in replicating LCNN — the best performing CNN
model of the ASVspoof 2017 challenge that reported an EER of 7.34% on the
evaluation set. We train our replicated version of the LCNN model using the
same input representation and network parameterisation [Lavrentyeva et al.,
2017] with the following difference7: we use 2048 FFT points and 2048 window
size with a 10 ms hop size to compute the spectrograms. Therefore, our input
spectrogram is of shape 400 × 1025 instead of 400 × 864 as used in LCNN
[Lavrentyeva et al., 2017], where 400 denotes time frames and 1025 number
of frequency bins. We either truncate or copy the original samples depending
upon the original audio duration to create a 4 seconds fixed duration audio
representation. We do this for every audio recording in the dataset. We use
the Librosa8 library for computing the spectrograms. Appendix A provides the
details of the LCNN architecture.
Model training and testing
The input to the network is a mean-variance normalised log power magnitude
spectrogram. We initialise our network weights using Xavier initialisation [Glo-
rot and Bengio, 2010] and biases with zero. The network is trained to optimise
the cross entropy loss between the bonafide and spoofed classes. As specified
in [Lavrentyeva et al., 2017], we use max-feature-map (MFM) non-linearity, a
learning rate of 0.0001, 32 as batch size, and 0.9 as the momentum. The network
7Our preliminary experiments using 1728 FFT points show worse performance on the
evaluation set. We envisage that use of higher frequency resolution (2048 point FFT) should
help improve detection performance.
8http://librosa.github.io
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Figure 4.2: Cross entropy loss on the training and development sets for four
different runs of training our replicated version of the LCNN.
is trained using stochastic gradient descent with the ADAM optimiser [Kingma
and Ba, 2014]. The default parameter value of epsilon did not work and we use
0.1 instead. A dropout of 70% to the inputs of the first fully connected layer is
used during model training. We use the tensorflow [Abadi et al., 2015] frame-
work for the CNN implementation. We use early stopping9 during training to
overcome overfitting. If the validation loss does not improve for 30 epochs then
we abort the training. We use a maximum of 300 training epochs and chose
the model that shows the best performance on the validation data. At inference
time, for each audio spectrogram the model outputs a posterior probability dis-
tribution for the bonafide and spoofed classes. The final score is obtained by
converting these posteriors into a log likelihood ratio and the EER is computed.
Using the above described approach, we train 5 different CNN models initialised
with different random weights, with an aim to study how model behaviour varies
across different runs of model training.
Results
Figure 4.2 shows the training and validation cross entropy loss visualisations
for four different training runs of our replicated version of LCNN model. As
expected, we see a decrease in the training loss as the number of epochs in-
crease. Except for a few bumps in some training epochs the loss decreases
smoothly reaching almost 0% after few training epochs. This holds true for
all four training runs. However, we do not observe much improvement in the
validation loss after 20 - 30 epochs suggesting a case of overfitting. All our
9Lavrentyeva et al. [2017] do not mention using early stopping in their paper.
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Table 4.6: Performance (EER%) of our replicated CNNs in an end-to-end set-
ting and training GMMs on CNN features. Shown results are for five different
training runs.
End-to-End GMM
Dev Eval Dev Eval
Run 1 9.04 32.02 9.49 34.00
Run 2 9.30 37.67 10.46 39.00
Run 3 8.01 30.96 9.40 34.24
Run 4 14.11 36.97 12.80 38.70
Run 5 9.11 37.34 10.78 35.66
models are trained on the training set and validated using the development set.
We present the results of our replicated version of the LCNN model in Table
4.6. Furthermore, for comparison with the state-of-the-art performance we also
build a GMM system trained on features extracted from our pre-trained CNNs.
For each audio recording, a 32 dimensional feature vector, which is the output
of the fully connected layer (with 32 units), is extracted. A one-component
GMM is then trained to model the bonafide and spoofed feature distribution
and the log-likelihood difference between the bonafide and spoof GMMs is used
for scoring as described in Equation 4.1. Having run the setup for five different
runs with different random initialisations, none of our replicated version models
could achieve a performance even half of what Lavrentyeva et al. [2017] reported
under the common training conditions. We observe the best performance for
Run 3, with an EER of 8.01% and 30.96% on the development and evaluation
sets under an end-to-end setting and 9.4% and 34.24% using GMMs. We also
tried a small experiment altering the training and validation sets, where we now
use the development set for learning CNN parameters and the training set for
validation. Using this approach our model reported a small EER of 2% on the
validation set (which is the training set in this case), but worse performance on
the evaluation set.
We make the following observations: (1) We do not see a substantial differ-
ence in performance by training the GMM on CNN features in contrast to the
end-to-end model, suggesting that the features learned by CNN are not gener-
alisable; (2) On the evaluation set we see a large variance in performance across
different runs of model training, suggesting difficulty in reproducing the same
results; (3) The performance gap between the development set and evaluation
set is always large. This suggests overfitting on the development set and that the
development set partition may not be representative of the unseen evaluation
set.
Therefore these experiments suggest that it is quite difficult to replicate the
LCNN model to achieve the same level of generalisation between the develop-
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ment and evaluation sets using the limited details provided by Lavrentyeva et al.
[2017]. In the next section we investigate new CNN architectures with an aim to
achieve better generalisation on both the development and the evaluation sets.
4.3.3 Investigating alternative CNN architectures
This section now describes three different CNN architectures using log-power
spectrogram inputs for replay spoofing attack detection. The first architecture
which we call Model1, is adapted from [Nagarsheth et al., 2017] who reported
the second best performance using CNNs on the ASVspoof 2017 v1.0 evaluation
set. The second architecture, which we call it Model2, is adapted from [Grill and
Schlüter, 2017] which is the best performing model of the Bird Audio Detection
(BAD) challenge 2017. The third architecture which we call Model3 is our
proposed CNN architecture having a smaller number of model parameters yet
reports comparable performance with all other CNN models studied here.
Model1
This section now describes the methodology used to train Model1, which uses
the CNN architecture of the second best performing CNN-based model [Na-
garsheth et al., 2017] of the ASVspoof 2017 evaluations. As mentioned earlier
in Section 4.3.1, the authors trained a CNN on tandem features (CQCCs +
HFCCs) to model different spoofing attack configurations in the training (and
development) set in a multi-class setting. Later the authors used this pretrained
CNN for feature extraction and trained an SVM classifier for spoofing detection.
In our case, we adopt this architecture but use two output targets to model the
bonafide and spoofed classes in an end-to-end setting using log-power spectro-
grams as its input representation. Furthermore, inspired by Nagarsheth et al.
[2017], we only chose to use the first one second of audio during training and
evaluation. As described earlier in Section 4.3.2, we copy or truncate samples
to obtain a one second audio representation for every audio recording. In this
setup we use a 512 point FFT, 512 window size and 10 ms hop size to produce
a unified input spectrogram of 100× 257 (time x frequency) dimensions.
The network comprises three convolutional layers with 128 filters each. The
first convolutional layer uses a 3×257 (time x frequency) filter while the second
and third layers use 3× 1 size filters. All the convolutional layers use a stride of
1×1. This is followed by a max pooling procedure over the time axis. The pooled
input is then fed to a series of three fully connected (FC) layers each having
256 units. As all the implementation details of their CNN are not disclosed
in [Nagarsheth et al., 2017], we chose to use the parameter initialisation and
training approach described in Section 4.3.2.
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Table 4.7: Performance comparison of different CNN architectures studied.
System Dev EER (%) Eval EER (%) # params
LCNN (our) 8.01 30.96 371 K
Model1 5.47 25.28 4 M
Model2 4.52 34.91 68 K
Model3 4.98 33.11 7682
The performance of Model1 in terms of EER% is shown in Table 4.7. Here
we only report the best performing model obtained using this architecture which
shows 5.47% and 25.28% EER on the development and evaluation data. How-
ever, this model uses a high dropout rate: 90% and 80% to the inputs of the
first and second FC layers and 60% to the inputs of the output layer.
Model2
This CNN architecture is motivated from the work of Grill and Schlüter [2017]
that was submitted to the 2017 Bird Audio Detection (BAD) challenge. Al-
though the objectives of the BAD and ASVspoof 2017 challenges are completely
different, they exhibit some similarities in the proposed test conditions: both
focus on wild and diverse test conditions. Therefore, we adopt one of their CNN
architecture called “Bulbul” to study if changing the architecture helps improve
the performance gap (better generalisation) between the development and the
evaluation sets applied to the replay spoofing detection task. Our adapted
network has four convolutional layers each having 16 kernels/filters. Each con-
volutional layer is followed by a max pooling layer. The first two convolutional
layers use a 3 × 3 filter with a stride of 1 × 1 while the last two convolutional
layers use a 3× 1 size filter with 1× 1 stride. The first two pooling layers use a
3× 3 size filter and stride, and the last two pooling layers use a 3× 1 size filter
and stride. This is followed by two fully connected layers consisting of 256 and
32 units. Unlike the single unit used by [Grill and Schlüter, 2017] in the output
layer we use two units to model the probability distribution for bonafide and
spoofed classes.
In this setup, partly motivated by [Grill and Schlüter, 2017], we create ex-
cerpts of 1 second duration from the original audio files and use them during
training and testing. For a given audio utterance s, we use the following algo-
rithm to split the original data and prepare excerpts of 1 second duration.
1. Let l = length(s), be the original duration of s. Update s by copying or
truncating the original samples such that lnew = ceil(l).
2. Compute the log power magnitude spectrogram: D = log |STFT (s)|2
using a 256 point FFT, 256 window size and a 10 ms hop size. Here, the
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resulting matrix D contains T time frames and F number of frequency
bins.
3. Let specwind and windshift be the desired excerpt (window) size and win-
dow shift size (in time) respectively. Now split D into different excerpts
by moving specwind by windshift.
4. Return the list of spectrograms generated in previous step, where each
spectrogram is of dimension specwind x F .
Using the above outlined steps and 1 second (100 frames) specwind and
windshift we created spectrogram excerpts of 1 second duration and used them
during training and testing. Therefore, the input to the network in this setup
is a spectrogram of 100 × 129 dimensions. At test time we take the average of
the scores obtained for different spectrogram excerpts corresponding to a given
test utterance and compute the EER. We use the parameterisation and training
recipe as described in Section 4.3.2.
The performance of Model2 is shown in Table 4.7. Although we experimented
with different dropouts, we found the best result using 50% dropout to the inputs
of the last two FC layers and 90% to the first FC layer inputs. This model gives
4.52% and 34.91% EER on the development and the evaluation sets respectively.
However, the generalisation gap between the two test sets is large, suggesting
that our model might be overfitting on the development set.
Model3
Our work so far in this section has investigated different CNN architectures.
These architectures range from medium to complex in terms of trainable pa-
rameters of the network (see the last column of Table 4.7). However, none of
these systems showed a similar level of generalisation on the development and
evaluation sets of the ASVspoof 2017 v1.0 dataset. Therefore, we now propose
an architecture with a smaller number of parameters which shows comparable
performance with other network architectures studied so far. This architecture,
partly motivated from the previous two architectures (Model1 and Model2), has
three convolutional layers and two fully connected layers. Each convolutional
layer has 16 output filters (feature maps) and uses a small rectangular filter of
size 1 × 9 with a stride of 1 × 1 along the time and frequency axes. We apply
a max pooling operation after each convolution layer. We use a 3 × 3 kernel
and a stride of 3 × 3 in all max pooling layers. We use 32 neurons in the first
FC layer with linear activation and two neurons in the output layer. All other
layers use MFM non-linearity (described in Subsection 2.6.2). We apply a 50%
dropout to the first FC layer inputs. Our proposed network topology is shown
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Figure 4.3: Architecture of the proposed model. The highlighted component
shows a layer and its output feature map. For example, the shape of the feature
map after the second convolutional layer and max pooling layer is 33 x 25 x 8.
FC: fully connected, MP: max pooling.
Table 4.8: Model3 performance (EER %) for different activation functions.
Activation function Dev Eval
MFM 4.98 33.11
ReLU 5.29 31.7
ELU 8.66 40.78
in Fig. 4.3. The input representation, model training and testing approach used
for Model3 is the same as in Model2 described earlier.
The performance of Model3 is shown in Table 4.7. Our proposed architec-
ture appears to work quite well giving about 5% EER on the development set.
However, our model shows a worse generalisation on the evaluation set yielding
an EER more than 30%.
4.3.4 Effect of parameterisation on performance
Now we take our Model3 which showed comparable performance with other
models we studied and investigate how different network parameterisations af-
fect its performance. To this end, we look at how different choices of activation
functions (non linearity) and mini batch size used during stochastic gradient
descent optimisation affect the model performance. One key motivation to do
this is that so far we have used some of these parameterisations directly from
[Lavrentyeva et al., 2017] considering the impressive performance they reported
during the ASVspoof 2017 evaluations.
Activation function vs EER
All our models studied so far have used the MFM activation function in both
convolutional and fully connected layers following [Lavrentyeva et al., 2017].
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Table 4.9: Model3 performance (EER %) for different batch sizes.
Batch size Dev Eval
8 4.62 36.02
16 5.64 35.35
32 4.98 33.11
64 5.96 36.6
Table 4.10: Model3 performance (EER %) using a single spectrogram excerpt
and multiple one-second excerpts per audio file.
spectrogram Dev Eval
split 4.98 33.11
single 6.5 35.56
Here, we compare the performance of MFM with two other popular activation
functions: ReLU and ELU, that are often used in various deep learning tasks.
Subsection 2.6.2 provides necessary background on these activation functions.
Model3 is now trained and tested using the ReLU and ELU activation func-
tions using the same training and testing approach described earlier in Subsec-
tion 4.3.3. Table 4.8 summarises the results. The ELU activation shows worse
performance on both the development and evaluation sets. Although ReLU
shows competitive performance with MFM on the development set, it yields
the best performance on the evaluation set outperforming both MFM and ELU
activations.
Batch size vs EER
Following [Lavrentyeva et al., 2017], we have used a mini batch size of 32 samples
in training all the CNN models in this section. Using the Model3 architecture,
we now investigate how performance compares when the network is trained
using different mini batch sizes. To this end, we experiment with 8, 16 and
64 batch sizes. We use the same training and testing approach as described
earlier in Subsection 4.3.3. We present the results in Table 4.9. We see worse
performance on both the development and evaluation sets for a 64 batch size.
Similarly, batch size 16 does not seem to work well. Overall, we see an optimal
performance for a batch size of 32.
Split data vs EER
A final set of experiments we perform on Model3 is to see the variation in the
performance when the same model is trained on one-spectrogram excerpt (of
3 seconds duration) and multiple spectrogram excerpts of 1-second durations
(obtained using the approach described earlier in Subsection 4.3.3). For the
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one-spectrogram representation, we use three seconds audio obtained either by
truncating or copying the original audio samples to match the duration. There-
fore, in this setup the input spectrogram per each audio file is of shape 300×129
with 300 time frames and 129 frequency bins. We used 256 point FFT, window
size of 256 and 10 ms hop size. We train and evaluate this model using the same
method described in Subsection 4.3.3. Table 4.10 summarises the results. The
model trained on split spectrograms outperforms the single-spectrogram repre-
sentation model on both the development and evaluation sets. However, the
gain in performance is not substantially large as we would expect by increasing
the training data points where the original spectrogram is split into multiple
excerpts.
4.3.5 Discussion
This section described our efforts towards replicating the state-of-the-art LCNN
model that showed the best replay spoofing attack detection performance in the
ASVspoof 2017 challenge evaluation set. Our experimental results suggest that
using only the available audio examples in the training set along with the de-
tails provided in their paper [Lavrentyeva et al., 2017] it is not easy to replicate
their model to reach even 10− 15% EER on the evaluation set. Following this,
we investigated alternative CNN architectures with an aim to see if the perfor-
mance on the evaluation set can be improved. To this end, we also proposed a
CNN architecture with fewer trainable parameters that showed a similar level
of performance as other models with more parameters. In all our experiments
the trained models failed to generalise on the evaluation set but achieved good
performance on the development set. We find that despite trying different CNN
architectures it is very easy to overfit not only on the training set but overfitting
on the validation set (the development set is always used for model validation) is
quite prevalent. Hence, reducing the performance gap between the development
and evaluation sets is challenging. Taking our proposed Model 3 architecture,
we then studied the effect of network parameterisation: activation functions
and mini batch sizes, on the model performance. Experimental results suggest
that 32 is an optimal choice for mini batch size on this dataset. Interestingly,
we find that the ReLU activation function shows superior performance over
the MFM activation (proposed by Lavrentyeva et al. [2017]) on the evaluation
set. Finally, our proposed idea of splitting the original data (spectrogram) into
different splits (excerpts) resulting in increased training data points — a kind
of data augmentation strategy — did not show notable performance gains in
contrast to the model trained with a fixed-duration single spectrogram input
representation (see Table 4.10).
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4.4 Analysing spoofing countermeasure perfor-
mance under varied conditions
4.4.1 Introduction
As highlighted in Sections 2.3 and 3.2, the ASVspoof 2017 dataset contains
spoofed utterances created under ‘wild’ replay attack conditions. Although
Lavrentyeva et al. [2017] reported an EER of about 6% on the evaluation set of
the v1.0 ASVspoof 2017 dataset, the number is still high, indicating difficultly
towards reliable detection of replay spoofing attacks under wild conditions on
this dataset. Furthermore, Section 4.3 demonstrated that it is also not easy to
replicate the LCNN model of [Lavrentyeva et al., 2017] using details published
in their paper. Following these findings, this section aims at analysing the per-
formance of countermeasure models across different replay attack conditions in
the evaluation set. For this, both frame-level and utterance-level countermea-
sure models are investigated. Following the potential issues identified in v1.0
of the ASVspoof 2017 dataset, an updated version (v2.0) of the dataset was
released by the ASVspoof challenge organisers (see Section 3.2). From hereon,
all the work reported on ASVspoof 2017 dataset in this thesis uses v2.0 of the
dataset.
To this end, Subsection 4.4.2 provides details of the experimental design con-
sidered here. The description of CQCC feature-based GMM baselines, CNNs
trained on spectrogram inputs, GMMs and SVMs trained on hand-designed fea-
tures and various ensemble models is provided. Subsection 4.4.3 then evaluates
the performance of these countermeasure models using the EER metric (as de-
scribed in Subsection 3.5.1). Subsection 4.4.4 then analyses the performance of
these countermeasures under varied replay attack conditions. First, it studies
how EER varies across different qualities of playback devices, recording devices
and acoustic environments used to derive replayed recordings in the ASVspoof
2017 evaluation set. It then looks at how different qualities of replay attack
configurations impact countermeasure performance. Three different qualities of
attacks: low, medium and high as defined by Delgado et al. [2018] are used in
this study. The section then analyses two of the GMM systems for both low
and high quality replay configurations. It looks at how frame-wise energy and
log-likelihood scores are distributed across frames with an aim to understand
what influences model decisions. Finally, Subsection 4.4.5 provides a summary
of the work done in this section. This work was published in Chettri et al.
[2018c].
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4.4.2 Experimental design
This section discusses the baselines and different countermeasure models consid-
ered in this study: (1) CNNs trained on spectrogram inputs; (2) GMMs trained
on MFCCs and IMFCCs; (3) SVMs trained on MFCC i-vectors and IMFCC
i-vectors; and finally (4) Fusion systems. We use pooled (train+development)
data for training all our systems except for the CNNs that are trained on the
training set, with the development set being used for model validation. As for
performance evaluation, this section uses the EER metric (described in Sec-
tion 3.5.1) for all models.
Baselines
The baseline system used during the ASVspoof 2017 evaluations on v1.0 of the
dataset was a 512 component GMM trained on 90 dimensional CQCC features
that was obtained by combining the delta and acceleration coefficients of the
first 30 static coefficients [Kinnunen et al., 2017a]. Using the same feature con-
figuration we train this baseline but on v2.0 of the dataset. We call this system
B1. We also design another baseline system B2 using the feature parameteri-
sation from Delgado et al. [2018] on v2.0 of the dataset. Although B2 is also
designed using 512 mixture components on CQCC acoustic features, the fea-
ture parameterisation is different. Every feature vector is now represented by
a 60-dimensional vector obtained by taking the log energy (replacing the 0th
coefficients) and the first 19 static coefficients followed by their delta and accel-
eration coefficients. This is followed by cepstral mean variance normalisation.
Although Delgado et al. [2018] calls this an enhanced baseline, this section refers
to this system as B2.
CNN-based systems
Two CNN-based countermeasure models, CNN1 and CNN2, are trained using
spectrogram inputs. CNN1 uses the architecture of our replicated LCNN model
from Subsection 4.3.2. CNN2 uses our proposed model architecture (Model3)
from Subsection 4.3.3. However, we make the following modifications in terms
of input to these models. As the average duration of the training set in v2.0
of the ASVspoof 2017 dataset is about 2.66 seconds, we chose to use a 3 sec-
onds fixed duration representation during training and testing. We copy or
truncate the original audio samples to obtain this fixed duration input repre-
sentation. Following our prior work in Subsection 4.3.3, we use a 256 point
FFT, 256 window size and a hop of 10 ms for computing spectrograms. This
holds true for both the CNNs. Thus, our input to the CNNs is a mean-variance
normalised log power spectrogram of 300× 129 (time × frequency) dimensions,
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where time denotes the number of frames and frequency the number of bins.
The means and variances per frequency bins are computed from the training
set. Furthermore, in both the CNNs we use the ReLU activation function in
both the convolutional and fully connected layers following our findings in Sub-
section 4.3.4. However, we use the same training and testing methodology as
described in Subsection 4.3.2 for training our replicated version of the LCNN
model.
GMM-based systems
Following our prior work in Subsection 4.2.2, we chose two standard short-time
spectral features, MFCCs and IMFCCs, and build two GMM countermeasure
models, GMM1 and GMM2, respectively. Feature extraction, training and test-
ing of these GMMs is the same as described in Subsection 4.2.2. The score is
computed as the log likelihood ratio between the bonafide and spoofed GMM
models as described in Equation 4.1. GMM1 uses 512 mixture components
trained on MFCCs and GMM2 is trained on IMFCCs using 256 mixture com-
ponents. Both GMMs use a 40-dimensional feature vector per frame obtained
by concatenating delta and acceleration (DA) coefficients. This choice of feature
parameterisation comes from our prior findings in Subsection 4.2.2.
SVM-based systems
We train two utterance-level binary SVM models, SVM1 and SVM2, using i-
vectors [Dehak et al., 2011]. SVM1 is trained using MFCC feature-based i-
vectors and SVM2 uses IMFCC feature-based i-vectors. We use the same 40
dimensional DA feature representation for both MFCCs and IMFCCs that was
used in training the GMMs. Using this feature representation we train the
total variability matrix (T-matrix) and universal background model (UBM). We
use the pooled (train+development) data to train the UBM with 128 mixture
components and the T-matrix with a 100 rank. We extract i-vectors for the
entire dataset for both MFCCs and IMFCCs. Then, the SVM1 and SVM2
models with a linear kernel are trained on pooled i-vectors (MFCC and IMFCC
based i-vectors respectively) to discriminate between the bonafide and spoofed
classes. SVMs are implemented using Scikit-learn [Pedregosa et al., 2011] and
the i-vector extractor is implemented using the MSR-Identity toolkit [Sadjadi
et al., 2013].
Ensemble systems
We argue that a single feature and a single classifier may not adequately model
the diverse spoofing conditions that appear in the ASVspoof 2017 evaluation set.
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Table 4.11: Performance of countermeasure models on the evaluation set of the
ASVspoof 2017 v2.0 dataset.
ID System Features EER %
1
B1 90 dimensional CQCCs 23.4
B2 60 dimensional CQCCs 12.2
2
CNN1 Spectrograms
28.2
CNN2 27.8
3
GMM1 MFCCs 27.8
GMM2 IMFCCs 18.3
4
SVM1 i-vectors derived from MFCCs 24.6
SVM2 i-vectors derived from IMFCCs 16.3
5
Fused1 Scores from systems in 2-4 12.3
Fused2 GMM1+GMM2 system scores 15.9
Fused3 SVM1+SVM2 system scores 11.5
Fused4 Scores from systems in 3− 4 11.0
To this end, we investigate detection performance using ensemble approaches
which have shown promising results in both the ASVspoof 2017 [Lavrentyeva
et al., 2017] and ASVspoof 2015 [Patel and Patil, 2015] challenges. Therefore,
we design four score-level fusion10 models using the linear logistic regression
implementation of Brümmer and de Villiers [2013]. Fused1 combines scores
from all the six countermeasures: CNN1, CNN2, GMM1, GMM2, SVM1 and
SVM2. Fused2 combines the GMM1 and GMM2 scores while Fused3 fuses the
scores of the SVM1 and SVM2 models. Finally, Fused4 combines the two GMMs
and the two SVMs.
It should be noted that in our work we consider CQCC-based GMMs as
baselines to compare the performance of our systems. Therefore we do not
include them in our fusion setups, although including them may offer a gain in
performance.
4.4.3 Evaluation
We now evaluate the performance of all our countermeasure models on the
ASVspoof 2017 v2.0 evaluation set using the EER metric. Table 4.11 sum-
marises the results. The two baseline GMMs B1 and B2 produce an EER of
23.4% and 12.2% respectively. The end-to-end CNN models CNN1 and CNN2
show poor performance on the evaluation set. CNN1 shows an EER of 28.2% and
CNN2 yields an EER of 27.81%. A possible reason for the poor generalisation
of both CNN models might be attributed to the small amount (only 2.22 hours)
of data available for training the models. GMM2 trained on IMFCCs shows an
10We explore many different model combinations but report only the four ensemble systems
that showed best performance on the evaluation set.
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EER of 18.3%, clearly outperforming GMM1 which is trained on MFCC features
with an EER of 27.8%. We find a similar trend in performance for the i-vector
based SVM models. SVM2, which is trained on IMFCC-based i-vectors, shows
an EER of 16.3%, outperforming the MFCC-based i-vector SVM1 model with
24.6% EER. Thus, IMFCCs that emphasise higher frequencies of the speech
signal seem to give better performance over MFCCs in general.
By now, it is quite evident how hard it is for a single countermeasure to
counter the diverse nature of replay attacks in the evaluation set. Thus, we
investigate the benefits that these countermeasures offer as an ensemble system.
The first ensemble system Fused1 produces an EER of 12.3%, offering about
11% absolute gain over the baseline B1 and a comparable performance with
the baseline B2. The Fused2 model shows an EER of 15.9% and the Fused3
model an EER of 11.5%. Our best fusion system Fused4 reports an EER of
11.0%, outperforming both the baselines B1 and B2 by 13.4% and 1.2% absolute
value, respectively. These results suggest that ensemble approaches could be one
possible direction for further investigation.
The results seen so far do not explain what these models have learned to
make predictions or which factor (among acoustic environment, playback and
recording device in a replay attack) influences the prediction most. Thus, we
perform an analysis on countermeasure performance for different replay spoofing
conditions in the next section.
4.4.4 Analysis
This section describes the performance analysis of the various countermeasure
models considered in this study in terms of different factors of a replay attack.
The details of different factors such as acoustic environment, playback devices
and recording devices used in creating replayed utterances of the ASVspoof
2017 v2.0 dataset are provided in Subsection 3.2.2. This section first aims at
understanding the impact on model performance for different qualities of play-
back and recording devices and the type of acoustic environment individually.
Then it aims at analysing how the performance of countermeasures varies across
different qualities of replay configurations (RC) as a whole. To this end, three
different configurations of low, medium and high qualities are investigated. For
more details on different RCs please see [Delgado et al., 2018]. Furthermore,
we do not use all our countermeasure models for this analysis. We choose B2
and CNN2 as they showed better results over the B1 and CNN1 models. We
also include both GMMs and SVMs in our analysis. Among different fusion
models, we choose the Fused2 model in this analysis. One motivation for this
is that Fused2, which combines GMM1 and GMM2, shows a substantial perfor-
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mance improvement over the GMM1 model trained on MFCCs (EER of 27.8%).
Finally, this section also performs frame-level analysis using one low- and one
high-quality replay configuration in the evaluation set. For this, the GMM1 and
GMM2 models are used.
Impact of device quality and acoustic environment
To study the impact on model performance for different quality of recording
devices, playback devices and acoustic environments, following Delgado et al.
[2018] we pool all the evaluation set scores according to low, medium and high
quality categories for each factors: acoustic environment (AE), playback device
(PD) and recording device (RD). We then evaluate the performance in terms
of EER for each of these categories. Table 4.12 summarises the results. Note
that the number of replayed utterances varies across different conditions (eg.
9336 for medium quality and 1633 for high quality acoustic environments) but
the number of genuine utterances remains the same11. We make the follow-
ing observations. (1) The Fused2 model outperforms the baseline B2 under
each category except for low quality recording devices, indicating that ensem-
ble approaches do help improve detection performance. (2) CNN2 shows worse
performance compared to the baseline B2. (3) Generally, SVM models tend
to show better performance over GMMs (with few exceptions in some cases).
(4) AE: for the low quality AE, the MFCC feature-based models (GMM1 and
SVM1) show better performance over IMFCC feature-based models (GMM2 and
SVM2). However, we see an opposite trend for replay attacks using medium and
high quality AE. (5) PD: for the low quality PD, the MFCC feature-based i-
vector model SVM1 outperforms the IMFCC feature-based model SVM2, but
on the medium and high quality PD SVM2 outperforms SVM1. (6) RD: for
all low, medium and high quality RDs, the IMFCC-ivector based SVM2 model
outperforms SVM1 based on MFCC i-vectors.
The experiments conducted here make an assumption that while analysing
the influence of one factor, say AE, the other two factors PD and RD have
negligible impact. This however is not true because it is difficult to mask out
the information related to RD and PD from a replayed audio signal. Had this
been true, the problem of replay attack detection would have been less difficult to
solve. Therefore, we argue that the results reported here may not be completely
insightful to understand a replay spoofing detection system. This leads us to
perform an analysis according to different qualities of replay configurations in
the next section.
11The evaluation subset has 1298 genuine utterances. Whether we compute EER for the
low AE or high AE the number of genuine utterances is always 1298.
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Impact of different replay configurations
This section aims at understanding the impact of different qualities of replay
attacks (or replay configurations) on the countermeasure models. We consider
three low quality RCs: RC15 (E02 P21 R18), RC16 (E02 P21 R14) and RC19
(E02 P20 R14); three medium quality RCs: RC30 (E15 P19 R20), RC33 (E13
P14 R04), RC34 (E17 P12 R04); and three high quality RCs: RC55 (E26 P24
R24), RC56 (E25 P13 R08) and RC57 (E24 P23 R23). The letters E,P,R de-
notes the environment, playback device and replay device IDs. Their details
are provided in Tables 3.4, 3.5 and 3.6 of Section 3.2.2. We follow the same
RC identifiers as defined by Delgado et al. [2018]. It is worth noting that these
high quality RCs use analog wire acoustic conditions, meaning there is no phys-
ical sound propagation and hence are considered to be the most difficult replay
attacks to be detected by a countermeasure. As in [Delgado et al., 2018], we
pool all the evaluation set scores corresponding to these RCs and evaluate sys-
tem performance. Table 4.13 summarises the results and the details of the RCs
considered in this analysis.
In general, the Fused2 model shows the best performance outperforming the
baseline model B2. Low: Under low quality RCs, we observe worse perfor-
mance for CNN2 and for the IMFCC feature-based GMM2 and SVM2 models.
Though we expected IMFCC features to show better performance as they em-
phasise higher frequency regions which enable capturing ambient noise, we find
contradictory results. The MFCC feature-based models show comparable per-
formance with the enhanced baseline model B2. For RC19, GMM1 shows 7.0%
EER which further reduces to 3.5% for the i-vector based model SVM1, clearly
outperforming the baseline (10.5%). Medium: except CNN2, all other mod-
els show comparable or improved performance in comparison to the baseline.
High: For high quality RCs, the MFCC feature-based models (GMM1 and
SVM1) show worse performance indicating that low frequency information is
not very helpful for discriminating high quality replay attacks. All other mod-
els including CNN2 clearly outperform the baseline for the high quality RCs
we investigated. On the RC55 configuration, the GMM2 model shows a good
performance of 3.8% EER, in comparison to the baseline (15.0%) which further
reduces to 3.5% for SVM2 using IMFCC i-vectors.
Overall, we make the following observations. Within the context of the
ASVspoof 2017 2.0 dataset, (1) MFCCs seem to show better performance for
low and medium quality replay attacks. IMFCCs on the contrary show poor
performance in general. This suggests that information at low frequencies is
helpful for detecting low quality attacks. (2) For the high quality category (the
hardest ones), MFCCs show the worse performance while IMFCC feature-based
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Figure 4.4: Log energy (top) and log-likelihood (bottom) plots for the first 100
frames of confidently classified spoofed (left) and bonafide (right) audio files in
the evaluation set of the ASVspoof 2017 v2.0 dataset. Green: log-likelihood
difference. Blue: bonafide GMM2. Orange: spoofed GMM2.
models show better performance, with SVM2 trained on IMFCC i-vectors taking
the lead. A possible explanation for this could be that these high quality devices
may use low pass filters that mask out high frequency information in a replayed
signal, leaving cues for discrimination. This hypothesis however needs further
investigation that we aim to consider as our future work.
Frame-wise energy and log-likelihood analysis
Now we conduct frame-level analysis to see if we can derive any understanding
about what the MFCC and IMFCC feature-based GMM models (GMM1 and
GMM2) have learned about high quality replay attacks. For this we look at log
energy and log-likelihood distributions across the frames of the most confidently
classified spoofed and bonafide audio files under RC5512.
Figure 4.4 shows the energy and log-likelihood distribution plots across the
first 100 frames of bonafide and spoofed files for GMM2. For the spoof file
E 1005573.wav (left column of the figure), the energy distribution across frames
seems to be uniform and smooth. The bonafide and spoofed model log-likelihood
across the frames shows competitive behaviour, indicating how hard it is to have
a clear boundary of discrimination between bonafide and replayed signals. Fur-
thermore, we find that the log-likelihood difference (green profile) across the
frames seems to be around zero indicating ambiguity in the decision boundary.
However, on the bonafide file E 1002092.wav (right column of Figure 4.4), we
find some cues about the bonafide class in the first few frames. We find lower en-
12Among the three high quality replay attacks/configurations we analysed (RC55, RC56,
RC57) the IMFCC frontend shows the lowest EER for RC55, so we choose RC55 for analysis.
104
ergy for these frames in comparison to the remaining frames of the signal. Also,
the spoof model for these frames assigns a very low likelihood score indicating
that such frame instances were not seen during training for the spoofed GMM.
As a result, the log likelihood ratio (green profile) in these frames dominates the
other frames in the signal, thus serving as a key indicator favouring the bonafide
class. We refer to these frames as outliers. Even for the MFCC feature-based
GMM1 model, we observe a similar trend as in Fig.4.4, and therefore do not
include those plots here.
Table 4.14: Confusion matrix for GMM1 and GMM2 for low and high quality
replay configurations: RC15 and RC55 respectively. B: bonafide, S: spoofed.
Columns denote ground-truth and rows the predicted.
RC15 (Low) RC55 (High)
B S B S
GMM1 (MFCC)
B 1208 22 1208 162
S 90 128 90 16
GMM2 (IMFCC)
B 1197 116 1197 2
S 101 34 101 176
From these observations, it appears that these models are also using the
class-dependent data cues (outliers) found in the bonafide signals as one of
the factors for making predictions. However, this would not be the case if a
voice activity detector (VAD) was in place that would automatically eliminate
non-speech frames, including such outliers. But this is not the case: these
countermeasures use both speech and non-speech frames. Therefore, a realistic
real-world replay countermeasure should detect and automatically handle such
outliers during model training and testing to allow reliable prediction.
Finally, we look at the confusion matrices for GMM1 and GMM2 models
for RC15 and RC55 conditions. One motivation to do this is that the reported
EERs in Table 4.13 for different replay configurations do not provide significant
statistical insights about the correct and incorrect classification for the bonafide
and spoofed classes. The confusion matrices help understand the proportion of
correct and incorrect classification. Table 4.14 shows this. For RC15, GMM1
has high true negative (85.33%) but a small false positive (14.66%) rates while
GMM2 shows the opposite trend: high false positive (77.33%) and small true
negative (22.66%) rates. On RC55, we see an opposite trend in contrast to
RC15. Here, the GMM1 model shows high false positive (91.01%) and low
true negative (8.98%) while GMM2 shows small false positive (1.12%) but high
true negative (98.87%) rates. For genuine cases, both GMM1 and GMM2 show
comparable performance (in terms of true positives and false negatives).
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4.4.5 Discussion
This section investigated and analysed various countermeasures for replay spoof-
ing detection on the ASVspoof 2017 v2.0 dataset. We find that the models using
MFCC frontends have a smaller EER than the models using IMFCC frontends
in the evaluation set when looking at replay configurations with supposed low
quality. We find the opposite when looking at replay configurations with sup-
posed high quality. However, gaining an in-depth understanding of what is
causing this behaviour seems challenging because the original RedDots corpus
[Lee et al., 2015] of bonafide recordings includes both clean and noisy recordings
collected from heterogeneous devices, but lacks documentation on the meta-data
(acoustic conditions, recording devices). This means that “high-quality spoof-
ing conditions” may actually be low quality since the bonafide files were of low
quality and vice-versa. Thus, on this dataset it is difficult to perform evalua-
tion on factors (AE, PD, RD and RC) influencing replay attacks in controlled
conditions and provide significant conclusions whether reverberation noise or
some device-specific (recording or playback) attributes provide a cue to replay
signal discrimination. Furthermore, our analysis suggests that the models may
be using dataset-specific artefacts during prediction. Therefore, on this dataset,
a reliable replay detector should automatically take care of such outliers and al-
low learning algorithms to exploit only the information related to replay factors
to make a reliable prediction. This section also showed that ensemble models
have potential towards improving detection performance. To this end, data
augmentation approaches, augmented with ensemble techniques, may improve
generalisation, and therefore should be investigated further.
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4.5 Explaining CNN predictions
4.5.1 Introduction
As described in Subsection 4.3.1, the most successful systems in detecting replay
spoofing attacks on the challenging ASVspoof 2017 test set are the ones based
on deep neural networks (DNNs). Although these systems have shown promis-
ing results, what they have actually learned to do has not been answered; they
are often used as a black-box. Is a system that appears to detect a spoofing
attack actually working with attributes relevant to the problem, or is it merely
a product of how a train/test dataset was constructed [Sturm, 2014]? For exam-
ple, Section 4.2 demonstrated how a frame-based GMM countermeasure trained
for replay spoofing detection exploited artefacts in the dataset (ASVspoof 2017
v1.0) to make class decisions. Similarly, Section 4.4 highlighted a similar issue
for frame-based GMMs trained on the updated version (v2.0) of the dataset.
Can we trust such a system “in the wild”? Answers to these questions can not
only help improve the security of ASV systems, but also motivate new spoofing
attacks, and improve training databases.
This section attempts to answer some of these questions for a deep CM
model trained on v2.0 of the ASVspoof 2017 dataset. Following the lessons
learnt from Section 4.3 we propose and build a new CNN model that shows
good performance on the version 2.0 of the evaluation set and a comparable
performance to the state-of-the-art LCNN model on version 1.0 of this dataset.
Subsection 4.5.2 describes these details. There exist several methods to un-
derstand the global or local behaviour of deep models [Montavon et al., 2018].
Here, we use the SLIME [Mishra et al., 2017] algorithm to generate explana-
tions for individual predictions. It is based on the LIME algorithm [Ribeiro
et al., 2016], which is an acronym for Local Interpretable Model-Agnostic Ex-
planations. Subsection 2.9.2 provides background on SLIME. Subsection 4.5.3
then provides explanations produced using this method highlighting temporal
and spectral regions that the model weighs heavily to form its decisions for each
class. The section describes explanations produced at both the instance-level
and model-level (on the whole dataset). Our findings show that a decision of
a recording being “spoofed” is weighted heavily by the information present in
the first 400 milliseconds of the recording. It then appears that at least some
of the attributes the model has learned come from peculiarities of the database,
and not from the difference in channel characteristics one would expect in a
replay attack. Next, Subsection 4.5.4 demonstrates the significance of our anal-
ysis in two ways. We show how to manipulate misclassified spoof recordings
to be judged as “spoofed” by the model, thereby lowering its EER; and we
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show how to manipulate spoofed recordings such that the model judges them
as “bonafide”, thereby dramatically raising the EER. Finally, Subsection 4.5.5
provides a summary of the work done in this section. This work was published
in [Chettri et al., 2018a].
4.5.2 Experimental design and evaluation
This section describes details related to the experimental design and evaluation
of our CNN countermeasure model for replay spoofing detection. It provides
details of the dataset and the evaluation metric considered here. The architec-
ture details of the CNN, model training and testing methodology are described.
We follow the lesson learnt from our study in Section 4.3 (such as parameter
initialisation, training and testing methods) in training CNNs and further in-
troduce several changes that helped achieve performance closer to the LCNN
model13. For comparative purposes, we train and evaluate our CNN on v1.0
of the dataset. The section then evaluates the performance of the reproduced
models in terms of the EER metric.
Dataset and evaluation metric
This study uses the ASVspoof 2017 v2.0 dataset described in Subsection 3.2.2
and the EER metric for performance evaluation as described in Subsection 3.5.1.
CNN architecture and input representation
The architecture of our proposed CNN is adapted from the state-of-the-art
LCNN [Lavrentyeva et al., 2017] model which showed the lowest EER on the
evaluation set during the ASVspoof 2017 spoofing detection challenge. It com-
prises 5 convolution (Conv) layers, 4 network-in-network layers, 5 max-pooling
layers and 2 fully connected (FC) layers. In other words, the structure in terms
of stacking series of convolutional and fully connected layers remains the same
as in LCNN. However, following our findings in Section 4.3, we now focus more
on model generalisation. For this, we introduce following changes. First, we
reduce the number of kernels in each convolutional (Conv) layer by a factor of
2 to keep the number of free parameters to a minimum. Second, we introduced
a batch normalisation layer before applying non-linearity in every Conv layer
to ensure features follow a normal distribution after the convolution operation.
Third, we use 32 neurons in the first FC layer and a single neuron in the output
layer in contrast to 64 neurons and two neurons used in the original LCNN.
13The author would like to thank Héctor Delgado (who was one of the organisers of the
ASVspoof 2017 challenge), Senior Research Scientist at Nuance Communications Inc., for the
fruitful discussion and help in developing the proposed CNN model.
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Table 4.15: Performance (EER%) of our replicated LCNN models: M1 and M2
on the ASVspoof 2017 dataset respectively.
System DB version Train Dev Eval
LCNN [Lavrentyeva et al., 2017] 1.0 - 4.53 7.34
M1 1.0 0.0 7.0 9.44
M2 2.0 0.0 7.6 10.6
Furthermore, we now use a binary cross entropy loss instead of softmax loss in
training CNNs. As for the non-linearity, we use the ReLU activation in both
Conv and FC layers following our findings in Section 4.3. Our proposed CNN
has 189k trainable parameters which is much smaller in comparison to the 572k
parameters of the LCNN [Lavrentyeva et al., 2017]. Further details on the CNN
architecture are provided in Appendix A.
The input to the network, as in LCNN, is a mean-variance normalised log
power spectrogram of 4 seconds duration. We perform this normalisation at
the utterance-level14 to standardize the features within a given recording. Since
the ASVspoof 2017 dataset uses 10 different phrases (shown in Table 3.1), the
duration of audio files varies across these phrases. To obtain a consistent input
representation we replicate15 the audio samples if the duration is smaller than
4 seconds or truncate them if the duration is more than 4 seconds. Here, we use
a 1728 point FFT, and a 108 ms window (1728 samples) with a hop size of 10
ms. Therefore, the input spectrogram has dimensions 865 × 400, where 865 is
the number of frequency bins and 400 the number of time frames.
Training and testing
As for training the CNN model, we follow the same approach described in Sub-
section 4.3.2 with the following changes: the shape of the input spectrogram is
now 865× 400 instead of 1025× 400; to avoid overfitting, we train our CNN for
a maximum of 100 epochs (instead of 300) with 10 epochs for early stopping
(instead of 30). We implement the model using the Keras [Chollet, 2015] frame-
work with the TensorFlow backend. During testing, for each test utterance we
use the model output — the posterior probability of being genuine — as the
score and compute the EER. Using the above approach, we train two models
M1 and M2 on versions 1.0 and 2.0 of the ASVspoof 2017 dataset, respectively.
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Results
Table 4.15 summarises the performance of our replicated versions of the LCNN
models: M1 and M2. Model M1 shows comparable performance with the orig-
inal LCNN model trained on v1.0 of the ASVspoof 2017 dataset. Further it
should be noted that reproducing16 the exact same results is difficult due to
high dropouts and random weight initialisation used during training. Since
our main objective in this section is to understand what the CNN has learned
about spoofing detection, we do not focus on minimizing the EER of LCNN.
From hereon, we only consider M2 for further analysis as it uses the updated
(v2.0) dataset.
4.5.3 Explaining predictions using SLIME
This section aims at explaining the predictions of the M2 model using the SLIME
algorithm that is described in Subsection 2.9.2. First, explanations are produced
at instance-level taking the most confidently classified bonafide and spoofed in-
stances in the training, development and evaluation sets. Both temporal and
spectral explanations are generated for them. Following this, explanations are
then produced for the entire dataset to derive a global model-level understand-
ing of what M2 has exploited from the underlying training data to make class
decisions.
Instance-level explanations
We take the six most confidently correctly classified bonafide and spoofed audio
instances from the training, development and evaluation sets and have SLIME
generate explanations for their predictions. Table 4.16 summarises the weights
assigned to each of the ten temporal segments for these six instances. The po-
larity of the learned weights signifies how the presence (or the absence) of a
segment influences a model prediction. For example, the T8 and T5 segments
in all the bonafide instances in Table 4.16 are segments in favour of and against
the prediction, respectively. The bold numbers in the table represent the top
two weighing segments/components. We refer to them as top1 and top2 expla-
nations. For the genuine instances, SLIME assigns T8 and T9 as the top two
explanations. We observe a marginal difference in the magnitude of weights
assigned to T8 and T9 but a relatively larger difference for other temporal seg-
ments. These weights suggest that T8 and T9 offer more contribution towards
14Instead of computing means and variances from the training set as in Section 4.3.
15We replicate samples in the time domain.
16Reported models M1 and M2 are the best performing models on the development set
among five different models trained with different random initialisations.
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bonafide class decisions. For the spoofed instances, SLIME returns T1 and T10
as the top two explanations. Table 4.17 shows the spectral explanations for
bonafide and spoofed class predictions on the same six instances used in Ta-
ble 4.16. There is not much difference in the magnitude of weights across the
spectral segments. For both the bonafide and spoofed decisions, it seems that
M2 uses information across most of the spectral bands.
Using only the explanations for few confidently classified audio instances
would not provide a global understanding of the model behaviour. Therefore,
in the next section we apply SLIME to every audio instance of the ASVspoof
2017 2.0 dataset and study the prediction explanation (weights) statistics to
derive conclusions about what M2 has learned to make predictions.
Model-level explanations
Now we apply the SLIME algorithm across the entire training, development
and evaluation set. We record the top1 explanations returned by SLIME and
present the count statistics for top1 explanations. This helps us derive a global
understanding on the behaviour of M2 for bonafide and spoofed class decisions.
In the training set, M2 correctly classifies 1505 out of 1507 bonafide in-
stances with more than 70% confidence. Table 4.18 (first row) shows the tem-
poral and spectral explanations on these 1505 bonafide instances. The temporal
explanations suggest that though the majority vote for top1 appears to be T9,
other temporal components also have some contribution in the prediction. To
summarise, we observe that the first four (T1-T4) and the last three temporal
segments (T8-T10) contribute most towards the bonafide class decision. One
possible reason for such a spread in temporal explanations could be because of
the 10 different variable length utterances used in the ASVspoof 2017 dataset.
Further, inspecting the T9 segment of several bonafide files in the training sub-
set does not immediately reveal what M2 is detecting; however, we noticed that
many files have nonspeech (or silence) frames at their beginning. Therefore,
M2 may be using both the speech and nonspeech information across different
temporal locations. Looking at the spectral explanations (right hand side of
Table 4.18) we find that M2 gives importance to the information present across
all frequencies (0-8 kHz). To validate these findings, we repeat the above pro-
cess across all the bonafide instances in the development and evaluation sets.
As shown in Table 4.18 (third and fifth rows), we observe a consistency in the
bonafide class explanations.
As for the spoofed class, in the training set, M2 correctly classifies 1504 out
of 1507 spoofed instances with more than 70% confidence. Table 4.18 (second
row) shows the temporal and spectral explanations on these 1504 instances. The
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temporal explanation statistics suggest that the discriminative cue for replay
spoofing detection appears either in the first or the last 400 ms of the signal (T1
or T10 segments) and that M2 is not influenced much by the information present
in temporal regions T2-T9. On the spectral explanations, we observe that M2
is looking at the information present across all the frequencies. To validate
these observations we repeat the process across all the spoofed instances in the
development and evaluation sets. As shown in the fourth and sixth rows of
Table 4.18 we observe similar explanations.
Now the question is what cue is there in the first and the last 400 ms of these
instances? We inspect 50 spoof instances drawn randomly from the training set
and find that (1) the majority of instances do not have non-speech/silence in
the first 400 ms (2) and, these instances have DTMF-like (dual-tone multi-
frequency) tones with speech (29 out of 50) and without speech (7 out of 50) in
the first 400 ms of the signal. The last 400 ms of the spoof instances have the
same property found in (1) and (2). One reason for this could be due to raw
samples copied for audio instances less than 4 seconds duration.
We now analyse why a bonafide test instance is misclassified as spoofed and
vice-versa. We hypothesize that a test utterance is misclassified if it does not
exhibit its own class attributes but shows the attributes of the competing class.
First, we look at why M2 misclassifies a bonafide instance. We take all the
bonafide instances misclassified as spoofed with more than 50% confidence17
in the development and evaluation sets and generate temporal and spectral
explanations. We show the results in the first two rows of Table 4.19. We find
that these bonafide instances do not have the genuine class attributes, rather
show the attributes of a spoofed class (top1 corresponds to either T1 or T10
only), which explains the reason for misclassification.
Finally, we look at the spoofed audio instances in both the development
and evaluation sets that were successful in fooling M2 with more than 50%
confidence. We find 269 (out of 950) such instances in the development set
and 2088 (out of 12008) spoofed examples in the evaluation set. We show the
explanations obtained from SLIME in the last two rows of Table 4.19. We find
that these spoofed audio instances do not show the attributes of the spoofed class
but appear to exhibit bonafide class properties (top1 explanations distributed
across T1-T10).
17We chose confidence more than 50% as there are very few instances with more than 70%
confidence in the development and evaluation sets.
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4.5.4 Interventions to test the significance of explanations
The previous Subsection 4.5.3 explained what M2 is using to discriminate be-
tween bonafide and spoof instances using the SLIME algorithm (see Subsec-
tion 2.9.2). This section now aims at testing the significance of such explana-
tions through two intervention experiments. The first one attempts to break the
system by manipulating correctly detected spoofed test examples. The second
intervention on the other hand aims at protecting an ASV system by manipu-
lating misclassified spoofed examples.
Table 4.20: Intervention I: breaking the system. Demonstrating the effect on
two spoof instances each in the training, development and evaluation sets.
Subset
Genuine class probability %
Instance ID Before After
Train
T 1002189 0.21 0.80
T 1001687 0.22 0.80
Dev
D 1000884 0.21 0.85
D 1000889 0.25 0.83
Eval
E 1004999 0.18 0.8
E 1008476 0.19 0.81
Intervention I - Break the system
Here, our primary goal is to break M2 from an attacker’s perspective. In other
words, we aim to increase the false alarm rate by manipulating correctly classi-
fied spoof instances so that M2 judges them as genuine. We randomly take two
spoofed audio instances from each of the training, development and evaluation
sets that have been classified correctly with more than 70% confidence and re-
place their first and last 400 ms (T1 and T10) by a T118 segment of the most
confidently classified bonafide signal in the training set (T 1000780). We then
submit them to M2 to see if they can pass as bonafide. Table 4.20 shows that M2
now misclassifies them with high confidence. When we repeat this procedure for
all the correctly detected spoofed instances in the development and evaluation
sets, we observe a dramatic increase in the EER from 7.6% to 34.1% and from
10.6% to 29.7% respectively (first and second rows of Table 4.22).
18The main motivation here is to ensure that T1 and T10 (of the spoof instances) would
not have any spoofed class attributes (as identified in Subsection 4.5.3) after the interven-
tion. The best option was to pick a bonafide audio whose first 400 ms would contain mostly
nonspeech/silence. That is why we pick T1 of T 1000780 (confident bonafide instance) which
satisfies the criteria.
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Intervention II - Protect the system
Here, our goal is to protect M2 from a researchers’ perspective (or an ASV
system administrator). In other words, we aim to reduce the EER by manipu-
lating misclassified spoofed instances so that M2 judges them correctly. Since
the training subset does not have any misclassified spoofed instances (EER is
0.0%) we randomly take two spoofed instances each from the development and
evaluation sets that were successful in fooling M2. From Subsection 4.5.3, we
know that M2 detects a spoofed signal correctly if spoofed attribute (DTMF
tone and/or speech) appears in the first or last 400 ms (i.e T1 or T10 segment),
we hypothesize that T1 and/or T10 of these four spoofed instances do not have
such attributes. We generate temporal explanations for these four instances and
find that the top1 explanation does not favor T1 or T10.
Table 4.21: Demonstrating the effect of intervention II: protecting the system.
Training subset has no misclassified instances.
Subset
Genuine class probability %
Instance ID Before After
Dev
D 1001544 0.81 0.23
D 1000803 0.78 0.4
Eval
E 1003144 0.83 0.25
E 1001926 0.82 0.29
Now, we remove raw samples from the beginning of these four instances
to ensure that the speech signal occurs within the first 400 milliseconds. We
choose the amount of samples to remove based on the original duration of the
audio signal. For example, if the duration is between three to four seconds we
remove the first 1200 ms samples. We then submit them to M2 to see if they
can be now detected as spoofed. Table 4.21 shows that M2 now classifies them
correctly as spoofed with high confidence. When we repeat this process across
all the misclassified spoofed instances in the development and evaluation sets,
we observe a reduction in the EER from 7.6% to 5.9% and from 10.6% to 7.8%
respectively (first and third rows of Table 4.22).
Though intervention II did not completely reduce the EER of M2 to 0%
on the development and evaluation sets, it shows the potential of our analysis,
and demonstrates how knowledge gained from such model explanations can help
improve the detection performance. Upon closer analysis, we find that out of
269 misclassified spoof instances we intervened in the development subset, M2
detects only 8 instances as spoofed with high confidence while a large number
of instances were detected spoofed with low confidence. We find a similar obser-
vation on the evaluation set. Out of 2088 misclassified spoofed instances, only
88 instances were detected as spoofed with high confidence. This explains the
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Table 4.22: EER% before and after the two interventions on M2.
Intervention Dev Eval
Initial EER 7.6 10.6
I: Break the system 34.13 29.76
II: Protect the system 5.9 7.8
reason for a small change in the EER.
4.5.5 Discussion
This section described the implementation and analysis of a replicated version of
the LCNN model for replay spoofing detection using the ASVspoof 2017 dataset.
Although our model M1 trained on v1.0 of the dataset could not achieve 7%
EER (as reported in [Lavrentyeva et al., 2017]), it achieved 9% EER on the eval-
uation set. Since version 1.0 of the dataset is obsolete, we focussed our analysis
on version 2.0 of the dataset. Our adapted LCNN model M2 reported an EER of
about 10% on the evaluation set of this dataset. We used the SLIME algorithm
to generate class explanations from both spectral and temporal perspectives.
Our analysis shows that M2 uses the first few milliseconds of the audio signal to
make class predictions. We further demonstrated the significance of our anal-
ysis and findings by preprocessing the test signals which led to a predictable
change in the EER on both the development and evaluation sets. Though these
systems, including the state-of-the-art LCNN [Lavrentyeva et al., 2017], seem to
be successful in discriminating between bonafide and spoofed speech, our anal-
ysis shows that to some extent they could be exploiting cues from the dataset
which are unrelated to the problem. This raises a question about the integrity
and trustworthiness of such systems. Further, the variability of patterns of
signals (presence and absence of nonspeech frames in the beginning) within a
class makes the problem difficult on this dataset. For example not all spoofed
instances have a speech onset in the first few milliseconds of the audio signal
and not all bonafide instances have nonspeech signals in the start. Our anal-
ysis showed how spoofing detection performance is correlated to the first few
samples of the audio signals. This suggests that verifying dataset artefacts and
potentially removing them prior to model training is important. Doing so will
help models only exploit factors of interest relevant for replay spoofing detec-
tion (such as acoustic environment, playback device, recording device properties
etc.)
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4.6 A deeper look at the ASVspoof 2017 dataset
The ASVspoof challenge series (Subsection 2.3) has motivated research in pro-
tecting speech biometric systems against different variety of access attacks. The
2017 edition focused on replay spoofing attacks, and involved participants build-
ing and training systems on a provided dataset (ASVspoof 2017). More than
60 research papers have so far been published with this dataset, but none have
sought to answer how successful countermeasures are in detecting spoofing at-
tacks. This section shows how artefacts inherent to the dataset may be con-
tributing to the apparent success of published systems.
4.6.1 Introduction
Most of the works on the ASVspoof 2017 dataset, as described in Section 2.4, aim
at building countermeasure (CM) models with a focus on improving detection
performance. Little attention is given to understand what these systems are
learning to make predictions and what attributes are being exploited by the
learning algorithms from the training data. Research often only focuses on
improving scores based on a particular evaluation metric, with the equal error
rate (EER) in this case. But showing better performance does not necessarily
mean a system is trustworthy [Rusak et al., 2020, Hernandez-Orallo, 2019].
The EER is a scalar that does not provide any insights into what the model is
learning to make a prediction.
Machine learning (ML) models learn to make decisions discovering patterns
in the training data [Bishop, 2006]. Such models may easily exploit irrelevant
cues, artefacts or confounders (if present) during the training optimisation. Un-
less explicitly accounted for (during training and inference) they often contribute
to achieving good results and overestimate the actual performance that would
be achieved in the wild on a test set [Kaufman et al., 2011]. As explained in
Subsection 2.9.1, such artefacts can influence ML models across a variety of
tasks including medicine, computer vision, music information retrieval, to name
a few. Their trustworthiness is therefore called into question and some can be-
have much like a “horse” in machine learning [Hernandez-Orallo, 2019, Sturm,
2014], i.e. a model that provides excellent results using cues not relevant to
the actual problem [Rodŕıguez-Algarra et al., 2019]. As highlighted in [Rosset
et al., 2010], such biases can occur as a result of data collection, compilation,
aggregation and partition. Such biases can have a severe impact on the trust-
worthiness of ML applications, and for domains such as finance, medicine and
security (including ASV anti-spoofing) this can be catastrophic. Therefore, it
is beneficial to perform an in-depth dataset analysis [Tommasi et al., 2015],
to detect the presence of artefacts or confounders [Stowell et al., 2019], ensur-
118
ing models do not exploit irrelevant factors during training, and therefore yield
reliable performance estimates.
The work in this section builds upon the findings from Section 4.5, which
suggests that v2.0 of the ASVspoof 2017 dataset contains some recording arte-
facts that bias the performance estimates. It was shown that the CNN highly
attends to the first few milliseconds to make decisions. Further analysing a few
confidently classified test audio signals showed the presence of dual tone multi-
frequency (DTMF) sounds (or speech signals) within the first few milliseconds
for spoofed audio but nonspeech or silence in case of the bonafide audio sig-
nals. Therefore we hypothesize that the training and development subsets of the
same dataset might contain such DTMF sounds and other confounders/artefacts
that might influence model decisions. Understanding their statistics enables the
building of trustworthy CMs using this dataset. To the best of our knowledge
there has been no other works in understanding this dataset, its artefacts and
its impact on machine learning CM models.
To this end, the next Subsection 4.6.2 first provides a description of differ-
ent countermeasure models investigated to understand the influence of dataset
artefacts. As for the artefact details, we use the results of qualitative analysis
on v2.0 of this dataset from Subsection 3.2.3. Then the following Subsection
4.6.3 performs an in-depth analysis through intervention experiments to uncover
the dependencies of the identified artefacts on countermeasure model decisions.
Furthermore, Subsection 4.6.4 performs additional intervention experiments to
confirm the findings on the influence of artefacts. It demonstrates how knowl-
edge of cues/artefacts in the training data can be used to compromise model
decisions. Finally, Subsection 4.6.5 provides a summary of work done in this
section.
4.6.2 Experimental design and evaluation
This section describes different features, classifiers and performance metrics
considered to evaluate the influence of the artefacts (Subsection 3.2.3) on CM
models. The section also discusses the initial performance of these models.
Features
We use CQCCs, i-vectors and power spectrograms as input features. The main
reasons for choosing them are: CQCCs and its variants have been studied ex-
tensively on the ASVspoof 2017 dataset [Delgado et al., 2018, Witkowski et al.,
2017, Yang et al., 2018a]; CQCC-based i-vectors have been used as a baseline
system [Delgado et al., 2018]; power spectrogram features have shown the best
performance during the ASVspoof 2017 challenge [Lavrentyeva et al., 2017].
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Section 2.5 provides background on these features.
Classifiers
We now describe five different backend models: GMMs, Cosine Distance, SVMs
and two CNNs considered in this study. The motivation to chose them is twofold.
First, the above mentioned classifiers have been widely used for spoofing detec-
tion tasks [Delgado et al., 2018, Lavrentyeva et al., 2017, Sahidullah et al., 2015].
Second, we aim to demonstrate that dataset artefacts can affect any ML model
and that the issues discussed do not revolve around a specific model.
GMM: We train one GMM each for the bonafide and spoof classes using 512
mixture components with random initialisation. We use 60 dimensional CQCC
features extracted using the setup from [Delgado et al., 2018] to train the GMMs.
During testing, for each test utterance X (with T feature vectors) a score is ob-
tained using the log-likelihood ratio between the bonafide and spoofed GMM as
described in Eq. (4.1).
Cosine: We compute 100-dimensional i-vectors using the same 60 dimensional
CQCC features used in GMMs for the entire dataset. We compute the mean
i-vector corresponding to the bonafide and spoof classes in the training set
and use them as the representative models. During testing, a similarity score
is computed between a test i-vector and the model i-vector using the cosine
distance metric:
cos(θ) =
X ·Y
||X||||Y||
(4.2)
where X represents the test i-vector and Y the model i-vector. The final score
is then obtained by taking the difference between the bonafide and spoof model
scores. We follow the same i-vector setup from [Delgado et al., 2018]. It is also
worth noting that this model has far fewer parameters than the others.
SVM: We train a binary SVM classifier with a linear kernel using mean-variance
normalised i-vector features, with mean-variance values computed on the train-
ing set. Here, we use the same 100 dimensional CQCC-based i-vectors used in
the Cosine model. We use the Scikit-learn [Pedregosa et al., 2011] library with
default parameters for training the SVM model.
CNN: We use two different CNN models, CNN1 and CNN2. We take CNN1 as
a pretrained model from Section 4.5.2 (model M2). CNN2 is a newly proposed
architecture with only 36, 174 free parameters and comprises 3 convolutional
(Conv) and 2 fully connected (FC) layers unlike CNN1 which is very deep com-
120
prising 9 convolutional layers. Both CNNs operate on a fixed input representa-
tion and use a batch normalisation layer before applying ReLU nonlinearity in
every Conv and FC layers. The input representation, model training and test-
ing approach used in CNN2 is same as in CNN1 with the key difference being
the input duration and parameters used in spectrogram computation. CNN2
operates on 3 seconds input (CNN1 uses 4 seconds duration) computed using a
512-point FFT, 32 ms frame window and 10 ms hop size. Additional details on
the CNN architectures are provided in Appendix A.
Table 4.23: Initial model performance. Θ = EER decision threshold.
Model Set Θ TP FN FP TN EER%
CNN1
Dev 0.6663 701 59 74 876 7.7
Eval 0.7467 1159 139 1286 10722 10.7
CNN2
Dev 0.6 704 56 70 880 7.37
Eval 0.842 1124 174 1609 10399 13.4
Cosine
Dev 0.125 679 81 101 849 10.6
Eval 0.181 1105 193 1779 10228 14.8
SVM
Dev 0.3972 678 82 103 847 10.8
Eval 0.506 1094 204 1883 10125 15.6
GMM
Dev 0.3334 690 70 87 863 9.2
Eval 0.7120 1119 179 1656 10352 13.7
Performance measures
We use the EER metric to evaluate the performance of CM models. In order
to derive more insights in understanding the impact of the artefacts on this
dataset, we further report true positive (TP), false negative (FN), false positive
(FP), true negative (TN), false acceptance rate (FAR) and false rejection rate
(FRR) for the bonafide class. Subsection 3.5.1 provides a description of these
metrics.
Preliminary results
We train all our CM models using the training set and validate them on the de-
velopment set. Table 4.23 summarises our preliminary results. Our CM models
Cosine and GMM show consistent performance as reported in [Delgado et al.,
2018]. Although CNN2 and CNN1 show similar performance on the develop-
ment set, CNN2 performs poorly on the evaluation set. A possible reason could
be due to the simple 4 hidden layer architecture used by CNN2 in comparison
to the 10 hidden layer representation in CNN1. However, CNN2 outperforms
both Cosine, GMM and SVM on both the development and evaluation subsets.
We also record the individual EER threshold for each model (for each test set)
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Figure 4.5: Block diagram: intervention pipeline towards understanding the
influence of artefacts on the predictions of countermeasure models.
that we use in the next section to understand the influence of the dataset cues
highlighted in Subsection 3.2.3 on model predictions.
4.6.3 Understanding the influence of dataset artefacts
In this section we thoroughly study the impact of artefacts explained in Subsec-
tion 3.2.3 on the CM model decisions. More precisely we focus on understanding
the influence of pattern difference, BCS and DTMF sounds on model prediction
through intervention experiments illustrated in Fig. 4.5. We call this setup as
inference-time intervention because we do not retrain any of our CM models,
rather use our pretrained CMs. Here the intervention module updates the test
signal by exploiting information about the dataset artefacts which we pass as a
side information. Features are then computed on the updated test signal and
scoring is performed using a pretrained model. The optional unify-duration
module truncates or replicates audio samples to create a fixed-duration input
representation. This is applicable only for the CNNs.
Finally, we demonstrate a use-case where an attacker despite having physical
access to such cues (for example, a BCS) is still capable of manipulating CM
decisions by crafting synthetic artefacts. With these interventions we confirm
that both frame-level and utterance-level CM models can exploit the artefacts
in this dataset raising concerns about their trustworthiness and reliability of the
published results.
Impact of “BCS” on prediction
As described in Subsection 3.2.3, the training set contains a large proportion
(36.36%) of bonafide examples with BCS artefacts in comparison to only 2.45%
of spoof examples. BCS, if present in an audio recording, usually occurs within
a 100 ms time window and is found either at the start or at the end. Although
few (10.81%) bonafide class audio files in the training set have BCS at the end,
our preliminary interventions showed they have no impact on model predictions.
However, we find a substantial influence for BCS found at the start of the audio
recordings. We do not perform this intervention on the spoof class as the BCS
serves as a cue for the bonafide class. Therefore we hypothesize and demonstrate
that BCS serves as one kind of bonafide signature on this dataset. And if this
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Table 4.24: BCS intervention results. TFI: test files intervened, which cor-
responds to TP cases (Table 4.23) identified to contain BCS artefact. Prop:
proportion of files that changed class label.
Model Set # TFI FN Prop (%)
CNN1
Dev 177 +34 19.21
Eval 513 +118 23.0
CNN2
Dev 175 +12 6.85
Eval 508 +60 11.81
Cosine
Dev 159 +8 5.03
Eval 486 +32 6.58
SVM
Dev 159 +6 3.77
Eval 491 +32 6.51
GMM
Dev 173 +13 7.51
Eval 508 +56 11.02
signature is not removed, machine learning CMs can easily exploit it. To this
end, we take all the TPs for the bonafide class that contain a BCS at the start
and run this intervention on them.
Here our intervention module (Fig. 4.5) takes a BCS annotation file contain-
ing a list of files having a BCS as side information. It then discards the first
100 ms audio samples from the test utterance before extracting features and ob-
taining a classification score. Table 4.24 summarises the results. As expected,
dropping BCS samples causes models to misclassify bonafide test signals raising
the false negatives. Interestingly, we find CNN1 to be more sensitive in contrast
to CNN2 and other models. A possible explanation is since CNN1 uses a 4
second representation in contrast to the 3 seconds one for CNN2. The above
mentioned representation of CNN1 contains more replicated copies of shorter
audio segments, which propagates artefacts (see Fig. 4.6).
Impact of “DTMF” on prediction
During replay data collection a number of bonafide utterances were first con-
catenated using a DTMF sound to mark the utterance boundary and replay
attacks were simulated on them. The individual replayed utterance was then
retrieved based on this marker [Kinnunen et al., 2017b]. As outlined in Subsec-
tion 3.2.3, some spoof audio files in the training set have DTMF sounds (low
or loud) which are not present in the bonafide files. Do DTMF sounds provide
cues for the spoof class? Do these dataset artefacts bias our ML models? We
perform interventions to understand this. As the ground truth of DTMF arte-
facts for the spoof class in the evaluation set is unavailable the present study
does not include this intervention on them. To this end, we take all the TNs for
the spoof class in the development set that contain a DTMF artefact and run
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Figure 4.6: Spectrogram (top) and raw audio (bottom) of “Ok google”. Left
represents a bonafide example and right its replayed version. The green rectan-
gular box highlights the original audio and the red box shows signal replication
to create a fixed duration (4 seconds) input representation. Two use cases are
reflected: pattern difference and BCS. It shows how artefacts spread while cre-
ating an input representation with fixed duration.
this intervention.
We pass the file identifier containing a DTMF as side information to the in-
tervention module (Fig. 4.5) which removes the first 250 ms audio samples from
them before extracting features and obtaining a classification score. Table 4.25
summarises the intervention results. We see a negligible proportion of inter-
vened files affected from this intervention, which suggests that DTMF sounds
do not provide a substantial bias on CM decisions. Another interpretation is
the fact that the spoof signals acquire other channel characteristics during the
replay simulation. Therefore, their impact may be negligible when audio signals
are replayed in noisy acoustic conditions.
Table 4.25: DTMF intervention results for the development set spoof files iden-
tified to contain a DTMF. Prop has the same meaning as in Table 4.24. TFI:
test files intervened.
Model # TFI FP Prop (%)
CNN1 136 +3 2.2
CNN2 144 +3 2.08
Cosine 145 0 0.0
SVM 145 0 0.0
GMM 141 +1 0.71
Impact of “pattern difference” on prediction
The previous two experiments involved removing BCS and DTMF artefacts
from the test files identified to contain such artefacts. In this experiment we
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remove audio samples before and after the actual speech utterance during testing
ensuring that both bonafide and spoofed audio recordings now have similar
audio patterns. This also means that BCS or DTMF gets removed, if present,
in this intervention experiment. Thus, BCS and DTMF experiments can be
thought of as a special case of pattern difference interventions but performed
on a small set of test files identified to contain such artefacts.
Here, the intervention module uses speech endpoints as side information
and discards audio samples before and after the actual speech utterance. We
use our manual speech endpoint annotations that we prepared during dataset
inspection (Subsection 3.2.3). This intervention ensures that both bonafide
and spoof test recordings now have similar audio patterns. Following our prior
findings from Subsection 4.5.3 we hypothesize that the pattern difference favours
the bonafide class. To confirm this, we take all the TPs for the bonafide class
and all the FPs for the spoof class (from Table 4.23) and run this intervention
on them. Furthermore, due to the large numbers of spoof files in the evaluation
set we could not perform manual inspection on them. Therefore, we are unable
to run this intervention on them in the present study. We evaluate all our
countermeasure model performance using the original decision thresholds from
Table 4.23.
Table 4.26: Pattern difference intervention results. To be compared with Ta-
ble 4.23. ‘+’, ‘-’ denotes an absolute increase/decrease. Ground truth annota-
tions for spoof files in the evaluation set are unavailable (indicated by −).
Intervention on Bonafide class Spoof class
Model Set FN FRR % FP FAR %
CNN1
Dev +334 +43.95 -49 -5.16
Eval +519 +39.98 − −
CNN2
Dev +73 +9.61 -35 -3.68
Eval +289 +22.27 − −
Cosine
Dev +155 +20.39 -53 -5.58
Eval +352 +27.12 − −
SVM
Dev +174 +22.89 -52 -5.47
Eval +349 +26.89 − −
GMM
Dev +170 +22.37 -41 -4.32
Eval +429 +33.13 − −
Table 4.26 summarises the results of this intervention. As expected, a large
number of bonafide test examples on both the development and evaluation sets
are now misclassified by all our ML models as shown from the increased FN
and FRR% metrics. On the spoof class (development set) we find a drop in the
FP and FAR% metrics for all ML models. These results confirm our hypothesis
about this pattern difference on this dataset. It indeed favours the bonafide
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class. This makes sense since a large proportion of bonafide audio files in the
training set have silence/nonspeech in the first 300 ms while the spoof class
contains speech.
4.6.4 Manipulating model decisions
Now we aim to manipulate countermeasure decisions by using the knowledge
acquired so far through our intervention experiments. Among different arte-
facts, we find that “pattern” difference and “BCS” artefacts favour the bonafide
class as evident from the increase in FRR% when we removed them from the
bonafide test files. Therefore, using the BCS artefact as a bonafide class signa-
ture we perform interventions on all the FNs (misclassified bonafide files) and
FPs (correctly detected spoof files) from Table 4.23. From these interventions
we demonstrate that machine learning CM models trained on this dataset can
indeed be manipulated using this cue.
Here the intervention module (Fig. 4.5) takes as side-information a “BCS”
signature and appends it to the start of test audio recordings before passing on
to the other modules for feature extraction and scoring. As a BCS signature we
use the first 100 ms samples of the most confidently classified bonafide audio
“T 1001039.wav” containing a BCS artefact in the training set. It should be
noted that we did a similar line of study in Sections 4.2 and 4.5 but this study
is different in terms of the signature we used for interventions. In Section 4.2
we used 60 ms zero-valued silence as a signature to fool GMM-based counter-
measures on version 1.0 of this dataset. In Section 4.5, we find that CNNs
give strong emphasis on the first 400 ms for class discrimination. And, we used
the initial 400 ms samples19 as a signature to fool the prediction of the CNN
countermeasure.
Table 4.27 shows the intervention results in terms of absolute increase/decrease
in the error metrics. The consistency in the drop of FN and FRR% and the
increase in FP and FAR% across all ML models confirm our hypothesis about
BCS. It indeed serves as a strong cue that a model attends to form bonafide
class predictions. The GMM and CNNs in particular show a high impact of this
intervention on the evaluation set. For example 124 misclassified genuine files
are now correctly classified by CNN1 (out of 139) and 142 by the GMM (out
of 179). Furthermore FAR raises by more than 40% for the GMM and CNNs
demonstrating that a large amount of correctly detected spoof files are now
able to bypass them. Even though i-vectors are computed on CQCC features
the impact on Cosine and SVM models that operate on i-vectors is much smaller
than GMMs. A possible reason for this is that i-vectors involve feature aggre-
19Taken from the most confidently classified bonafide audio signal in the training set.
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Table 4.27: Manipulating model decisions using BCS. To be compared with
Table 4.23. ‘+’, ‘-’ denotes an absolute increase/decrease.
Intervention on
Misclassified Correctly detected
bonafide files spoof files
Model Set FN FRR % FP FAR %
CNN1
Dev -46 -6.05 +446 +46.95
Eval -129 -9.94 +4909 +40.88
CNN2
Dev -56 -7.37 +479 +50.42
Eval -153 -11.79 +4937 +41.11
Cosine
Dev -37 -4.87 +130 +13.68
Eval -54 -4.16 +1857 +15.46
SVM
Dev -33 -4.34 +106 +11.16
Eval -53 -4.08 +1952 +16.26
GMM
Dev -51 -6.71 +325 +34.21
Eval -142 -10.94 +5732 +47.73
gation across all time frames during super-vector computation which may have
reduced the influence of BCS on the final i-vector feature. Furthermore, Fig. 4.7
provides additional insights through score visualisations illustrating how confi-
dently classified spoof test examples (true negatives) are now misclassified by
our CMs.
An interesting question we now ask is: What if an attacker did not have
access to this BCS signature? Can they still fool countermeasure models trained
on this dataset using a synthesized burst sound? To demonstrate this, we now
repeat the same BCS interventions but use 100 ms white noise as a signature to
fool ML models. We experiment with synthetic noise at different signal to noise
ratios (SNR) and demonstrate that white noise with enough power can fool ML
decisions serving as a cue for the bonafide class. To ensure that the power of
the original and manipulated speech signal is equivalent after adding noise, we
first normalise the noise samples. Let Xi represent a test audio signal and ni
be the noise samples drawn from a standard normal distribution. Therefore the
signal to noise ratio (SNR) can be written as:
SNR = log10
[
Var(Xi)
Var(α× ni)
]
(4.3)
where α is the scalar we want to compute for a given Xi and an SNR and Var(.)
represents variance. Thus:
α =
√
Var(Xi)× 10−SNR. (4.4)
Using α in Equation 4.4, the intervention module (Fig. 4.5) normalises the
random noise ni before appending it to Xi. The updated signal is then prop-
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Figure 4.7: Score distribution (before and after) illustrating how true negatives
(spoof files) in the evaluation set are misclassified after adding a BCS signature
on them. X-axis represents the countermeasure scores.
agated for feature extraction and scoring. We investigate the impact of noise
at different SNR levels and at the start and random time locations. Due to
similarity in the trend for different SNRs, we report the findings only for 0 and
6 dB SNR noise.
Tables 4.28 and 4.29 summarise the results of performing this intervention
adding white noise at random time locations and at the start of test signals.
In general, irrespective of locations where we inject this signature, on both the
development and evaluation sets we find the impact to become less effective
as we increase the SNR. Although we see a similar trend (as in Table 4.27) in
FRR% and FAR% for all our CMs, we find much smaller impact for the GMM
using noise in comparison to BCS (compare Table 4.27 and 4.28). A possible
reason could be that we normalise the noise with respect to the original signal
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Table 4.28: Manipulating model decisions injecting white noise at random time
locations of the intervened test signal. To be compared with Table 4.23.
Intervention on
Misclassified Correctly detected
bonafide trials spoof trials
Model SNR Set FN FRR FP FAR
CNN1
0
Dev -26 -3.42 +394 +41.47
Eval -114 -8.78 +4583 +38.17
6
Dev -38 -5.0 +176 +18.53
Eval -94 -7.24 +1138 +9.48
CNN2
0
Dev -43 -5.66 +662 +69.68
Eval -136 -10.48 +6748 +56.2
6
Dev -40 -5.26 +164 +17.26
Eval -73 -5.62 +2113 +17.6
Cosine
0
Dev -63 -8.29 +161 +16.95
Eval -78 -6.01 +1425 +11.87
6
Dev -13 -1.71 +14 +1.47
Eval -13 -1.0 +240 +2.01
SVM
0
Dev -61 -8.03 +139 +14.63
Eval -74 -5.70 +1333 +11.10
6
Dev -11 -1.45 +20 +2.11
Eval -19 -1.46 +267 +2.22
GMM
0
Dev -17 -2.24 +46 +4.84
Eval -20 -1.54 +660 +5.50
6
Dev -27 -3.55 +49 +5.16
Eval -23 -1.77 +368 +3.06
power (Eq. 4.4) which is not performed with BCS. We simply copy the BCS
(raw samples containing BCS) and append it to the test signal during the in-
tervention (Fig. 4.5).
Fooling CM decisions using “silence”. A final set of intervention exper-
iments we perform is towards evaluating CM robustness against silence (zero-
valued samples). It was already demonstrated on version 1.0 of this dataset how
strong impact silence had on class decisions (see Subsection 4.2.3). During our
dataset inspection on version 2.0 of this dataset, we found some of the bonafide
audio files in the training set still contain silence of more than 10 ms in the start
(see Section 3.2.3) which is not found in the spoof class. As highlighted in Sec-
tion 3.2.3 the training set has 288 (out of 1507) bonafide files containing silence
of more than 10 ms. Out of these files, 68 files have more than 70 ms silence and
37 with more than 100 ms silence in the start. Therefore, we hypothesize that
CMs trained on the version 2.0 of this dataset may be still exploiting silence
as one potential cue for the bonafide class. To this end, we repeat the same
interventions as we did for BCS and noise, but now we use zero-valued samples
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Table 4.29: Same as in Table 4.28 but we append white noise at the beginning
now.
Intervention on
Misclassified Correctly detected
bonafide trials spoof trials
Model SNR Set FN FRR FP FAR
CNN1
0
D -32 -4.21 +457 +48.11
E -120 -9.24 +5875 +48.93
6
D -52 -6.84 +292 +30.74
E -106 -8.17 +2519 +20.98
CNN2
0
D -52 -6.84 +798 +84.00
E -161 -12.4 +8537 +71.09
6
D -49 -6.45 +289 +30.42
E -118 -9.09 +3794 +31.6
Cosine
0
D -56 -7.37 +107 +11.26
E -74 -5.70 +1239 +10.32
6
D -20 -2.63 +17 +1.79
E -21 -1.62 +291 +2.42
SVM
0
D -59 -7.76 +101 +10.63
E -78 -6.01 +1201 +10.00
6
D -15 -1.97 +17 +1.79
E -20 -1.54 +288 +2.40
GMM
0
D -8 -1.05 +17 +1.79
E -8 -0.62 +617 +5.14
6
D -30 -3.95 +30 +3.16
E -29 -2.23 +330 +2.75
as a bonafide class signature (at start and random time locations) with an aim
to fool CM decisions. We perform this intervention using 10 ms and 100 ms
duration to demonstrate how varying duration effects CM decisions.
Tables 4.30 and 4.31 summarise the results of these intervention experiments
injecting silence at the start and at random time locations of test signals. Over-
all, both these tables illustrate a similar pattern. The impact becomes higher
as we increase zero-valued samples from 10 ms to 100 ms. This holds true for
both the development and evaluation sets. Interestingly, CNN2 appears to be
more sensitive than CNN1. A possible interpretation to this corresponds to
the framing size used during spectrogram computation. A frame size of more
than 100 ms indicates that even though all 100 ms samples are replaced with
silence, a frame may contain some speech/nonspeech information. To this end,
CNN1 uses a 108 ms frame size (1728 point FFT ) while CNN2 uses only 32 ms
(512 point FFT) as frame size to compute spectrograms. Both use 10 ms frame
shift. Thus, appending silence of 10 or 100 ms would impact CNN2 more in
comparison to CNN1 due to occurrences of such silences (in the bonafide class)
during model training. To derive further understanding on the impact of this
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Table 4.30: Manipulating CM decisions injecting silence at the start of the
intervened test signal. To be compared with Table 4.23
Intervention on
Misclassified Correctly detected
bonafide trials spoof trials
Model Silence Set FN FRR FP FAR
CNN1
10 ms
D 0 0 +1 +0.11
E -2 -0.15 +33 +0.27
100 ms
D -9 -1.18 +24 +2.53
E -8 -0.62 +199 +1.66
CNN2
10 ms
D -17 -2.24 +28 +2.95
E -17 -1.31 +219 +1.82
100 ms
D -51 -6.71 +711 +74.84
E -134 -10.32 +6226 +51.85
Cosine
10 ms
D -16 -2.11 +4 +0.42
E -9 -0.69 +97 +0.81
100 ms
D -29 -3.82 +35 +3.68
E -37 -2.85 +479 +3.99
SVM
10 ms
D -9 -1.18 +9 +0.95
E -12 -0.92 +12 +0.10
100 ms
D -33 -4.34 +33 +3.47
E -34 -2.62 +34 +0.28
GMM
10 ms
D -7 -0.92 +6 +0.63
E -5 -0.39 +78 +0.65
100 ms
D -32 -4.21 +44 +4.63
E -44 -3.39 +479 +3.99
intervention we look at the score distribution for CNN2. Fig. 4.8 shows this.
Overall, these results indicate that silence does provide cues for the bonafide
class on v2.0 of this dataset.
4.6.5 Discussion
The performance of any data-driven ML task highly depends on the training
data fed to the learning algorithm. They learn to make decisions by exploiting
the underlying pattern within the training data. Therefore, artefacts and con-
founders, if present in the dataset, can introduce biases in model decisions rais-
ing questions on their reliability and trustworthiness [Hernandez-Orallo, 2019,
Sturm, 2016]. As explained in Subsection 2.9.1 such issues can affect a wide
range of ML tasks, and the impact caused by these biases in domains such as
finance, medicine and security (including ASV anti-spoofing) can be very costly.
Therefore, it is important to ensure that dataset artefacts that introduce biases
in ML decisions are taken into account to build reliable ML models.
In this direction, this section focussed on security for voice biometric us-
ing a benchmark ASVspoof 2017 dataset which is a popular dataset for replay
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Table 4.31: Same as in Table 4.30 but now we inject silence at random time
locations.
Intervention on
Misclassified Correctly detected
bonafide trials spoof trials
Model Silence Set FN FRR FP FAR
CNN1
10 ms
D 0 0.0 0 0.0
E -2 -0.15 +34 +0.28
100 ms
D -11 -1.45 +53 +5.58
E -9 -0.69 +295 +2.46
CNN2
10 ms
D -16 -2.11 +59 +6.21
E -34 -2.62 +355 +2.96
100 ms
D -52 -6.84 +814 +85.68
E -142 -10.94 +7310 +60.88
Cosine
10 ms
D -10 -1.32 +9 +0.95
E -10 -0.77 +100 +0.83
100 ms
D -19 -2.5 +31 +3.26
E -35 -2.7 +534 +4.45
SVM
10 ms
D -4 -0.53 +11 +1.16
E -9 -0.69 +102 +0.85
100 ms
D -26 -3.42 +33 +3.47
E -35 -2.7 +533 +4.44
GMM
10 ms
D -3 -0.39 +8 +0.84
E -10 -0.77 +103 +0.86
100 ms
D -30 -3.95 +73 +7.68
E -26 -2.0 +655 +5.45
spoofing attack detection used in more than 60 published research papers. We
identified and investigated the impact of artefacts (see Subsection 3.2.3) on this
dataset that machine learning models exploit to form decisions. Among differ-
ent artefacts, we found that burst click sounds (BCS) provide strong cues for
the bonafide class. Interestingly, experimental results for interventions using
DTMF sounds showed that they have no influence on model decisions (Sub-
section 4.6.3). We also find that silence (zero valued samples) still serves as a
cue for the bonafide class on version 2.0 of this dataset. Initially, in Section
4.2 we had shown how silence influenced model decisions on version 1.0 of this
dataset. Subsequently version 2.0 was released by the ASVspoof organisers [Del-
gado et al., 2018] fixing such issues. However, our intervention results suggest
that this problem is not solved completely, and that CM models still exploit
silence as one potential cue in class discrimination.
Among 10 different utterances (see Table 3.1) used in this dataset, S02 “Ok
Google” is the shortest one with an average duration of about 0.7 to 0.8 seconds.
However, the dataset contains a large number of S02 examples with more than
2 seconds duration indicating more than half of its contents being nonspeech,
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Figure 4.8: Score distributions of spoof files in the evaluation set that were orig-
inally detected correctly by CNN2 and get misclassified adding 100 ms silence
at random time locations.
noise or silence. As a result of this, a reliable detection of this sentence may
be difficult and that the attacks we demonstrated using dataset cues may have
more impact on S02 than the other nine phrases. To confirm this, we visualise
the distribution of how the proportion (in terms of impact) looks across the ten
phrases. Fig. 4.9 summarises this and confirms our hypothesis.
We find the work of [Fang et al., 2018b] to be closely relevant to ours. The
authors study the effect of enhancing the quality of stolen speech using genera-
tive adversarial networks before performing a replay attack. They demonstrate
a significant increase in the EER for both the baseline GMM and CNN coun-
termeasures on the ASVspoof 2017 dataset. However, our current work demon-
strates that knowledge of artefacts in a dataset can also be used to manipulate
model predictions (Subsection 4.6.4). This is much simpler than training a GAN
on a specific dataset. Our in-depth analysis of this dataset and experimental
results from different interventions confirms the presence of a “horse” in ma-
chine learning [Hernandez-Orallo, 2019, Sturm, 2014] for anti-spoofing applied
to ASVspoof 2017 dataset. Furthermore, none of the research results published
in this dataset (more than 60 papers) have accounted for these artefacts, further
indicating that the countermeasures showing impressive results may not be fully
reliable and trustworthy as their decision process involves the contribution of
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Figure 4.9: Impact of the BCS intervention on correctly detected spoof files
across ten different phrases (S01 through S10 defined in Table 3.1) of the
ASVspoof 2017 dataset. Shown results illustrate the proportion for different
phrases for all our CM models.
these artefacts which are not related to the actual problem.
4.7 Summary
This chapter presented a detailed study towards understanding replay spoofing
detection systems by investigating existing methodologies and techniques from
the literature. Several interesting insights have been discovered revolving around
the ASVspoof 2017 dataset, a benchmark spoofing dataset and state-of-the-art
countermeasure models on this dataset. This section provides a summary of
these findings.
In Section 4.2, our experimental results demonstrated that CM models ex-
ploited confounding factors in this dataset (version 1.0) that are not relevant to
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the replay detection problem, overestimating the actual performance. Further-
more, the poor performance using hand-crafted features indicated that crafting
features to capture unknown attack conditions might be difficult, suggesting
data-driven models could be a way for exploration. To this end, Section 4.3 at-
tempted to replicate the best performing deep model (LCNN) of the ASVspoof
2017 challenge. It was found that replicating this model using only the pub-
lished details was not possible. Despite trying alternative network architectures
it was found that achieving good test generalisation was a major challenge on
this dataset.
Why is spoofing detection on this dataset difficult? Section 4.4 attempted
to understand this. It was found that due to inherent dataset issues, making
confident conclusions whether reverberation noise or some device-specific at-
tributes provide a cue to replay signal discrimination on this dataset is difficult.
Extending this, the next Section 4.5 developed a CNN model that showed com-
parable performance to LCNN, and used it to understand what it has learned
to detect spoofing using a method from interpretable machine learning. Results
demonstrated that the model was paying attention to the first few milliseconds
of each input recording to make class decisions. Motivated by this, Section 4.6
performed an in-depth study on the ASVspoof 2017 v2.0 dataset, discovered
artefacts/confounders and demonstrated that CM models benefit from exploit-
ing them in their decision making.
The work reported in this chapter has been published (and is under review)
in peer-reviewed international conferences and journals.
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Chapter 5
Design of novel spoofing
countermeasures
5.1 Introduction
This chapter proposes novel methods for the design of countermeasures for re-
play spoofing attacks while also focusing on model robustness and avoiding bi-
ases in the datasets. The work reported in this chapter uses both the ASVspoof
2017 v2.0 and ASVspoof 2019 PA datasets except for Section 5.3 which mainly
focuses on the ASVspoof 2017 v2.0 dataset. Section 5.2 describes our proposed
ensemble model comprising several shallow and deep models reporting promis-
ing results on the benchmark ASVspoof 2019 PA dataset. It also discusses how
countermeasure models show biased performance with zero-valued silences in the
PA dataset, and subsequently proposes simple preprocessing methods to over-
come them. This work is a result of our participation in the recent ASVspoof
2019 challenge, and was published in [Chettri et al., 2019]. Then Section 5.3
extends work from Section 4.6 and proposes methods to mitigate the impact of
dataset biases and help countermeasure models become more robust against ma-
nipulations using dataset specific cues (see Section 4.6). The next Section 5.4
analyses how spoofing detection performance varies across different subbands
using CNNs trained on spectrograms. It then proposes a joint subband mod-
eling framework which outperforms models trained on fullband spectrograms.
Furthermore, this section performs a cross-dataset evaluation of these models
on the ASVspoof 2019 real PA test set (described in Subsection 3.3.3). Mo-
tivated from the widespread popularity of the GMM backend classifier (which
is a generative model) in spoofing detection, Section 5.5 proposes the use of
variational autoencoders (VAEs), which are deep generative models, as an al-
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ternative backend for spoofing detection. Different VAE modelling approaches
are further studied. Furthermore, this section also studies VAEs in a classical
setting — using VAEs as a feature extractor and training a separate classifier
for classification. Finally, this chapter concludes with a summary in Section 5.6.
5.2 Ensemble models for spoofing detection
5.2.1 Introduction
Designing a single model to robustly detect unseen spoofing attacks can be chal-
lenging, as demonstrated at the ASVspoof 2015 and 2017 challenges, where the
best performing systems [Patel and Patil, 2015, Lavrentyeva et al., 2017, Na-
garsheth et al., 2017] made use of an ensemble model that combines input fea-
tures or classifier scores. To this end, this section proposes ensemble models for
robust spoofing detection combining both deep neural networks and traditional
machine learning models through logistic regression. Our proposed approach
is evaluated on the latest spoofing dataset ASVspoof 2019 (see Section 3.3)
which was released as a result of the 2019 spoofing evaluations (Section 2.3).
Both logical access (LA) and physical access (PA) spoofing detection tasks of
the challenge are considered. Although the main focus of this thesis is on PA
attacks (replay spoofing), this section describes results on the LA subtask as
well because of our participation in both the subtasks of the ASVspoof 2019
challenge. The work reported here was published in [Chettri et al., 2019].
The next Subsection 5.2.2 describes our proposed ensemble model compris-
ing various deep and shallow models. We build our models by discarding data
points ensuring non-overlap in spoofing conditions between training and vali-
dation for better generalisation. For this, we propose a dataset partition which
is described in Subsection 5.2.3. This dataset partition ensures that different
attack types are present during training and validation to improve system ro-
bustness. Then Subsection 5.2.4 evaluates the performance of our ensemble and
all the models in the ensemble. Two evaluation metrics, EER and t-DCF, as de-
scribed in Section 3.5, are considered for this. We demonstrate that combining
information from deep and traditional machine learning approaches along with
our dataset partition can improve model generalisation. Furthermore, results
on the PA tasks suggest that the same CNN performs much better when trained
on the last 4 seconds of audio than on the first 4 seconds. We find that spoofed
audio recordings for the PA task tend to have more silence at the end than
bonafide recordings. Following this, Subsection 5.2.5 performs three different
interventions proving that models exploit this silence pattern in the dataset and
achieve lower performance without these cues. Our results suggest that perfor-
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mance metrics reported on the current PA dataset may be overestimating the
actual performance of the models, which might become somewhat of a “horse”
[Sturm, 2014] that trivially sidestep the actual problem, thus raising concerns
about model validity as well as performance results. Finally, Subsection 5.2.6
provides a summary of the work done in this section.
5.2.2 Models in the proposed ensemble
This section describes the approach used to design countermeasures for the LA
and PA tasks of the ASVspoof 2019 challenge. A model ensemble is used in
order to combine information from different countermeasure models employing
various features and training procedures. This diversity leads to a powerful
ensemble with good generalisation. Our ensemble comprises various deep and
shallow models which are described next.
Deep Models
We train five deep models using raw audio or time-frequency representations as
input to minimise a binary cross-entropy loss using Adam optimiser and early
stopping with a patience of P epochs. As the dataset has more spoofed exam-
ples, we replicate the bonafide examples to ensure that each batch contains an
equal number of bonafide and spoofed examples, which helps stabilise training.
At inference time, we use the output layer sigmoid activation as a score. We
provide model-specific training details below.
Convolutional Neural Network (CNN). We use the CNN architecture from Sub-
section 4.5.2 featuring 50% dropout in the fully connected layers, a batch size
of 32, and a learning rate of 10−4. We train the model for 100 epochs with an
early stopping patience of P = 5 and P = 2 for the LA and PA tasks, respec-
tively. We use an utterance-level mean-variance normalised log spectrogram1,
computed using a 1024-point FFT with a hop size of 160 samples, as the input.
For each task, we train two such CNN models, model A and B, on the first and
last 4 seconds of each audio sample. We truncate or loop the spectrogram time
frames to obtain a unified time representation.
Convolutional Recurrent Neural Network (CRNN). We use a modified version
of the CRNN architecture from [Morfi and Stowell, 2018] (model C). We train
the model for 500 epochs with early stopping patience of P = 10 for both the
LA and PA tasks. As input, we use a mean-variance (computed on the training
1Power-spectrogram for the LA task and Mel-spectrogram with 80 mel bands (for compu-
tational reasons) for the PA task.
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set) normalised log-Mel spectrogram of 40 Mel bands, computed on the first 5
seconds of truncated or looped audio samples, using a 1024-point FFT with a
hop size of 256 samples. During training, we use a batch size of 8 and 32 for
the LA and PA tasks, respectively, with an initial learning rate of 10−5 that is
halved on the validation loss plateau with a patience of P = 5 epochs, until 10−8.
1D-Convolutional Neural Network. We use the network architecture from the
sample-level 1D CNN [Lee et al., 2017] (model D). In total, the model consists of
9 ReSE-2 blocks [Kim et al., 2018]. These blocks are a combination of ResNets
[He et al., 2016] and SENets [Hu et al., 2018]. We use multi-level feature aggre-
gation, where the outputs of the last three blocks are concatenated and followed
by a fully connected layer of 1024 units, batch normalization and ReLU layers,
a 50% dropout layer and a fully connected layer of 1 unit with sigmoid acti-
vation. Each convolutional layer has filters of size 3, an L2 weight regularizer
of 0.0005, and all strides are of unit value. The raw audio input is 3.7 seconds
in duration and randomly sampled segments of this size are selected from the
recordings. We loop shorter samples to obtain a unified time representation.
We train the model using a batch size of 16, learning rate of 10−4 and an early
stopping patience of P = 25 epochs.
Wave-U-Net. We use a modified version of the Wave-U-Net [Stoller et al.,
2018], with five layers of stride four, and without upsampling blocks (model E).
The outputs of the last convolution are max-pooled across time, reducing the
parameter count and incorporating the intuition that the important features in
the tasks are temporally local. Finally, we apply a fully connected layer with a
single output to yield a classification probability. We train the model using a
batch size of 64, a learning rate of 10−5 and early stopping patience of P = 10
for both the LA and PA tasks, where an epoch is defined as 500 update steps.
To ensure the audio inputs have the same length, we pad all recordings with
silence to 196608 audio samples (= 12.23 seconds). For the PA task, we also
match real samples to their spoofed versions based on the speaker identity and
utterance. We train on pairs of audio samples (discarding samples without any
matches) and balanced batches, in order to stabilise the training process and
improve generalisation by preventing the network from using speaker identity
and utterance content for discrimination.
Shallow Models
Additional to deep models, we use two different shallow [Salamon et al., 2017]
models: Gaussian Mixture Models (GMMs) and Support Vector Machines (SVMs).
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GMM. We train three GMM models using MFCC (model F), IMFCC (model
G), and SCMC (model H) features due to their performance on the ASVspoof
2015 [Sahidullah et al., 2015] and 2017 spoofing datasets (Section 4.2.2). For
each of them, we extract 60 dimensional static-delta-acceleration (SDA) fea-
ture vectors per frame. Section 2.5 provides background information on these
features. We use 128 and 256 mixture components for the LA and PA tasks
respectively and train one GMM each for the bonafide and spoof classes. At
test time, the score of each test utterance is computed as the log likelihood ratio
between the bonafide and spoofed GMM model as described in Equation 4.1.
We use the publicly available scripts and feature configuration from [Sahidullah
et al., 2015] for computing these features.
SVM. We train two SVMs using i-vectors (model I) and the long-term-average-
spectrum (LTAS) feature (model J) since they have shown good performance
on prior spoofing datasets [Sahidullah et al., 2015, Muckenhirn et al., 2017a].
Inspired by [Novoselov et al., 2016b], we fuse multiple i-vectors in our approach,
each based on complementary hand-engineered features, and manage to improve
performance over a single i-vector based SVM. We train four different i-vector
extractors using MFCC, IMFCC, CQCC and SCMC features. For each of them
we use a 60-dimensional SDA feature vector per frame. We train the T matrix
with 100 total factors on both tasks and a universal background model (UBM)
with 128 and 256 mixtures on the LA and PA tasks, respectively and extract 4
different 100-dimensional i-vectors for every utterance. We use 400-dimensional
fused i-vectors for the LA task and 300-dimensional fused i-vectors for the PA
task. We perform mean-variance normalisation on the fused i-vectors and LTAS
feature and train SVMs with a linear kernel and the default parameters of the
Scikit-Learn [Pedregosa et al., 2011] library. We train the UBM and T matrix
using the MSR-Identity toolkit [Sadjadi et al., 2013].
Ensemble
We investigate several ensemble models combining different sets of deep and
shallow models. We optimise this choice monitoring the performance on a subset
of the development data (dev es, details in the next section). We do not use
this subset during the training of fusion weights. The weights are learned using a
logistic regression implementation using the Bosaris [Brümmer and de Villiers,
2013] toolkit. Therefore, we only report the best ensemble setting we obtain
from many combinations investigated. To this end, we define three ensemble
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models E1
2, E2, and E3 for both the LA and PA tasks.
The E1 ensemble focuses on adding as many individual models (deep and
shallow) as possible to include more diversity that may help improve perfor-
mance on the unseen test set. On the LA task, it combines models A, C through
G and I. On the PA tasks, E1 fuses all single models except D. For the LA task,
models B, H and J were not used in E1, while model D was discarded for the
PA task since including it deteriorated the ensemble performance on dev es.
E2 on the other hand combines only deep models aiming to understand how
models trained with different architectures, input representations and training
strategies affect performance and generalisation on the test set. On the LA tasks,
E2 combines models A, B and E. On the PA tasks, E2 combines all five deep
models A through E. Including models C and D deteriorated the performance
on dev es, so they were not included in LA.
The final ensemble E3 combines two deep models A and B. While both
models use the same architecture, they operate on different parts of the audio
input —the first and the last 4 seconds audio for A and B respectively. This
ensemble aims to understand how overall performance improves when the whole
input is re-combined through score fusion.
5.2.3 Dataset and proposed partitions
We used the ASVspoof 2019 LA and PA datasets for evaluation of our en-
semble models. Section 3.3 provides a description of these datasets. Here, we
describe our proposed dataset partitions that were used during our ASVspoof
2019 challenge participation. The training and development subsets have sim-
ilar spoofing algorithms/conditions in both the LA and PA datasets. We ar-
gue that using the same types of spoofing attacks during training and val-
idation might lead to overfitting and poor generalisation on unseen attack
conditions. Thus, we further partition the original training and development
datasets for both LA and PA, ensuring non-overlap in spoofing attack con-
ditions. Protocol files and details related to data partitions are available in
https://github.com/BhusanChettri/ASVspoof2019.
LA dataset partition. The spoofed utterances in the training and devel-
opment sets are generated using one of the four speech synthesis algorithms:
SS 1, SS 2, SS 4, US 1 and two voice conversion algorithms: VC 1 and VC 4.
The voice conversion algorithms are based on neural network (VC 1) and trans-
fer function based methods (VC 4) [Bonastre et al., 2006]. Speech synthesis
2The ensemble E1 was the primary system we submitted to the ASVspoof 2019 evaluations
for ranking.
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algorithms are based on waveform concatenation (US 1) [Morise et al., 2016],
neural network-based parametric speech synthesis using Wavenet (SS 1) [Oord
et al., 2016], neural network-based parametric speech synthesis using source-
filter vocoders (SS 2) [Morise et al., 2016], and publicly available toolkits such
as Merlin3, CURRENT4 and MaryTTS5 (SS 4).
We create the train tr6 subset from the original training set by discarding
all the spoofed utterances for the SS 1 and VC 1 spoofing conditions. However,
all the bonafide utterances of the training set are used in train tr . Therefore,
our proposed training partition train tr consists of 2580 bonafide and 15200
spoofed utterances.
We partition the original development set into two subsets: dev es and
dev lr . We use dev es for model validation, early stopping and parameter
tuning; and the dev lr partition is used to learn fusion weights through logistic
regression. In the dev es partition we use the two spoofed conditions SS 1 and
VC 1 that were not used in train tr . Among 20 speakers in the bonafide class
of the development set, we chose 12 speakers (8 female and 4 male speakers)
randomly for the bonafide class of this partition. Furthermore, only 10 speakers
out of these 20 speakers in the development set are seen in the spoofed class.
Therefore, we use 6 speakers (4 female and 2 male) out of 10 in the dev es
partition. Following this criterion, the dev es partition comprises 5160 spoofed
files corresponding to the two spoofing attack conditions and six speakers and
1820 bonafide files.
In the dev lr partition we keep all the six attack conditions of the devel-
opment set but ensure that speakers seen in the dev es partition are not used
here to avoid overfitting on speakers. Therefore, in the bonafide class of this
partition, we use those 8 speakers (4 male and 4 female) that we discarded in
the dev es partition. This gives us 728 bonafide files. As for the spoofed class,
we consider all 6 attack conditions but use only those 4 speakers that were
discarded in the spoofed class of the dev es partition. Therefore, the dev lr
partition comprises 728 bonafide and 6816 spoofed utterances.
PA dataset partition. Unlike LA, the attack conditions/configurations in PA
are defined in a different manner. Here, we combine the environment identifier
and attack identifier as replay attack conditions on which we define our dataset
partition. In other words, we represent the attack condition as a quintuplet:
S,R,D s,D a,Q where the first three represent the environment ID and the re-
3https://github.com/CSTR-Edinburgh/merlin
4https://github.com/nii-yamagishilab/project-CURRENNT-public
5http://mary.dfki.de
6The suffixes tr, es, and lr signifies our proposed partition used for model training, early
stopping (model validation) and learning ensemble model through logistic regression.
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maining two the attack ID. Parameters S,R,D s represents room size in square
meters, reverberation and talker-to-ASV distance in centimeters. Parameters
D a and Q represent attacker-to-talker distance in centimeters and replay device
quality (low, medium and high quality). Following this, we get a total of 243
different attack settings. Both the training and development sets have these at-
tack settings. As in LA, we follow the same procedure and ensure that no attack
conditions or speakers are overlapping across training and model validation and
while learning fusion weights through logistic regression.
Therefore, in train tr we keep 170 attack conditions (chosen randomly) but
all the bonafide files from the training set. This gives 5400 bonafide files and
33700 spoofed files in this partition. For early stopping and model validation
the dev es partition uses 73 attack conditions different from the ones used
in train tr . This gives 4050 bonafide files and 5966 spoofed files in dev es
partition. As for the dev lr partition we use all the 243 attack conditions
but non overlapping speakers from dev es. This gives 1350 bonafide and 4860
spoofed files in the dev lr partition.
Please see [Todisco et al., 2019.] and the ASVspoof 2019 evaluation plan7
for further details on the acronyms and different attack conditions for the LA
and PA datasets discussed here.
5.2.4 Evaluation
This section describes the approach used in model training following the pro-
posed dataset partition in Subsection 5.2.3. A brief description of the metrics
considered for performance evaluation is provided. It then evaluates the effec-
tiveness of our proposed data protocols for training and model validation. Then
it describes the performance of all our single and ensemble models on both the
development and evaluation sets for both the LA and PA tasks.
Training and testing
We train our models (single and ensemble) described in Subsection 5.2.2 using
the train tr and dev lr sets respectively. We use dev es for model validation,
early stopping and hyper-parameter optimisation. We compare our models’
performance with the baseline LFCC (model B1) and CQCC (model B2) feature
based GMM models provided by the ASVspoof 2019 challenge organisers.
Performance metric
We use the EER and t-DCF metrics to evaluate model performance. Section 3.5
and Section 2.3 provide details on these metrics and the ASVspoof 2019 chal-
7https://www.asvspoof.org/asvspoof2019/asvspoof2019_evaluation_plan.pdf
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Table 5.1: Comparison of Model A (CNN) performance trained and validated
using the original protocol (*) and our proposed protocol.
Protocol Test set*
LA PA
t-DCF EER% t-DCF EER%
Proposed
Dev 0.0074 0.32 0.2795 10.77
Eval 0.1790 7.66 0.3091 12.16
Original
Dev 0.0 0.0 0.2693 10.94
Eval 0.3599 11.26 0.3161 12.36
lenge, respectively.
Effectiveness of the proposed data partition
To evaluate the effectiveness of our proposed protocol for training and model
validation, we train a deep countermeasure model using both our proposed and
the original protocols. For this, we take Model A which operates on spectrogram
inputs. We chose this model architecture as it takes the least computational
time (training and testing) among other deep architectures we considered in
this section. Furthermore, our objective here is to confirm and validate our
hypothesis towards using distinct spoofing attack conditions during training
and model validation for better generalisation.
Table 5.1 summarises the performance of the CNN on the original devel-
opment and evaluation sets. The results clearly indicate that avoiding the use
of same attack conditions during model training and validation indeed helps
improve model generalisation. On the LA tasks, this is more prevalent as we
can observe that the CNN trained on the original protocol overfits easily on
the development set showing poor generalisation on the evaluation set. As for
the PA tasks, we witness improved generalisation using our protocols, but the
gain is not as substantial as we saw in the case of LA. This also suggests the
difficulty of the replay spoofing detection task itself. Nonetheless, it should be
noted that our proposed protocol discards a lot of data points yet achieves im-
proved performance on the evaluation set in comparison to using the original
data protocols.
Development set results
Table 5.2 summarises the results on the original development set for both the
LA and PA tasks. In general, the results suggest that the PA task is harder
than the LA task. For the PA task, our CNN performs noticeably better when
operating on the last 4 seconds of audio (model B) instead of the first 4 seconds
(model A), suggesting the presence of discriminative cues at the end of each
audio signal which we confirm in Subsection 5.2.5. Furthermore, we observe
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Table 5.2: Results on the LA and PA development sets. Bold: best performance,
na: not applicable. A and B uses the same CNN but are trained on the first
and the last 4 seconds spectrogram respectively. * as we do not use the same
set of models for LA and PA, we do not provide the detailed model combination
here. Please see Subsection 5.2.2 for ensemble model details.
Model
Model LA PA
ID t-DCF EER% t-DCF EER%
LFCC-GMM B1 0.0663 2.71 0.2554 11.96
CQCC-GMM B2 0.0123 0.43 0.1953 9.87
CNN A 0.0074 0.32 0.2795 10.77
CNN B 0.0040 0.27 0.1672 5.98
CRNN C 0.1706 5.65 0.1223 5.0
1D-CNN D 0.36 13.58 0.9269 36.28
Wave-U-Net E 0.0745 2.43 0.4725 21.16
MFCC-GMM F 0.1805 7.46 0.2354 10.88
IMFCC-GMM G 0.0438 1.73 0.2119 8.94
SCMC-GMM H na na 0.2787 12.46
i-vector SVM I 0.0045 0.16 0.2537 9.93
LTAS SVM J na na 0.3534 13.6
Deep and shallow* E1 0.0 0.0 0.0354 1.33
Only deep E2 0.0002 0.03 0.0523 1.85
A+B E3 0.0025 0.2 0.1316 4.85
a poor performance for models D and E. Apart from having to learn features
directly from the raw audio, another reason could be that they involve zero-
padding all signals or using a randomly selected audio segment for prediction,
respectively, and thus might not be able to exploit such cues at the end of audio
signals.
Our i-vector feature fusion approach (model I) shows impressive performance
on the LA task but relatively poor performance on the PA task. One reason for
this could be that the i-vectors extracted using hand-crafted features are not
able to capture characteristics of unseen replay attack conditions. On both the
LA and PA tasks, model G (IMFCC) outperforms model F (MFCC) showing
consistency on prior findings on the v1.0 and v2.0 of the ASVspoof 2017 datasets
(Subsection 4.2.2 and Subsection 4.4.3). This suggests that a focus on higher
frequency information is beneficial as it might not be perfectly generated by
the TTS and VC algorithms. Likewise, on the PA task, the playback device
properties may impact high-frequency content. Finally, the poor performance
of models H and J suggest that the SCMC and LTAS features are not suitable
for this task.
As expected, our ensemble model appears to benefit from combining different
models for both tasks, as indicated by the strong reduction in t-DCF and EER
compared to all individual models. On both tasks, E1 performs better than E2
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Table 5.3: Results on the LA and PA evaluation sets.
Model
LA PA
t-DCF EER% t-DCF EER%
B1 0.2116 8.09 0.3017 13.54
B2 0.2366 9.57 0.2454 11.04
A 0.1790 7.66 0.3091 12.16
B 0.3841 19.11 0.1577 5.75
E1 0.0755 2.64 0.1492 6.11
E2 0.2136 9.57 0.2913 14.12
E3 0.2952 10.63 0.1465 5.43
which in turn performs better than E3.
Evaluation set results
Table 5.3 summarises the results on the evaluation set8. On the LA task, model
E1 has an EER of 2.64% and a t-DCF of 0.0755, outperforming the baselines
by a large margin and securing the third rank in the ASVspoof 2019 challenge.
The superior performance of E1 over E2 and E3 suggests that fusing multiple
models employing different features does provide complementary information
useful for spoofing detection.
However, on the PA tasks our single model B outperforms ensemble models
E1 (on the EER) and E2 (both metrics). Furthermore, our two model ensemble
E3 (A+B) outperforms the five deep model ensemble E2 and nine model en-
semble E1 reaching the lowest t-DCF of 0.1465 and an EER of 5.43%. While
these results suggest good model generalisation, they raise questions about the
relevance of the cues used by model B as it is only trained on the last 4 seconds
of each recording. Besides the poor performance of models D and E, the inferior
performance of ensemble models on the evaluation set compared to the develop-
ment set (Table 5.2) could be explained by model C making random predictions
on the evaluation data (due to a bug we found after the challenge submission),
but not on the development set – which is corroborated by the fact that model
C receives the second highest weight by logistic regression in both E1 and E2.
Furthermore, post-evaluation, having received the labels for the evaluation
set, we rescored all our individual systems and our primary ensemble system E1
using the corrected system C scores. Table 5.4 summarises the results. On the
LA subtask our updated system E1 do not seem to have a substantial impact,
however, on the PA subtasks we observe a significant impact.
8Computed by the ASVspoof 2019 challenge organisers.
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Table 5.4: Results on the LA and PA evaluation set scored post-evaluation
after the evaluation set labels were released by the ASVspoof organiser. * the
corrupted system that was used during the challenge submission. Updated:
rescored after using the correct scores from system C.
Model
LA PA
t-DCF EER% t-DCF EER%
C* 0.9993 49.62 0.9999 50.31
C (updated) 0.2536 10.45 0.2003 7.25
D 0.3801 14.88 0.6087 24.79
E 0.1841 7.81 0.9838 42.91
F 0.2988 11.41 0.3151 12.82
G 0.2615 12.35 0.2560 10.66
H na na 0.3311 14.05
I 0.2912 11.16 0.2413 9.415
J na na 0.3768 15.25
E1 (submitted) 0.0755 2.64 0.1492 6.11
E1 (updated) 0.0878 3.24 0.0620 2.36
5.2.5 Interventions on the PA tasks
In Table 5.2 we find that for the PA task, the same CNN performs much better
when trained on the last 4 seconds of audio (model B) than on the first 4
seconds (model A). We thus analyse a set of audio recordings for the PA task
that were confidently classified by model B and find that spoofed audio tends to
have more silence (zero-valued samples) at the end than bonafide examples. In
comparison, silence at the beginning of the recordings is often shorter and does
not appear to follow this pattern. Therefore, we hypothesize that any model
(deep or shallow) trained on the PA dataset that does not specifically discard
this information could exploit the duration of silence as a discriminative cue.
This leads to countermeasure models that are easily manipulated, simply by
removing silence from the spoofed signals to make the model misclassify them
as a bonafide signal, and vice versa. To demonstrate this effect in practice, we
perform three interventions on model B and the adapted9 baselines M1 and M2
by manipulating the silence at the end of the audio signal.
Intervention I: During testing
In this intervention we train the models on the original recordings with silence
but remove silence during testing10. In Table 5.5, a strong increase can be
noticed in both EER and t-DCF for all models, suggesting that they indeed
rely on the silence parts for prediction. We find that model B is most sensitive
9We use 128 mixtures to train the LFCC (M1) and CQCC (M2) GMMs in contrast to 512
mixtures used in the baselines B1 and B2.
10We use a naive approach of counting the first consecutive zeros as silence and remove
them.
147
Table 5.5: Intervention results on the development set of the PA tasks. Numbers
to the left of the arrow indicate performance without any intervention.
Intervention Model t-DCF EER%
I
M1 0.2036→ 0.2741 9.18→ 13.27
M2 0.1971→ 0.2959 10.06→ 15.59
B 0.1672→ 0.5018 5.98→ 19.8
II
M1 0.2036→ 0.9528 9.18→ 54.76
M2 0.1971→ 0.9463 10.06→ 57.98
B 0.1672→ 0.2626 5.98→ 11.20
III
M1 0.2036→ 0.8614 9.18→ 41.09
M2 0.1971→ 0.9448 10.06→ 58.71
B 0.1672→ 0.3129 5.98→ 12.85
Table 5.6: Same as in Table 5.5 but for the evaluation set.
Intervention Model t-DCF EER%
I
M1 0.2483→ 0.3349 10.85→ 15.07
M2 0.2498→ 0.3698 11.07→ 16.55
B 0.1576→ 0.5263 5.75→ 19.75
II
M1 0.2483→ 0.9734 10.85→ 53.34
M2 0.2498→ 0.9923 11.07→ 56.84
B 0.1576→ 0.2926 5.75→ 11.7
III
M1 0.2483→ 0.8871 10.85→ 38.97
M2 0.2498→ 0.9928 11.07→ 59.12
B 0.1576→ 0.3472 5.75→ 13.98
to this intervention, with t-DCF and EER rising by 0.3346 and an absolute
13.82%, respectively. This could be due to deep models focusing more strongly
on silences than the GMM models, which are trained on individual spectral
frames and aggregate the score through averaging frame-wise likelihoods.
Intervention II: During training
Here, we train the model with silence parts removed, but test on the original
test recordings (with silence). The stable performance of the CNN (model B)
over the GMMs in Table 5.5 suggests that the former is more robust against
variations in silence duration. On the other hand, we find a dramatic increase in
the error rates for M1 and M2. One interpretation for this is that the bonafide
and spoof GMMs may assign a low likelihood to silence frames as they have not
seen them during training. Thus, silence frames do not make large contributions
to the final score making the task much harder.
Intervention III: During training and testing
In this intervention, we remove silence during training and testing to ensure
that the audio samples do not share an easily exploitable cue. This forces the
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models to learn about the actually relevant factors of interest and thus provides
more realistic performance estimates (Table 5.5). As in intervention II, model
B shows a stable performance indicating good generalisation and discrimination
capabilities. Models M1 and M2 on the other hand achieve poor performance,
possibly since their bonafide GMM models assign a high likelihood to spoofed
frames as they are very similar to bonafide ones when only considering the
speech frames.
Finally, we repeat the above three intervention experiments on the evaluation
set. Table 5.6 summarises the results. Since spoofed files in the evaluation set
have similar issues of silence as in the development set, we observe similar trends
across the three different intervention experiments.
5.2.6 Discussion
This section proposed an ensemble modeling approach towards the logical ac-
cess (TTS and VC) and physical access (replay) spoofing detection problem on
the ASVspoof 2019 dataset (Section 5.2.2). Then Subsection 5.2.3 described
our proposed dataset partitions for training (train tr), validation (dev es)
and learning fusion weights (dev lr). This partition involves discarding a lot
of spoofed data points to ensure that there is no overlap in terms of spoofing
attack conditions and speakers between these sets. In Subsection 5.2.4 we eval-
uated and demonstrated (see Table 5.1) the effectiveness of our proposed data
partition by comparing the generalisation performance of our CNN model when
it is trained using the original and our proposed protocols. Following this, the
experimental results in Subsection 5.2.4 further showed that combining models
trained on different feature representations and using our proposed dataset par-
tition can be effective in detecting unseen spoofing attacks. We achieve good
performance on the PA task and 3rd ranking on the LA task of the ASVspoof
2019 challenge. The PA task seems generally more difficult and will be the
primary focus of future work. Our intervention experiments described in Sub-
section 5.2.5 suggest that many models trained on the PA dataset can become
somewhat of a “horse” [Sturm, 2014], where solving the actual problem is un-
intentionally avoided by exploiting silence as trivial cues. As the evaluation set
also contains such silences (see Table 5.6), the reported performance metrics in
this task currently overestimate the actual performance. In addition to remov-
ing silence from the end of recordings, we also removed it from the beginning,
but found lesser impact on the performance and therefore do not report those
results in this section. Overall, the work in this section demonstrated the ef-
fectiveness of choosing a good data partition to use during model training and
validation. Although this might mean losing a lot of data points, our experi-
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mental results demonstrated that such approach can potentially improve model
robustness.
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5.3 Overcoming the impact of dataset artefacts
5.3.1 Introduction
Artefacts and confounders in a dataset can bias decisions of a machine learning
model making them unreliable and untrustworthy. Such artefacts, if appearing
in a dataset, could be the result of methods used in data collection, compilation,
aggregation and partition [Rosset et al., 2010]. These issues can occur in any
data-driven machine learning task, and the impact caused by such biases in
domains such as medicine, finance and security is not affordable. Therefore,
it is important to provide some mechanism (eg., a pre-processing step) that
would help mitigate the impact of biases induced by such dataset artefacts in
machine learning decisions. A background on artefacts and their impact on
ML is provided in Subsection 2.9.1. As suggested in Section 2.9, the results
of a trustworthy ML model should be independent of the factors or cues in a
dataset that are not relevant to the problem. As summarised in Subsection
2.9.1, the learning algorithms can easily exploit artefacts and confounders (if
present) within the training data. Biases introduced by such confounding factors
often contribute towards solving the problem measured using some figure of
merit (EER, for example). Apparently, as explained in [Hernandez-Orallo, 2019,
Sturm, 2014] these ML models behave much like a “horse” in machine learning
since they provide excellent results using cues not relevant to the actual problem
[Sturm, 2016, Rodŕıguez-Algarra et al., 2019].
To this end, this thesis has identified “horses” in machine learning for anti-
spoofing research applied to both the ASVspoof 2017 and ASVspoof 2019 PA
benchmark datasets. Section 4.2 described how initial silence in some of the
bonafide recordings served as a potential cue on the version 1.0 of the ASVspoof
2017 dataset. As a result, an updated version 2.0 dataset was released fixing
these issues. However, as explained in Section 4.6 the potential cues/confounders
in this dataset were not completely removed. The experimental intervention ex-
periments confirmed the presence of artefacts and how they contributed in model
predictions. Furthermore, as described in Subsection 5.2.5, on the ASVspoof
2019 PA dataset, the duration of silence at the end of audio signal served as
a potential cue that models exploited for spoofing detection. A simple prepro-
cessing step that removed silence samples from the start and end was proposed
that helped mitigate the issue.
Motivated from these, the work described here builds upon Section 4.6 and
aims at proposing methods to build trustworthy CM models on the ASVspoof
2017 v2.0 dataset towards producing reliable performance estimates. The next
Subsection 5.3.2 explains our proposed method that uses speech endpoint detec-
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tion to remove audio samples before and after the actual speech utterance. This
is applied during both training and testing. As the reliability of our proposed
method highly depends on the correctness of speech endpoints, we have manu-
ally prepared speech endpoint annotations for all the audio files in the training
and development sets of this dataset. Therefore, in this section we train our
CM models applying these annotations during training and validation, which
ensures that parameter updates and model selection are independent of arte-
facts that were found in the start and end of audio recordings as highlighted
in Subsection 3.2.3. During testing, we use endpoint detection derived using
automatic speech activity detection. We use automatic methods on the evalu-
ation set for two reasons. First, due to time constraints, manually annotating
the large amount of audio recordings (more than 13, 000 recordings) was not
possible. Second, even if we do not get accurate endpoint annotations on the
evaluation set, this would not have a substantial impact on performance as mod-
els have been trained and validated using the manual endpoint annotations. The
section also provides a description of both manual and automatic endpoint an-
notations. Then the next Subsection 5.3.3 evaluates our proposed methodology
using the same five different countermeasure models that were studied in Sec-
tion 4.6. In addition, a novel frame-level deep CM model is proposed based on
endpoint detection that demonstrates robust performance even in the presence
of recording artefacts at test time. New benchmark results are provided for all
of these CM models that could serve as new baselines. The effectiveness of our
proposed approach is further demonstrated by running the same intervention
experiment from Subsection 4.6.4 using the same “burst click sound” (BCS)
artefact. Finally, Subsection 5.3.4 provides a summary of the work done in this
section.
5.3.2 Proposed method
We now describe our proposed methodology to address the issues highlighted in
the ASVspoof 2017 v2.0 dataset (Subsection 3.2.3). To this end, we propose the
use of speech endpoint detection during training and inference to build reliable
and trustworthy CMs on this dataset. Fig. 5.1 illustrates our proposed idea.
The first three blocks are shared during training and testing. The endpoint
detection module removes raw samples before and after the actual speech utter-
ance. This ensures that both bonafide and spoof utterances now have similar
audio patterns and are free from recording artefacts we highlighted in Section
3.2.3. The cleaned speech signal is then passed on to the subsequent modules for
feature extraction, model training and inference. As before (Subsection 4.6.3)
the role of unify duration, an optional module remains the same. It truncates
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Figure 5.1: Proposed CM design for trustworthy performance estimates.
or replicates audio samples to create a fixed-duration input representation, and
is applicable only for the CNNs. Finally, we also propose a frame-level deep
countermeasure model (DNN) with endpoint detection for robust performance.
In the following we briefly discuss the approach used for speech endpoint
detection. Then we evaluate the performance of our new models providing new
benchmark results. Finally we demonstrate the effectiveness of our proposed
method through BCS intervention experiments and compare its robustness with
the initial models (Subsection 4.6.2). Furthermore, from hereon we discard the
use of corrupted audio files identified in Subsection 3.2.3 during training and
testing.
Speech endpoint detection
We use two approaches for speech endpoint detection: manual and automatic.
The manual approach uses speech endpoint annotations that we collected dur-
ing the dataset inspection. Automatic speech endpoint detection is based on
rVAD [Tan et al., 2020], a robust voice activity detection algorithm.
Manual endpoint annotation. We manually inspected all the training and de-
velopment set audio files and bonafide audio files in the evaluation set of the
ASVspoof 2017 v2.0 dataset. We record the speech start and end points for them
during the inspection. All audio recordings were carefully listened to mark the
annotations, and the process was often repeated for the replayed recordings to
ensure correctness. We further validated these annotations and updated a few
erroneous annotations. We stress that due to time constraints and a large num-
ber of spoof files in the evaluation set we did not carry out a manual inspection
on them. These annotations were developed by the author himself using Audac-
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Figure 5.2: Performance (EER%) on the evaluation set (ASVspoof 2017 v2.0)
using models trained with manual and automatic speech endpoint annotations.
ity11. One of the key motivations for manual annotations is to ensure reliable
endpoints which may be challenging using automatic methods due to the nature
of the audio recordings in this dataset. We wanted to ensure that the annota-
tions for the training and development sets are as accurate as possible because
model parameters are trained and optimised on them.
Automatic speech endpoint detection. We also create speech endpoint annota-
tions using an automatic voice activity detection (VAD) algorithm. In particu-
lar, we use rVAD [Tan et al., 2020] – robust voice activity detector – that oper-
ates on raw audio samples. The main reason for choosing the rVAD algorithm
is that this approach has shown promising results in noisy conditions. More-
over, this algorithm focusses on robust voice activity detection in the presence
of burst-like noise sound that has high energy. In the first step, high-energy
segments are detected using the a posteriori SNR weighted energy difference
measure. Then, the method checks for pitched segments. If found, they are
regarded as speech else all samples are set to zero and the segment is labelled
as nonspeech [Tan et al., 2020]. As the ASVspoof 2017 dataset contains noisy
speech recordings and recordings with burst-click sounds, the use of this algo-
rithm suits our problem. Below we describe the steps we used to derive speech
endpoints using this algorithm.
11https://www.audacityteam.org/
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1. Framing: using a 25 ms frame window and a frame shift of 10 ms, the
original audio signal is split into frames. Then, we run the rVAD algorithm
on these frames to obtain a sequence of binary labels (0’s and 1’s).
2. Mark the speech start and end points using the following steps:
• We use N consecutive frames of 1’s as speech onset detection thresh-
old, and mark its first frame as the speech start point.
• Similarly, the algorithm counts for the detection of N consecutive
frames of 0’s after the speech onset. If found, its first frame is marked
as endpoint.
• Derive the start and end times from the speech onset and offset frame
markers.
We tried different values for N, but we chose to use N = 10 that accounts for
100 ms samples as the onset speech detection threshold because this showed bet-
ter approximation when compared with ground truth annotations (using manual
endpoint annotations) on the training and development set. Finally, we validate
the accuracy of the automatic endpoint speech annotations by comparing them
with our manual annotations on the development set. Using a 200 ms collar,
the speech onset and endpoint accuracy is 97% and 85% respectively. Further,
with a 100 ms collar these accuracies were 68% and 56% respectively.
Finally, we also compare the performance estimate on the evaluation set
using CM models using both the manual and automatic annotations during
training and validation. Fig. 5.2 summarises this result. We find a comparable
performance using models trained using manual and automatic annotations.
This holds true across all five CM models, confirming the reliability of r-VAD
method for computing speech endpoint annotations in this dataset. Therefore,
we use manual speech endpoint annotations for training and validating models
ensuring the correctness of our approach. Following the reliable performance
of our models trained and tested using automatic speech endpoint annotations
(see Fig. 5.2) we use automatic speech endpoint detection during testing.
Frame-level deep countermeasure model
From our study so far, it is confirmed that deep CMs (CNNs) not only show
superior performance over other CMs, but are equally more sensitive to arte-
facts in this dataset. One reason for this accounts to the fixed-duration input
representation used by them. Duplicating audio contents to match the desired
duration also involves spreading artefacts in the audio signal (see Fig. 4.6). As
a result they become more sensitive to artefacts (see Tables 4.26, 4.27), and
hence they are less reliable and untrustworthy.
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Motivated from this, we propose a frame-level deep CM model (DNN) that
is trained on the original audio contents without requiring to truncate or copy
audio samples as in CNNs. The use of context-frames — augmenting past
and future time frames to the current time frame — is often adopted in training
frame-level DNNs [Cai et al., 2017]. However, for direct comparison with GMMs
we do not use any context-frames in this work. This DNN treats the inputs as a
bag-of-frames much like the way GMMs are trained. Its architecture comprises
a series of fully connected layers and operates on a single input frame to predict
whether the frame corresponds to a bonafide or spoofed class. The details of
the DNN architecture is provided in Appendix A.
As for training, we use the same procedure that was used in training the
CNNs (Subsection 4.5.2) but with different input representation. The input to
the DNN is a spectrogram frame of shape 1× 257, where 1 corresponds to time
frame and 257 to the number of frequency bins computed using a 512 point
FFT with a 10 ms hop. During testing, for a given test utterance, we compute
the score for every frame and take their average as the final score.
For comparison and completeness of the study, we first train and evaluate
this DNN on the original dataset (without endpoint detection). Our DNN re-
ports an EER of 28.95% on the the evaluation set which is worse than CNN1
(10.7%) and CNN2 (13.4%, see Table 4.23) trained using fixed-input representa-
tions. Although CNNs trained with context information yield better detection
performance over frame-based DNNs, we demonstrate in the following subsec-
tion that DNNs are much more robust and trustworthy than CNNs.
5.3.3 Experimental setup and evaluation
This section describes different features, classifiers and performance metrics con-
sidered to evaluate CM models trained using speech endpoint detection. New
benchmark results for both frame-level and utterance-level CM models are de-
scribed. Finally, this section also demonstrates the robustness of the proposed
method across various CM models confirming the reliability of endpoint detec-
tion as a simple method to mitigate the issues found in the ASVspoof 2017 v2.0
dataset.
Features, classifier and performance metric
We use the same input features (CQCCs, i-vectors and power spectrograms)
and backend classifiers (GMMs, Cosine Distance, SVMs and two CNNs) from
Subsection 4.6.2 to evaluate our proposed method. We train these CM models
in a similar way as described in Subsection 4.6.2 but now we apply the endpoint
detection that discards everything before and after the actual speech utterance.
156
As for the performance evaluation of these CMs we use the EER metric as
described in Subsection 3.5.1.
Table 5.7: New benchmark results (EER %). (1) Condition 1: evaluate on
the original test dataset. (2) Condition 2: same as in (1) but uses automatic
endpoint detection.
Model Set Condition 1 Condition 2
CNN1
Dev 7.76 9.0
Eval 17.2 14.58
CNN2
Dev 8.6 9.49
Eval 15.16 14.77
Cosine
Dev 14.76 15.91
Eval 20.49 18.89
SVM
Dev 14.80 15.76
Eval 21.34 19.26
GMM
Dev 16.41 16.21
Eval 18.6 18.29
DNN
Dev 13.03 12.92
Eval 17.55 15.94
New benchmark results
We now train and validate all our CMs applying our manual endpoint anno-
tations. We evaluate their performance under two test conditions. Condition
1: we evaluate them on the original test data containing recording artefacts.
Condition 2: we evaluate them applying automatic endpoint detection during
testing. Table 5.7 summarises the results. As expected our new models now
show worse performance in comparison to initial models (see Table 4.23) trained
without endpoint detection. However it should be noted that our main focus
here is not on improving EERs. We aim towards building trustworthy CM
models providing reliable performance estimates, and making them secure from
being manipulated using artefacts/cues in the dataset.
Overall deep CM models show better performance on both the development
and evaluation sets compared to other CMs under both test conditions. This
demonstrates their superiority in learning discriminative features. We find that
all our CMs show better generalisation on the evaluation set using endpoint
speech detection (condition 2). Furthermore, the small performance difference
of these CMs between the two test conditions suggest that they are now less
sensitive to the dataset artefacts. These results demonstrate that CMs trained
on cleaned data (using endpoint detection) are more robust even in the presence
of noisy test data. We provide experimental evidence in the next section to prove
the robustness of our approach.
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Model robustness
We now demonstrate the robustness of our newly trained CMs against BCS sig-
natures through an intervention experiment illustrated in Fig. 4.5. We perform
this intervention on all the test recordings in the development and evaluation
sets using the same 100 ms BCS signature from Section 4.6.4 with one major
difference. Here the intervention module performs two tasks. First it applies
an automatic speech endpoint detector to remove raw samples before and after
the actual speech utterance. Second it appends the BCS signature at the start
of the cleaned speech signal. The updated signal is then passed to the subse-
quent modules for feature extraction and scoring. We score them using both
our newly trained models and initial models. Finally we compare and contrast
their performance in terms of EER. Table 5.8 summarises the results. Numbers
shown to the left of the arrow are the results of our initial models from Table
4.23 and Table 5.7 (condition 2) is included for better readability. It should be
noted that we take all our pretrained initial models from Subsection 4.6.2 to
run this intervention.
Table 5.8: Model robustness experimental results. Numbers to the left and the
right of arrow indicate EER% before and after the intervention on test signals
using the BCS signature.
Set New model Initial model
CNN1
Dev 9.0→ 10.08 7.7→ 34.5
Eval 14.58→ 18.01 10.7→ 36.19
CNN2
Dev 9.49→ 7.85 7.37→ 8.25
Eval 14.77→ 20.96 13.4→ 22.6
Cosine
Dev 15.91→ 15.24 10.6→ 15.11
Eval 18.89→ 19.11 14.8→ 18.13
SVM
Dev 15.76→ 15.43 10.8→ 15.84
Eval 19.26→ 19.33 15.6→ 18.84
GMM
Dev 16.21→ 15.50 9.2→ 16.85
Eval 18.29→ 19.65 13.7→ 22.48
DNN
Dev 12.92→ 12.40 11.57→ 13.33
Eval 15.94→ 17.91 28.95→ 31.46
From the increased EERs of our initial model, it is evident that the effect
of this intervention on CMs trained on the original training data containing
BCS signatures is much higher in comparison to the new models. We observe
that our proposed frame-level DNN model shows the best results under this
intervention, demonstrating its robustness on this dataset. Furthermore, under
the initial training conditions (without endpoint detection) the error rate of
this DNN changes by about 2.5% (on the evaluation set), and is the smallest
absolute change among all other initial models (including CNNs). Overall our
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proposed approach of training CMs using endpoint detection demonstrates ro-
bust performance over the initial models. This holds true for all our CM models
studied in this paper.
5.3.4 Discussion
Replay spoofing attack detection, a binary classification problem, in general is a
difficult task to solve. As explained in Subsection 2.9.1 confounders or artefacts
in a dataset can affect a wide range of machine learning tasks including anti-
spoofing systems (see Sections 4.2, 4.6 and Subsection 5.2.5). Such confounders
are often overlooked in research studies. We consider two reasons for this. First,
the figure of merit used in assessing performance (a scalar) does not account for
them and their influence in learning algorithms. Second, they often offer gains
in performance (see Subsection 2.9.1 for related background). Due to these
reasons we often do not care towards accountability of such ML models trained
on data containing artefacts. But, impressive performance reported by such
untrustworthy models can be costly as they may fail with high likelihood when
used in practical real-world scenarios. Therefore, ensuring reliable performance
estimates is important to truly assess the ability of proposed features/classifiers
for a given machine learning task.
In this direction, focussing on machine learning tasks for anti-spoofing using
the benchmark ASVspoof 2017 v2.0 dataset, this section proposed a method to
mitigate the impact of artefacts on this dataset, and build reliable and trust-
worthy models. For this, a speech endpoint detection module (Fig. 5.1) that
discards every audio sample before and after the actual speech utterance was
proposed. This ensures that both classes of audio now have a similar pattern,
forcing learning algorithms to focus on exploiting factors of interest — for ex-
ample channel characteristics, in solving the spoofing detection problem, thus
producing reliable performance estimates.
As the reliability of the proposed method depends heavily on the accuracy
of endpoint annotations, manual annotations were developed and used to train
and validate model parameters. During testing, a robust voice activity detection
algorithm was used (Subection 5.3.2) to derive endpoint annotations. The cor-
rectness of automatic annotations was further verified comparing performance
of CM models trained using both automatic and manual annotations (see Fig.
5.2). Next, the proposed method was evaluated on five different countermea-
sures. This includes CQCC feature based GMM and i-vector based Cosine that
were initially used in [Delgado et al., 2018] as baselines for the version 2.0 of this
dataset. New benchmark results are provided showcasing the true performance
estimates when these confounders are taken into account, making these models
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more trustworthy. The section also demonstrated the robustness of the pro-
posed method against being manipulated using signal artefacts. For this, both
newly trained countermeasures and the ones trained without endpoint detection
were used to assess their robustness. The results confirmed that the proposed
method helped mitigate the impact substantially (Subection 5.3.3). Finally, the
section also proposed a DNN trained at the frame-level and demonstrated its
robustness against artefacts in the dataset. The work described here and part
of the work from Section 4.6 is under review in an IEEE journal.
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5.4 Subband analysis for spoofing detection
In the previous Sections 4.5 and 5.3, we have seen how deep models are trained
on the fullband spectrum of the speech signal using time-frequency representa-
tions (spectrograms). While this is a commonly adopted approach in spoofing
detection research as evident from the literature in Section 2.8, we argue that
not all frequency bands are useful for these tasks. To this end, this section thor-
oughly investigates the impact of different subbands and their importance on
replay spoofing detection. A joint subband modelling framework that employs
n sub-networks to learn subband specific features is proposed. These networks
are later combined and passed to a classifier and the whole network weights
are updated during training. Subsection 5.4.2 provides a detailed explanation
of the proposed methodology. Then Subsection 5.4.3 provides details of three
different experimental designs. The first design focuses on subband CNNs and
a joint subband modelling framework. The second one aims at studying the
effect of late fusion of subband CNN models and comparing its performance
with the proposed joint model training framework. For this, two linear fusion
approaches are investigated: sum of scores and weighted sum of scores where
weights are learned through logistic regression. And the final experimental de-
sign aims at investigating the generalisability of the proposed subband modelling
approaches on the ASVspoof 2019 real PA testset (see Subsection 3.3.3). Then
Subsection 5.4.4 evaluates the proposed methods and provides a summary of
results for different experimental setups. Finally, Subsection 5.4.5 provides a
summary of the work done in this section. The proposed methodology is evalu-
ated on two benchmark datasets: ASVspoof 2017 v2.0 and ASVspoof 2019 PA
as described in Section 3.
5.4.1 Introduction
Here, we focus on feature extraction for audio spoofing attack detection.
There is a vast body of prior research on developing and enhancing different
low-level feature extractors (most relevant work is reviewed in Section 2.8), some
of them obtaining very low spoof-bonafide detection error rates (even 0%) on
specific datasets. Many of these techniques leverage domain knowledge, whether
speech science (speech production or perception), signal processing theory, or
both. A potential benefit of such rationale is transparency and interpretability.
At the same time, feature extractors crafted with the aid of domain knowledge
might be too simplistic. As illustrated in Fig. 5.3 (b), we aim at hitting a
suitable balance between hand-crafted and data-driven feature extraction: we
use spectrograms (a meaningful representation of audio), processed in dis-
joint subbands to divide-and-conquer high-dimensional spectrogram modeling
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across several, frequency-localized models, each handling a lower-dimensional
feature space, each modeled with a convolutional neural network to learn
band-specific features. The subband-specific features are concatenated to form
feature vectors that are then classified with a feedforward neural network.
The general idea of processing a power spectrogram in subbands, as such, is
not new in the speech field. Mel-frequency cepstral coefficients (MFCCs) are ex-
tracted using a filterbank consisting of frequency-localized filters and subband-
based modeling of speaker traits dates at least two decades back [Besacier and
Bonastre, 2000]. In conventional, or fullband models, one trains a single model
(with a large number of parameters) using a descriptor of the fullband spectrum.
In subband based models, the rationale is to instead divide-and-conquer the task
across independently modeled subbands which are later recombined using fea-
ture or score fusion techniques. The potential benefits include the possibility to
side-step the ‘curse of dimensionality’ by using a set of models trained on lower-
dimensional inputs, robustness to frequency-selective noise, and the possibility
to analyse the importance (contribution) of each subband to the classification
results. One potential downside, however, is that the models cannot easily learn
or exploit informative correlations between the subbands. Below we summarise
the main contributions of this work.
• A systematic study on different subbands and their contribution in replay
spoofing detection using convolutional neural networks (CNNs) trained on
time-frequency input representations (spectrograms) of the input signal is
performed.
• A joint subband CNN modelling framework is proposed. It works by first
splitting the original spectrogram into n sub-spectrograms and training
n independent models. The pretrained weights are then used to initialise
the weights of the subband joint modelling framework illustrated in Figure
5.3 (b). Subsection 5.4.4 demonstrates the effectiveness of this method
offering substantial improvement over traditional fullband modelling.
• We investigate the effect of late fusion of subband CNN models and com-
pare its performance with our proposed joint model training framework.
To this end, we investigate simple linear sum fusion and logistic regression
based score fusion approaches.
• Finally, we study the generalisability of all our replay spoofing counter-
measures on the ASVspoof 2019 “real” PA test set. We perform this study
using models trained on both the ASVspoof 2017 and 2019 PA datasets.
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(a) Baseline. Traditional CNN model trained on the fullband spectrum.
(b) Proposed framework. (i) The original spectrogram is split into n sub-spectrograms on
which n independent CNNs are trained. (ii) uses pretrained weights from (i) to initialise n
subband CNNs of the joint subband framework. The fully-connected layers output from n sub-
band models are concatenated and fed to a feed forward neural network for final classification.
The whole network weights are updated during training.
Figure 5.3: Proposed subband CNN modeling framework.
5.4.2 Proposed method
Convolutional neural network (CNN) based countermeasure models trained us-
ing spectrograms have shown state-of-the-art performance in spoofing detection
tasks in the ASVspoof 2017 challenge. They are usually trained using the full-
band spectrum of the input signal and use a fixed-duration input representation
[Lavrentyeva et al., 2017]. This conventional approach of building CNN-based
countermeasures is illustrated in Figure 5.3 (a). As the CNN is trained discrim-
inatively, it is forced to learn discriminative features using the entire frequency
spectrum of the input signal, using a single worker to extract usable information
across all the frequency subbands for spoofing attack detection.
But as the prior studies (Section 2.8) suggest, not all the subbands are nec-
essarily equally informative. From a modeling perspective, the raw spectrogram
163
patch (extracted by stacking multiple frames using all the frequency bands) is a
high-dimensional vector, with strong correlations between any neighboring time
(frame) or frequency (DFT bin) indices. As such low-level redundancy is com-
mon to both human and spoofed samples, it does not necessarily help in the
discrimination (classification) task itself; instead, the model will have to learn
both data compression (suppressing statistical redundancy to a useful interme-
diate representation) and classification tasks. This may also result in additional
computational time during convolution operations.
Therefore, rather than having a single CNN that merges information across
different frequency bands, we propose to incorporate a bank of n different
CNNs, each operating on non-overlapping n frequency subbands. Our proposed
methodology is illustrated in Figure 5.3 (b). Each of the subband CNNs now
has to model a much lower-dimensional subspace, producing a less redundant
and more relevant representation of its respective subband. Note that the sub-
band representations are afterwards re-combined through concatenation. This
new representation now contains again information across the full frequency
band, allowing any subsequent model to exploit possibly useful band-level cor-
relations. In our case, we use a simple feedforward neural network (FFNN) for
the final classification. Natural questions that arise now are how to perform the
frequency-domain split and how to choose n. We address three different forms
of splits, n = 2, n = 4 and n = 8, and go for the easiest choice of uniform
frequency division.
This choice is motivated from [Lin et al., 2018]. They divide the original
spectrogram into n uniform subbands with bandwidth 1 kHz corresponding to
n = 8 splits and 0.5 kHz bandwidth for n = 16 splits. They remove one subband
at a time and hand-craft features from the remaining subbands. GMMs are then
trained on these features for spoofing detection and the performance is evaluated
in terms of EER on the ASVspoof 2017 evaluation sets. As our dataset consists
of 16 kHz audio (Nyquist range 8 kHz), our three choices correspond to subbands
of bandwidths 4 kHz (n = 2), 2 kHz (n = 4) and 1 kHz (n = 8). It should be
noted that the default case n = 1 corresponds to the baseline CNN (Figure 5.3
a), i.e the model trained on the fullband spectrogram. From hereon we use
“CNN” to refer to the baseline CNN. And, we use “sub-CNN” to refer to models
trained on the subband spectrograms.
We operate on power spectrograms instead of other alternative time-frequency
representations, following findings in [Lavrentyeva et al., 2017]. All our sub-
CNNs use the architecture described in Subsection 4.5.2, which is an adapted
version of the best performing model [Lavrentyeva et al., 2017] in the ASVspoof
2017 challenge. It consists of 9 convolutional layers, 5 max-pooling layers and 2
fully connected (FC) layers; refer to Subsection 4.5.2 for further details. The key
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difference while training such sub-CNNs is in terms of the input they receive.
The bandwidth of the input sub-spectrogram varies depending upon different
values of n (number of splits). Subsection 5.4.4 provides more details regarding
input representations, training and testing of these models.
The proposed joint sub-CNN model of Figure 5.3 (b) second row uses the
same architecture as in sub-CNNs (first row of the same figure) with the fol-
lowing updates: (1) there is no output layer now, and (2) a concatenation layer
is added that merges the FC layer’s output from n sub-CNN models producing
a 32 × n dimensional vector. It should be noted that the choice of 32 units in
the FC layer comes from the baseline CNN of Figure 5.3 (a). Furthermore, this
architecture with 32 FC units has shown promising results as described in Sec-
tion 4.6. Next, the concatenated vector is fed to a feedforward neural network
for class discrimination. The FFNN consists of two fully-connected layers with
256 and 128 units. This is followed by a single unit output layer with sigmoid
non linearity for class discrimination. We apply batch normalisation before ap-
plying ReLU non-linearity to these layers. The architecture of the FFNN is
optimised through model validation (on the development set). Training and
optimisation of our proposed framework is done in two steps:
• First, the input spectrogram is split into n non-overlapping sub-spectrograms
and n sub-CNNs are trained independently on them. The training dataset
is used for model training and the development dataset is used for model
validation. This step is depicted in the top row of Figure 5.3(b).
• Second, the pretrained sub-CNNs (excluding the last layer) are used to
initialise the weights of the sub-CNN modules of our joint sub-CNN frame-
work shown in the bottom row of Figure 5.3 (b). The weights of the
FFNN layers are initialised randomly using xavier initialisation [Glorot
and Bengio, 2010]. The biases are initialised to zero. Given an input
spectrogram, the framework first splits it into n non-overlapping sub-
spectrograms which are processed by n sub-CNNs and the whole network
parameters are jointly updated during backpropagation. This step can be
interpreted as fine-tuning of the subband CNNs and the classifier back-end
jointly for best performance. As in the earlier step, model parameters are
trained on the training dataset and the development set is used for model
validation.
Our proposed work is different from prior works [Sriskandaraja et al., 2016,
Witkowski et al., 2017, Garg et al., 2019, Nagarsheth et al., 2017, Lin et al.,
2018] because most of them aim at hand-crafting or learning features [Soni
et al., 2016] based on the relevance of specific subbands for spoofing detection.
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To the best of our knowledge, there is no work in spoofing detection aiming to
learn band-specific features by discriminatively training CNNs on a spectrogram
input.
5.4.3 Experimental design
This section describes three different experimental designs. The first experi-
ment discusses various subband and joint subband modelling designs considered
in this work. The second experiment describes various fusion setups studied.
The third experiment aims at cross-database performance evaluation of subband
models on an unseen test set. Finally, a brief summary of baseline experiments
is also provided.
Experiment 1: subband modeling. We design four experimental setups
for different values of n using our proposed methodology. We use n = 2 in our
first setup. Using the architecture and training methodology described earlier we
train two independent sub-CNNs M1 and M2. M1 operates on the first 4 kHz and
M2 on the last 4 kHz subband spectrograms. Next, we use them (except the last
output layer) to initialise the respective sub-CNN module weights of our joint
sub-CNN model framework as shown in the bottom row of Figure 5.3(b). We
call this joint model as J1. Our second setup uses n = 4. Therefore, we train four
independent sub-CNNs M3 through M6 on 2 kHz subband spectrograms. We
then use these pretrained models to initialise the weights of sub-CNN modules
of our joint model framework J2. Our final setup uses n = 8. We now train
eight independent sub-CNNs M7 through M14 operating on 1 kHz subband
spectrograms. We then use them (except the last layer weights) to initialise our
joint model framework J3 shown in Figure 5.3(b) bottom row.
Finally, motivated from the results of sub-CNNs M7 and M14 on the ASVspoof
2017 dataset (shown in Table 5.13) we design a joint framework model J4 op-
erating on the first and the last 1 kHz subband spectrograms. This setup is
different from the previous setups as more than half of the information is being
discarded here. Overall J4 utilises only 2 kHz of information (first and the last 1
kHz) bands. As in the earlier setups, the pretrained weights (here M7 and M14
models) are used to initialise the weights of sub-CNN modules of our joint model
framework J4. It should be noted that the entire model parameters are jointly
optimised while training J1, J2, J3 and J4. We perform these experiments on
both the ASVspoof 2017 v2.0 and 2019 PA datasets.
Experiment 2: score fusion. We perform fusion experiments to understand if
combining information through score-level fusion helps improve detection per-
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Table 5.9: Fusion system details.
Fusion model ID Fusion type Models combined (scores)
F1 Linear sum M1, M2
F2 Weighted linear sum M1, M2
F3 Linear sum M3 - M6
F4 Weighted linear sum M3 - M6
F5 Linear sum M7 - M14
F6 Weighted linear sum M7 - M14
formance. In this setting we use the scores from each of the pretrained sub-
CNNs and combine their scores using two simple approaches: linear sum of
scores (LS), and linear weighted sum of scores (WLS). Let S1, S2, S3, ..., Sn rep-
resent scores from n sub-CNNs for a test utterance X. The fused score using
the two approaches is obtained as: linear sum = S1 + S2 + S3 + .. + Sn and
weighted sum = w1 ∗S1 +w2 ∗S2 +w3 ∗S3 + ..+wn ∗Sn where w1, w2, w3, ..., wn
are weights corresponding to each sub-CNN score learned using logistic regres-
sion (LR). We use the Bosaris toolkit [Brümmer and de Villiers, 2013] for the
LR implementation. We perform six different fusion experiments: F1 - F6. Ta-
ble 5.9 summarises the details of the fusion systems.
Experiment 3: cross-database evaluation. The final experimental setup
evaluates the performance of our proposed models on an unseen real replay test
dataset. In other words, the main goal here is to study the generalisability of
our models: M1 through M14 and joint models J1, J2, J3 and J4 in a cross-
database evaluation setting. We use all our pretrained models trained on the
ASVspoof 2017 and ASVspoof 2019 PA dataset and evaluate their performance
on the ASVspoof 2019 real PA test set.
Baseline. To assess the performance of our proposed framework, we train
a baseline CNN model on the fullband spectrogram. The model framework
is the same as in Figure 5.3(a) except that the number of splits is n = 1.
For completeness, we also train and test a CQCC-based GMM model so as to
compare it with our proposed framework. It should be noted that due to the
preprocessing (described in the next section) applied on the ASVspoof 2017 and
2019 PA datasets during training and testing, our baselines are different from
the ones reported in [Delgado et al., 2018, Todisco et al., 2019.]; therefore, the
numbers reported using our GMM baselines should not be directly compared
with the results of ASVspoof challenges. We train GMMs using the training
dataset and parameterisation from Delgado et al. [2018].
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5.4.4 Evaluation
Datasets
We use two publicly available spoofing datasets: ASVspoof 2017 v2.0 and
ASVspoof 2019 physical access (PA) for model training and testing. In ad-
dition, we also include results on the recently released ASVspoof2019 real PA
dataset12 for the challenging case of cross-database performance evaluation. All
the datasets are representative of replay attacks and are complementary to each
other. Section 3 provides more details on these datasets. Following our prior
findings (Subsection 5.2.5) we adopt a custom, but publicly available protocol13
described in Subsection 5.2.3 for training models on the ASVspoof 2019 dataset.
Input representation and preprocessing
The input to the network is a mean-variance normalised log power spectrogram
of 3 seconds. This normalisation, motivated from [Lavrentyeva et al., 2017],
is performed at the utterance-level to standardize the features (zero mean and
unit variance for all frequency bins) within a given recording. We use a 512-
point fast Fourier transform (FFT), and a 32 ms window with a hop of 10 ms.
Therefore, the original input spectrogram has a shape of 300×257, where 300 is
the number of frames and 257 the number of FFT bins. To obtain a consistent
input representation we replicate the audio samples (in the time domain) if the
duration is smaller, or truncate the samples to 3 seconds duration. When n = 1,
the input shape to the baseline CNN remains the same (300× 257) however it
varies for sub-CNNs depending upon different splits we use. For example, when
n = 2, the input shape becomes 300 × 128 and 300 × 129. We always include
the leftover bin to the last split. Similarly, when n = 4 we have four sub-
spectrograms where the first three will have a shape of 300× 64, and a shape of
300× 65 for the last split. Likewise, for n = 8 we have seven sub-spectrograms
of shape 300× 32, and a shape of 300× 33 for the last split.
Following our prior findings (Subsection 5.2.5) on the ASVspoof 2019 PA
dataset, we remove zero-valued samples from the start and end of every audio
recording in the dataset. Likewise, on the ASVspoof 2017 v2.0 dataset, we
remove leading and trailing silence/nonspeech samples following our findings
described in Subsection 4.6.3. For this, we use our publicly released speech
endpoint annotations described in Subsection 5.3.2. Applying such preprocess-
ing helps the model avoid exploiting cues that are actually not relevant to the
problem, rather this forces the models to now learn relevant factors in replay
spoofing detection.
12https://www.asvspoof.org/database
13https://github.com/BhusanChettri/ASVspoof2019
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Table 5.10: Performance of the baselines on the ASVspoof 2017 and 2019 eval-
uation sets. Models are trained and validated on the respective datasets.
Baseline
subbands ASVspoof 2017 ASVspoof 2019
(kHz) t-DCF EER% t-DCF EER%
CNN 0-8 0.3873 13.02 0.2019 7.00
GMM 0-8 0.5054 18.33 0.9928 59.12
Training, testing and evaluation
We train the network to optimise the binary cross entropy loss between a
bonafide and a spoof class. We use a batch size of 32 and learning rate of
1e−4. We use the ADAM [Kingma and Ba, 2014] optimiser with default param-
eters. We apply a dropout of 50% to the input of the fully connected layers. If
the validation loss does not improve for 5 epochs we stop the training process to
avoid overfitting. We train models for a maximum of 100 training epochs. Us-
ing this approach we train 5 models with random initialisation. We choose the
model showing the best performance on the development data and use it to test
performance on the evaluation data. At test time, for each audio spectrogram
we use the model output — the bonafide-class posterior probability — as our
detection score. The approach described above is the same for all our models.
We use the EER and t-DCF metrics (described in Section 3.5) to evaluate model
performance.
Results
We first look at the performance of our baseline models. Table 5.10 summarises
this. On the ASVspoof 2017 evaluation set, the GMM model reaches an EER of
18.33% and a t-DCF of 0.5054. As highlighted earlier due to the preprocessing
applied during training and testing on this dataset, the EER is worse than the
original EER of 13.74% reported by Delgado et al. [2018]. On the ASVspoof 2019
PA14 evaluation set, EER = 59.12% and t-DCF = 0.9928. The results suggest
that GMM models become less confident in making classification decisions when
silence cues are removed during training and testing. On both datasets, the
CNN baseline outperforms the GMM on both metrics. This demonstrates its
effectiveness at learning relevant features useful for discrimination despite the
preprocessing applied to the audio signals in contrast to hand-crafted CQCC
features used in the GMM.
Now we discuss the performance of our individual sub-CNNs M1, M2 and
the joint model J1. Table 5.11 summarises the results. On the ASVspoof 2017
14We used the pretrained GMM model from section 5.2.2 to test on the evaluation set with
preprocessing of silence. Without preprocessing, the same GMM reports an EER of 10.06%
and a t-DCF of 0.1971 on the evaluation set.
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Table 5.11: Performance of sub-CNNs M1, M2 and joint model J1. Bold indi-
cates the best performance.
Model
subbands ASVspoof 2017 ASVspoof 2019
(kHz) t-DCF EER% t-DCF EER%
M1 0-4 0.7045 33.03 0.1925 6.97
M2 4-8 0.4800 18.95 0.5201 19.69
J1 - 0.2893 10.63 0.1864 6.44
Table 5.12: Performance of sub-CNNs M3 through M6 and joint model J2. Bold
indicates the best performance.
Model
subbands ASVspoof 2017 ASVspoof 2019
(kHz) t-DCF EER% t-DCF EER%
M3 0-2 0.6172 31.20 0.2265 7.97
M4 2-4 0.9773 41.58 0.4568 17.72
M5 4-6 0.9995 50.70 0.5903 23.16
M6 6-8 0.5032 23.50 0.6019 23.59
J2 - 0.3343 11.78 0.1977 6.99
dataset, the higher frequency bands (4 − 8 kHz) seem to carry more discrim-
inative information than the lower bands (0 − 4 kHz). However, we observe
the opposite pattern on the ASVspoof 2019 dataset where M1 trained on 0− 4
kHz shows better results than M2. This might be due to differences in dataset
design (real vs. simulated replay) and compilation (different speakers and audio
qualities of the source corpora). Nonetheless, on both the datasets our proposed
joint modelling framework J1 outperforms M1, M2 and the baselines by a large
margin on both performance metrics. This demonstrates the effectiveness of our
proposed approach for spoofing attack detection.
Next we discuss the performance of sub-CNNs M3 through M6 and the joint
model J2. Table 5.12 summarises this. Overall, the individual sub-CNNs now
show poor performance, which is expected as each of them now receives only
half of the information as the previous case (n = 2). Nonetheless, the proposed
model J2 that merges information from all the bands again outperforms the
fullband baselines (CNN and GMM) and sub-CNNs M3 through M6.
Table 5.13 summarises the performance of our individual sub-CNNs M7
through M14 and joint models J3 and J4. These results provide deeper insights
in understanding the influence of different subbands for spoofing detection. As
in the previous two setups (n = 2 and n = 4), our joint model J3 shows better
results than training individual sub-CNNs indicating that joint training offers
some form of complementary information across different frequency bands. We
also find that on the ASVspoof 2017 dataset, M14 trained on the last 7− 8 kHz
band outperforms all other sub-CNNs by a large margin. This is followed by
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Table 5.13: Performance of sub-CNNs M7 through M14 and joint models J3 and
J4. Bold indicates the best performance.
Model
subbands ASVspoof 2017 ASVspoof 2019
(kHz) t-DCF EER% t-DCF EER%
M7 0-1 0.6216 31.59 0.2354 8.48
M8 1-2 0.9977 48.92 0.6557 25.15
M9 2-3 0.9971 50.61 0.7327 28.60
M10 3-4 0.9969 49.85 0.5390 21.60
M11 4-5 0.9992 44.06 0.6605 25.69
M12 5-6 0.9914 45.05 0.7118 28.34
M13 6-7 0.9817 42.23 0.7123 28.17
M14 7-8 0.4747 18.10 0.7231 28.01
J3 - 0.2734 11.02 0.1975 7.34
J4 - 0.2771 10.40 0.2238 8.30
Table 5.14: Score-level fusion results. LS: linear sum of scores. WLS: weighted
sum of scores.
Model
Fusion ASVspoof 2017 ASVspoof 2019
(type) t-DCF EER% t-DCF EER%
F1 LS 0.3208 11.86 0.2208 7.50
F2 WLS 0.3189 11.72 0.2034 6.78
F3 LS 0.6151 24.25 0.2197 8.00
F4 WLS 0.3079 11.55 0.1898 6.95
F5 LS 0.4932 18.25 0.2626 9.78
F6 WLS 0.3548 12.33 0.1848 6.99
M7 (operating on the 0 − 1 kHz band) that also performs substantially better
than the remaining sub-CNNs. Inspired by this finding, we further train another
joint model J4 trained only with the lowest and highest sub-CNNs. Interest-
ingly, this highly reduced model yields the best performance on the ASVspoof
2017 dataset, matching with the findings reported on the version 1.0 dataset
by Lin et al. [2018]. However, on the ASVspoof 2019 dataset, the first 1 kHz
subband appears to carry most relevant information as opposed to other sub-
bands. Furthermore, the results found for the ASVspoof 2017 and 2019 dataset
do not match completely with the main differences being in dataset design and
collection — the two datasets ASVspoof 2017 and 2019 PA are designed and
collected differently.
Next we discuss the performance of our fusion models. Table 5.14 shows
these results. In general, WLS fusion shows better performance than LS fu-
sion, outperforming the two baselines (Table 5.10). However they show poor
(or similar) performance compared to our joint subband modeling framework.
For example, on the ASVspoof 2017 evaluation set the joint model J4 (Table
5.13) shows better results in comparison to all our fusion models. Similarly, on
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Table 5.15: Cross dataset performance evaluation on the unseen ASVspoof 2019
real PA testset. D1: ASVspoof 2017 v2.0, D2: ASVspoof 2019 PA. Highlighted
in bold indicates the best performing subband models.
Model
subbands Trained on D1 Trained on D2
(kHz) t-DCF EER% t-DCF EER%
CNN 0-8 0.9986 41.29 0.6374 34.25
M1 0-4 0.8205 44.81 0.6800 33.12
M2 4-8 0.9687 42.59 0.7820 39.44
J1 - 0.9939 44.07 0.6741 35.92
M3 0-2 0.8984 38.33 0.6760 33.49
M4 2-4 0.8025 46.08 0.7311 34.62
M5 4-6 0.9995 59.44 0.8033 35.74
M6 6-8 0.9976 51.85 0.6877 28.37
J2 - 0.9944 40.55 0.6544 30.18
M7 0-1 0.8508 34.81 0.6678 34.95
M8 1-2 0.9875 47.63 1.0 51.29
M9 2-3 0.9545 51.48 0.8014 32.22
M10 3-4 0.9634 42.22 0.8553 35.41
M11 4-5 0.9003 43.33 0.7524 32.80
M12 5-6 0.9788 47.03 0.8322 38.65
M13 6-7 0.9828 48.49 0.7038 28.70
M14 7-8 0.9981 42.38 0.6483 27.22
J3 - 0.9208 37.61 0.6439 30.97
J4 - 0.9081 36.62 0.7541 36.71
the ASVspoof 2019 PA evaluation set the joint model J1 (Table 5.11) shows
better EER (and slightly worse t-DCF). As expected, combining information
through score-fusion techniques offers gain in detection performance. However,
our proposed joint subband modelling framework shows better results over score-
fusion approaches. This further confirms that the complementary information
provided by individual sub-CNNs helps improve overall detection performance.
Table 5.15 summarises the results of cross-database evaluation. Our models
trained on the ASVspoof 2017 v2.0 and ASVspoof 2019 PA datasets show poor
performance on the ASVspoof 2019 real PA test set. Though they show good
performance on the respective evaluation sets (see Tables 5.11, 5.12, 5.13), they
do not generalise well to unseen replay attack conditions. On both the t-DCF
and EER metrics, we observe high error rates for our joint models J1, J2, J3 and
J4. Furthermore, most of our individual sub-CNN models M1 through M14 show
poor generalisation. This indicates overfitting on the respective datasets and
lack of generalisability in unseen attack conditions. One possible interpretation
to this observation may be attributed to dataset design and collection for the
ASVspoof 2017 and 2019 PA datasets. It is worth noting that the ASVspoof
2019 PA dataset is developed through controlled simulation while the ASVspoof
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Table 5.16: Summary of results showing the comparison of baselines with our
proposed models. * results taken from Table 5.10.
Model
ASVspoof 2017 ASVspoof 2019
t-DCF EER% t-DCF EER%
GMM* 0.5054 18.33 0.9928 59.12
CNN* 0.3873 13.02 0.2019 7.0
J1 0.2893 10.63 0.1864 6.44
J2 0.3343 11.78 0.1977 6.99
J3 0.2734 11.02 0.1975 7.34
J4 0.2771 10.40 0.2238 8.30
2017 dataset is collected in real world recording and replay conditions. Due to
the dataset issues identified on both the ASVspoof 2017 and 2019 PA datasets,
the models trained on these datasets might not be able to capture real replay
attack conditions and thus perform poorly on the real PA test set which has been
designed carefully reflecting real replay attack conditions. This study further
suggests that there is still need for a reliable replay training dataset that can
be used to train models incorporating real world replay attack conditions.
5.4.5 Discussion
This section presented a detailed analysis on the impact of different subbands
and their importance on replay spoofing detection tasks on the benchmark
datasets ASVspoof 2017 v2.0 and ASVspoof 2019 PA. Our proposed subband
CNN model outperformed the traditional fullband CNN model, and also the
CQCC-GMM baselines by a large margin, demonstrating the significance of
our approach. We also investigated how combining information at the score
level from each subband CNNs compared with our joint subband modelling
framework. The final set of studies we performed here is on cross-database
evaluation to investigate the generalisability of replay spoofing countermeasures
on the ASVspoof 2019 real PA dataset. Table 5.16 provides a summary of our
main findings on both the ASVspoof 2017 and 2019 PA datasets. Performance
improvements obtained using our proposed approach over baselines are very
promising, encouraging further research on subband modelling for spoofing de-
tection. Furthermore, it should be noted that our main objective in this section
is not to beat the best performing models published on the two datasets, but
to validate our hypothesis about subband modelling using CNNs trained on
spectrogram inputs.
Our findings on the ASVspoof 2017 dataset suggest that the most discrimi-
native information appears to be in the first and the last 1 kHz frequency bands,
and the joint model trained on these two subbands shows the best performance
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outperforming the baselines by a large margin. However, these findings do not
generalise on the ASVspoof 2019 PA dataset. Likewise, we find similar ob-
servations when we tested our models on the ASVspoof 2019 real replay test
recordings. Furthermore, the poor cross-database experimental results suggest
that we still have some gaps to fill towards building datasets to study replay
spoofing detection for real world conditions.
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5.5 Deep VAEs for spoofing detection
So far, this thesis has investigated various machine learning and deep learning
approaches for spoofing attack detection in the form of discriminative mod-
els. While Chapter 4 has mainly focussed on the analysis of existing methods,
this chapter focusses on novel approaches for spoofing detection. Deep models,
usually CNNs, have been widely used for discriminative feature learning and
generative models (GMMs) have been trained on them for class discrimination
showing promising results [Lavrentyeva et al., 2017, Sriskandaraja et al., 2018].
Motivated from the widespread use of GMMs, a generative model, for audio
spoofing detection, this section explores the potential of VAEs, a deep genera-
tive model for spoofing detection. An introduction and the motivation of this
work is first provided in Subsection 5.5.1. Detailed background on GMMs and
VAEs is provided in Subsections 2.7.3 and 2.7.1 respectively. Additional details
relating GMMs and VAEs as latent variable models are provided in Subsection
2.7.3.
Then Subsection 5.5.2 describes our proposed methods of using VAEs under
two settings. First, we explore the potential of VAEs as a backend classifier.
For this, three different approaches to condition VAE training are investigated.
The second setting is on using the VAE as a feature extractor. For this, the
VAE residual, which is the absolute difference of the original input and the
reconstruction, is proposed as a new feature for spoofing detection. The next
Subsection 5.5.3 provides a description of datasets used, features and input rep-
resentations considered, model architectures, training and testing approaches,
and evaluation metrics. Then Subsection 5.5.4 evaluates our proposed meth-
ods and provides a summary of different experimental results. It first evaluates
the impact of latent space dimensionality on the VAE performance. Then, a
performance comparison of different VAE setups with the baseline GMMs is
provided. Next, this section evaluates the performance of VAEs trained with
multi-class conditioning and compares them with VAEs trained using binary-
class conditioning. Then, a qualitative analysis through t-SNE visualisations is
provided to gain insights on the latent space learned by the VAE. Next, this
section evaluates the performance of our proposed VAE residual features. Fi-
nally, Subsection 5.5.5 provides a summary of the work done in this section.
The work reported here was published in [Chettri et al., 2020].
5.5.1 Introduction
In classic automatic speech recognition (ASR) systems and many other speech
applications, prior knowledge of speech acoustics and speech perception has
guided the design of some successful feature extraction techniques, mel frequency
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cepstral coefficients (MFCCs) [Davis and Mermelstein, 1980] being a representa-
tive example. Similar a priori characterization of acoustic cues that are relevant
for spoofing attack detection, however, is challenging; this is because many at-
tacks are unseen, and since the human auditory system has its limits — it is not
designed to detect spoofed speech and may therefore be a poor guide in feature
crafting. This motivates the study of data-driven approaches that learn auto-
matically relevant representations for spoofing detection. Both discriminative
models (such as support vector machines (SVMs), deep neural networks (DNNs)
[Nagarsheth et al., 2017, Zhang et al., 2017]) and generative models (such as
GMMs) [Patel and Patil, 2015, Lavrentyeva et al., 2017], have extensively been
used as backends for spoofing detection. The former directly optimise the class
decision boundary while the latter model the data generation process within
each of the classes, with the decision boundary being implied indirectly. Both
approaches can be used for classification but only the generative approach can
be used to sample new data points. We focus on generative modeling as it al-
lows us to interpret the generated samples to gain insights about our modeling
problem, or to “debug” the deep learning models and illustrate what the model
has learned from the data to make decisions. Further, they can be used for
data augmentation which is challenging using purely discriminative approaches.
Subsections 2.7.3 and 2.7.1 provide necessary background on GMMs and VAEs
respectively. Furthermore, Subsection 2.7.3 provides additional details relating
them as latent variable models.
GMMs have empirically been demonstrated to be competitive in both the
ASVspoof 2015 and ASVspoof 2017 challenges [Patel and Patil, 2015, Lavren-
tyeva et al., 2017]. While Patel and Patil [2015] used hand-crafted features
for synthetic speech detection, Lavrentyeva et al. [2017] used deep features to
train GMM backends. A known problem with GMMs, however, is that the
use of high-dimensional (short-term) features often leads to numerical problems
due to singular covariance matrices. Even if off-the-shelf dimensionality reduc-
tion methods such as principal component analysis (PCA) [Jolliffe and Cadima,
2016] or linear discriminant analysis (LDA) [Tharwat et al., 2017] prior to GMM
modeling may help, they are not jointly optimised with the GMM. Is there an
alternative way to learn a generative model that can handle high-dimensional
inputs natively? Three generative models that have been demonstrated to pro-
duce excellent results in different applications include generative adversarial
networks (GANs) [Goodfellow et al., 2014], variational autoencoders (VAEs)
[Kingma and Welling, 2013] and autoregressive models (for example, WaveNet
[Oord et al., 2016]). Both GANs and VAEs have demonstrated promising results
in computer vision [Pu et al., 2016, Gulrajani et al., 2016, Walker et al., 2016],
video generation [Tulyakov et al., 2017] and natural language processing tasks
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[Subramanian et al., 2017]. VAEs have recently been studied for modeling and
generation of speech signals [Blaauw and Bonada, 2016, Hsu et al., 2017b,a],
and synthesizing music sounds in [Esling et al., 2018]. They have also been used
for speech enhancement [Leglaive et al., 2019, Kameoka et al., 2018b] and fea-
ture learning for ASR [Tan and Sim, 2016, Feng and Lee, 2019]. Recent studies
in ASV have studied the use of VAEs in data augmentation [Wu et al., 2019],
regularisation [Zhang et al., 2019b] and domain adaptation [Tu et al., 2019] for
deep speaker embeddings (x-vectors). In TTS, VAEs have been recently used
to learn speaking style in an end-to-end setting [Zhang et al., 2019a]. Recent
work in [Yang et al., 2019b] uses VAEs for extracting low-dimensional features
and trains a separate classifier on these features for spoofing detection.
However, to the best of the author’s knowledge, the application of VAEs as
a backend classifier for spoofing attack detection in ASV remains an unexplored
avenue. This section explores deep probabilistic VAEs under two settings. First,
as a backend for spoofing detection. Fig. 5.4 illustrates this idea. Second, as
a feature extractor (Fig. 5.6) where we propose VAE residuals — the absolute
difference of the original input and the reconstruction — as a new feature repre-
sentation. We are motivated to consider VAEs among other generative models
(GANs, WaveNets) because they have both the inference and generator net-
works, and are more naturally suited to our tasks. The reconstruction quality
of VAEs tends to be inferior to that obtained by GANs [Huang et al., 2018],
but for classification tasks, obtaining a perfect reconstruction is not the main
priority. A key challenge, instead, is how to train VAEs to not only preserve
reasonable reconstruction but to allow to retain discriminative information in
the latent space. To address this, VAEs are often trained with additional con-
straints. For example, by conditioning the encoder and decoder with additional
inputs — so called conditional VAEs (C-VAEs) [Kihyuk Sohn and Honglak Lee
and Xinchen Yan, 2015]; or by augmenting an auxiliary classifier either to the
latent space [Li et al., 2019a] or to the output of the decoder network [Kameoka
et al., 2018a]. As there is no de facto standard for this, we aim to fill this
knowledge gap in the domain of audio replay detection. We summarise the
contributions of this work as follows:
• While deep generative models, VAEs in particular, have been studied in
many other domains, their application in audio spoofing detection remains
less explored to date. We study the potential of deep generative VAEs as
a backend classifier for spoofing detection. To the best of our knowledge,
this is the first work in this direction.
• We describe practical challenges in training a VAE model for spoofing de-
tection applications and discuss approaches that can help overcome them,
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Figure 5.4: Spoofing countermeasure pipeline using a generative model backend.
which could serve as potential guidelines for others.
• Along with a “naive”15 VAE we also study conditional VAEs (C-VAEs)
[Kihyuk Sohn and Honglak Lee and Xinchen Yan, 2015]. The C-VAE
uses class labels as an additional conditional input during training and
inference. Since we pass class labels in the C-VAE, we use a single model
to represent both classes unlike the naive VAE where we train two separate
models, one each for bonafide and spoof class. For the text-dependent
setting of ASVspoof 2017 data, we further address conditioning using a
combination of the class and passphrase labels.
• Inspired by [Li et al., 2019a, Kameoka et al., 2018a], we introduce an
auxiliary classifier into our VAE modeling framework and study how this
helps the latent space16 to capture discriminative information without sac-
rificing much during reconstruction. We experiment adding the classifier
model on top of the latent space and at the end of the decoder.
• While our primary focus is in using VAEs as a back-end, we also address
their potential in feature extraction. In particular, we subtract a VAE-
modeled spectrogram from the original spectrogram so as to de-emphasize
the importance of salient speech features (hypothesized to be less relevant
in spoofing attack detection) and focus on the residual details. We train
a convolutional neural network classifier using these residual features.
15We use naive VAE to refer the standard (vanilla) VAE [Kingma and Welling, 2013] trained
without any class labels. Information about the class is included by independently training
one VAE per class.
16A latent space is a probability distribution that defines the observed-data generation
process and is characterised by means and variances of the encoder network.
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5.5.2 Proposed method
This section now provides a detailed description of our two proposed methods
for spoofing detection. The first method explores the potential of VAEs as
a classifier for spoofing detection. For this, three different VAE settings are
studied. Then the second method explores VAEs as a feature extractor. For
this, VAE residuals which is the absolute difference of the original input and
model reconstruction is proposed as a robust feature that retains the factors of
interest for replay spoofing detection. A separate classifier is then trained on
these features for final classification.
VAE as an alternative backend classifier
As described in Subsection 2.7.3, the VAE is an unsupervised method that learns
an encoder-decoder pair, Λ = (θ,φ), without requiring class labels. When used
for classification, rather than data reconstruction, we have to condition VAE
training with the class label. Here, we use labels yn = 1 (bonafide) and yn = 0
(spoof) to indicate whether or not the nth training exemplar represents bonafide
speech17. We consider three alternative approaches to condition VAE training,
described as follows.
The first, naive approach, is to train VAEs similarly as GMMs [Patil et al.,
2017, M S and Murthy, 2018, Todisco et al., 2017] — independently of each
other, using the respective training sets Xbona = {xn|yn = 1} and Xspoof =
{xn|yn = 0}. VAEs are trained to optimise the loss function described in
(2.11). This yields two VAEs, Λbona and Λspoof. At test time, they are in-
dependently scored using (2.11), and combined by subtracting the spoof score
from the bonafide score. The higher the score, the higher the confidence that
the test utterance originates from the bonafide class.
Our second approach is to train a single conditional VAE (C-VAE) [Ki-
hyuk Sohn and Honglak Lee and Xinchen Yan, 2015] model. In contrast to the
naive approach, the C-VAE can learn more complex (e.g., multimodal) distri-
butions by including auxiliary inputs (conditioning variables) to the encoder
and/or decoder distributions. In this approach, the label vector yn is used
both in training and scoring. Specifically, in our implementation inspired from
[Dahmani et al., 2019, Wu et al., 2019], we augment yn to the output of the
last convolutional layer in the encoder network and to the input of the decoder
network. Subsection 5.5.3 describes our encoder and decoder architectures. The
17We use the vector notation yn to indicate the corresponding one-hot vector — i.e., yn =
(0, 1) to represent bonafide and yn = (1, 0) to represent a spoof sample.
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training loss (2.11) is now revised as:
`n(θ,φ) = −Ez∼qφ(z|xn,yn)
[
log pθ(xn|z,yn)
]
+ KL
(
qφ(z|xn,yn) ‖ p(z|yn)
)
,
(5.1)
where, in practice, we relax the class-conditional prior distribution of the latent
variable to be independent of the class, i.e. p(z|yn) = p(z) [Kihyuk Sohn and
Honglak Lee and Xinchen Yan, 2015]. We perform scoring in the same way as
for the previous approach: we pass each test exemplar x through the C-VAE
using genuine and spoof class vectors yn, to give two different scores, which are
then differenced as before. Note that yn may include any other available useful
metadata besides the binary bonafide/spoof class label. In our experiments on
the text-dependent ASVspoof 2017 corpus consisting of 10 fixed passphrases, we
will address the use of class labels and phrase identifiers jointly.
Our third approach is to use an auxiliary classifier with a conditional
VAE (AC-VAE) to train a discriminative latent space. We use rψ(x) to denote
the predicted posterior probability of the bonafide class, as given by an auxiliary
classifier (AC); ψ denotes the parameters of AC. Note that the posterior for
the spoof class is 1 − rψ(x) as there are two classes. Inspired by [Tu et al.,
2019] and [Kameoka et al., 2018a], we consider two different AC setups. First,
following [Tu et al., 2019], we use the mean µz as the input to an AC which
is a feedforward neural network with a single hidden layer. Second, following
[Kameoka et al., 2018a], we augment a deep-CNN as an AC to the output of
the decoder network. Here, we use the CNN architecture from Subsection 4.5.2.
From hereon, we call these two setups as AC-VAE1 and AC-VAE2 respectively.
To train the model, we jointly optimise the C-VAE loss (5.1) and the AC loss.
In specific, the loss for the nth training exemplar is:
`n(θ,φ,ψ) = α · `n(θ,φ) + β · `n(ψ), (5.2)
where the non-negative control parameters α and β weigh the relative impor-
tance of the regularisation terms during training, set by cross-validation18, and
where `n(ψ) denotes the binary cross-entropy loss for the training exemplar xn.
It is defined as:
`n(ψ) = −
(
yn log rψ(xn) + (1− yn) log(1− rψ(xn))
)
(5.3)
Note that setting α = 1 and β = 0 in (5.2) gives (5.1) as a special case. At
test time we discard the auxiliary classifier and follow the same approach for
scoring as in the C-VAE setup discussed earlier. All the three approaches are
18We use 0.5 for both α and β.
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summarised in Fig. 5.5.
VAE as a feature extractor — VAE residuals
The results shown in Fig. 5.7 indicate that our VAEs have learnt to reconstruct
spectrograms using prominent acoustic cues and, further, the latent codes visu-
alised in Fig. 5.8 indicate strong content dependency. The latent space in a VAE
may therefore focus on retaining information such as broad spectral structure
and formants that help in increasing the data likelihood leading to good recon-
struction. But in spoofing attack detection (especially the case of high-quality
replay attacks) we are also interested in detail — the part not modeled by a
VAE. This motivates us to consider an alternative use case of the VAE as a fea-
ture extractor. The idea is illustrated in Fig. 5.6. We use a pre-trained C-VAE
model (with bonafide-class conditioning) to obtain a new feature representation
that we dub as VAE residual, defined as the absolute difference of the input
spectrogram and the reconstructed spectrogram by the C-VAE model. We ex-
tract the VAE residual features from all training utterances and train a new
classifier backend (here, a CNN) using these features as input. We adopt the
CNN architecture and training from Subsection 4.5.2. During testing, we use
the CNN output activation (Sigmoid activation) as our spoof detection score.
Though another recent study also used VAEs for feature extraction [Yang et al.,
2019b], our approach is different; they used the latent variable from a pretrained
VAE model, while we use the residual of the original and reconstructed inputs.
5.5.3 Experimental setup
We now describe our experimental setup. This includes description of the evalu-
ation datasets, inputs and feature representation, model architectures, training
and testing methods. A brief summary of the metrics considered for perfor-
mance evaluation is also provided.
Datasets
We use two publicly available spoofing datasets: ASVspoof 2017 v2.0 and
ASVspoof 2019 physical access (PA) for model training and testing. Section 3
provides more details on these datasets. Furthermore, following our prior find-
ings in Section 5.2, we adopt a custom protocol (described in Subsection 5.2.3)
for training and validating our models on the ASVspoof 2019 dataset.
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(a) Naive VAE. Separate bonafide and spoof VAE models are trained using the respective-
class training audio files.
(b) C-VAE. A single VAE model is trained using the entire training examples but with
class-label vectors.
(c) AC-VAE extends C-VAE by augmenting an auxiliary classifier (AC). We include AC
in two alternative settings: (i) AC-VAE1: use latent mean vector µz as its input, or (ii)
AC-VAE2: at the end of decoder using reconstruction as its input. These are highlighted with
dotted lines. At test time we discard the AC.
Figure 5.5: Different VAE setups investigated.
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Figure 5.6: Proposed countermeasure design using VAE residual — the dif-
ference of the original and reconstruction.
Features and input representations
We consider both CQCC [Todisco et al., 2017] and log-power spectrogram fea-
tures. On the ASVspoof 2017 v2.0 dataset, following our findings in Subsection
4.6.3, we trim silence/noise before and after the utterance in the training, de-
velopment and test sets. Similarly, on the ASVspoof 2019 PA dataset, following
our findings in Subsection 5.2.5 we remove silence from the start and end of
the utterances in the whole dataset. We apply these pre-processing steps to
ensure that models do not exploit dataset artefacts that bias their decisions
(see Subsections 4.6.3 and 5.2.5). Following [Delgado et al., 2018], we extract
log energy plus 19-dimensional CQCC static coefficients augmented with deltas
and double-deltas, yielding 60-dimensional feature vectors per frame. This is
followed by cepstral mean and variance normalisation. As for the power spec-
trogram, we use a 512-point discrete Fourier transform (DFT) with frame size
and shift of 32 ms and 10 ms, respectively, leading to N feature frames with
257 spectral bins.
As our VAE models use a fixed input representation, we create a unified
feature matrix by truncating or replicating the feature frames. If N is less than
our desired number of feature frames T , we copy the original N frames from
the beginning until the desired T frames are obtained. Otherwise, if N > T , we
retain the first T frames. The point of truncating (or replicating) frames in the
way described above is to ensure meaningful comparison where both models use
the same audio frames as their input. This also means that the numbers reported
in this paper are not directly19 comparable to those reported in literature; in
specific, excluding the trailing audio (mostly silence or nonspeech) after the first
T seconds will increase the error rates of our baseline GMM substantially. The
issue with the original, ‘low’ error rates relates in part to database design issues,
rather than bonafide/spoof discrimination (see Subsections 5.2.5 and 4.6.3). The
main motivation to use the T frames at the beginning is to build fixed-length
utterance-level countermeasure models, which is a commonly adopted design
19GMMs reported in the literature do not truncate or replicate, and this was done by us
for a fair comparison with VAEs.
183
(a) Bonafide file with bonafide-class conditioning (b) Bonafide file with spoof-class conditioning
(c) Spoof file with bonafide-class conditioning (d) Spoof file with spoof-class conditioning
Figure 5.7: Visualisation of the reconstructed spectrograms by the C-VAE.
Bonafide audio file (D 1000022.wav) and spoof audio file (D 1001049.wav) are
taken from the ASVspoof 2017 v2.0 development set.
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Table 5.17: Encoder architecture. Conv: convolutional. T, F: the number of
time frames and feature dimensions. The scalar f is the dimension of Conv5
output flattened vector. M is 16 and 32 for spectrogram and CQCC inputs.
Conv5 is not applicable for CQCCs.
Layer
Input Filter Stride # Filters/ Output
shape size size neurons shape
Conv1 T×F×1 5×257 2×2 M T/2×F/2×M
Conv2 T/2×F/2×M 5×129 2×2 2M T/4×F/4×2M
Conv3 T/4×F/4×2M 5×65 2×2 4M T/8×F/8×4M
Conv4 T/8×F/8×4M 5×33 2×2 8M T/16×F/16×8M
Conv5 T/16×F/16×8M 5×17 2×2 16M T/32×F/32 ×16M
µz f - - 128 128
log σ2z f - - 128 128
Table 5.18: Decoder architecture. ConvT: transposed convolutional. * denotes
zero padding to match the input shape. The Gaussian layers µx and log σ
2
x
use Conv layer. H and W values depends on the number of neurons (#neurons)
in the FC layer which is 12288 and 2304 for spectrogram and CQCC inputs,
respectively.
Layer
Input Filter Stride # Filters/ Output
shape size size neurons shape
FC 128 - - #neurons #neurons
ConvT H×W×128 5×10 2×2 64 2H×2W×64
ConvT 2H×2W×64 5×20 2×2 32 4H×4W×32
ConvT* 5H×4W×32 5×20 2×2 16 10H×8W×16
ConvT* 10H×8W×16 5×20 2×2 8 20H×16W×8
µx* 100×F×8 5×5 1×1 1 100×F×1
log σ2x∗ 100×F×8 5×5 1×1 1 100×F×1
choice for anti-spoofing systems, e.g. [Lavrentyeva et al., 2017, Zhang et al.,
2017].
This yields a 100 × 60-dimensional CQCC representation and a 100 × 257
power spectrogram representation for every audio file. We use the same number
of frames (T = 100) for both the GMM and VAE models. Note that GMMs
treat frames as independent observations while VAEs consider the whole matrix
as a single high-dimensional data point.
Model architecture
Our baseline GMM consists of 512 mixture components (motivated from [Del-
gado et al., 2018]) with diagonal covariance matrices. As for the VAE, our
encoder and decoder model architecture is adopted from [Mishra et al., 2019].
For a given T × D feature matrix, where T=time frames and D=feature di-
mension, the encoder predicts the mean µz and the log-variance log σ
2
z that
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parameterise the posterior distribution qφ(z|x), by applying a series of strided
2D convolutions [Dumoulin and Visin, 2016] as detailed in Table 5.17. We use a
stride of 2 instead of pooling for downsampling the original input. The decoder
network architecture is summarised in Table 5.18. It takes a d-dimensional sam-
pled z vector as input and predicts the mean µx and the log-variance log σ
2
x
that parameterise the distribution pθ(x|z) through a series of transposed convo-
lution [Dumoulin and Visin, 2016] operations. We use LeakyReLU [Maas et al.,
2013] activations in all layers except the Gaussian mean and log variance layers
which use linear activations. We use batch normalisation before applying the
non-linearity in both the encoder and decoder networks.
Training, scoring and performance metrics
We train GMMs for a maximum of 100 EM iterations with random initialisation
of parameters. We train bonafide and spoof GMMs separately to model the
respective class distributions. We use only the training partition to train GMMs
for both the ASVspoof 2017 and 2019 datasets. At test time, the score of each
test utterance is computed as the log likelihood ratio between the bonafide and
spoofed GMM model as described in Equation 4.1. We train our VAE models
using stochastic gradient descent with Adam optimisation [Kingma and Ba,
2014], with an initial learning rate of 10−4 and 16 samples as the minibatch
size. We train them for 300 epochs and stop the training if the validation loss
does not improve for 10 epochs. We apply 50% dropout to the inputs of fully
connected layers in our auxiliary classifier. We do not apply dropout in the
encoder and decoder networks.
As for the performance evaluation of our models we use the EER and t-DCF
metrics described in Subsections 3.5.1 and 3.5.2 respectively.
Experiments
We perform several experiments using different VAE setups (described in Section
5.5.2) using CQCCs and log-power spectrogram inputs. We also train baseline
GMMs for comparing VAE performance using the same input CQCC features.
While training VAEs with an auxiliary classifier on the µz input, we use 32
units in the FC layer. We do not use the entire training and development audio
files for training and model validation on the ASVspoof 2019 dataset, but adopt
our proposed protocols described in Subsection 5.2.3. We use them here as
they showed good generalisation on the ASVspoof 2019 test dataset during the
recent ASVspoof 2019 evaluations (Subsection 5.2.4). Note, however, that all
the evaluation portion results are reported on the standard ASVspoof protocols.
186
Table 5.19: Showing the effect of latent dimensions on the performance metric
for the C-VAE model when it is trained on CQCC and spectrogram inputs.
Spectrogram CQCC
Latent dimension EER% t-DCF EER% t-DCF
8 31.20 0.8642 33.35 0.8584
16 26.88 0.7551 33.74 0.8542
32 36.65 0.9383 30.81 0.7909
64 29.73 0.7650 29.52 0.7325
128 29.43 0.7303 29.27 0.7222
256 29.80 0.7609 28.87 0.6962
512 25.73 0.6662 28.42 0.7033
5.5.4 Evaluation
This section evaluates our proposed methods providing a summary of results
for different experimental setups. First, it evaluates the impact of latent space
dimensionality on the VAE performance and finds 128 as the optimal choice.
This dimension is then used in all our VAE setups. Then, a performance com-
parison between different VAEs with the baseline GMMs is provided. Next,
this section evaluates the performance of VAEs trained with multi-class condi-
tioning and contrasts it with the ones trained using binary-class conditioning.
Then, a qualitative analysis through t-SNE visualisations is provided to gain in-
sights on the latent space learned by the VAE. Finally, this section evaluates the
performance of our proposed VAE residual features by training a separate dis-
criminative classifier (CNN in this case), and further compares its performance
with the same CNN when it is trained on the original spectrogram inputs.
Impact of the latent space dimensionality
We first address the impact of latent space dimensionality on the ASVspoof 2017
corpus. To keep computation time manageable, we focus only on the C-VAE
variant. The results, for both CQCC and spectrogram features, are summarised
in Table 5.19. Shown results are on the ASVspoof 2017 v2.0 evaluation sets. We
observe an overall decreasing trend in EER with increased latent space dimen-
sionality, as expected. All the error rates are relatively high, which indicates
general difficulty of our detection task. In the remainder of this study, we fix
the latent space dimensionality to d = 128 as a suitable trade-off in EER and
computational cost.
187
Table 5.20: Performance of GMM and VAE variants using CQCC inputs.
Model
ASVspoof 2017 ASVspoof 2019 PA
Dev Eval Dev Eval
EER t-DCF EER t-DCF EER t-DCF EER t-DCF
GMM 19.07 0.4365 22.6 0.6211 43.77 0.9973 45.48 0.9988
VAE 29.2 0.7532 32.37 0.8079 45.24 0.9855 45.53 0.9978
C-VAE 18.1 0.4635 28.1 0.7020 34.06 0.8129 36.66 0.9104
AC-VAE1 21.8 0.4914 29.3 0.7365 34.73 0.8516 36.42 0.9036
AC-VAE2 17.78 0.4469 29.73 0.7368 34.87 0.8430 36.42 0.8963
Comparing different VAE setups with GMMs
Our next experiment addresses the relative performance of different VAE vari-
ants and their relation to our GMM baseline. As GMMs cannot be used with
high-dimensional spectrogram inputs, the results are shown only for the CQCC
features. This experiment serves to answer the question on which VAE variants
are the most promising, and whether VAEs have potential to be used as a back-
end for spoofing detection. The results for both the ASVspoof 2017 and 2019
(PA) datasets are summarised in Table 5.20.
Baseline GMM. On the ASVspoof 2017 dataset, the GMM reports an EER of
19.07% and 22.6% on the development and evaluation sets, respectively. Note
that our baseline is completely different from the CQCC-GMM results of [Del-
gado et al., 2018] for two reasons. First, we use a unified time representation
of the first 100 frames obtained either by truncating or copying time frames,
for reasons explained earlier. Second, we remove the leading and trailing non-
speech/silence from every utterance, to mitigate a dataset-related bias described
in Subsection 4.6.3: the goal of our modified setup is to ensure that our models
focus on actual factors rather than database artefacts.
On the ASVspoof 2019 PA dataset, the performance of the GMM baseline20
is nearly random as indicated by both metrics. The difficulty of the task and
our modified setup to suppress database artefacts both contribute to high error
rates. The results are consistent with our earlier findings in Subsection 5.2.5.
The two separate GMMs may have learnt similar data distributions. Note that
the similarly-trained naive VAE displays similar near-random performance.
VAE variants. Let us first focus on the ASVspoof 2017 results. Our first,
naive VAE approach falls systematically behind our baseline GMM. Even if
20For sanity check, we trained a GMM without removing silence (and using all frames per
utterance) and obtained a performance similar to the official GMM baseline of the ASVspoof
2019 challenge. On the development set, our GMM now shows an EER of 10.06% and t-DCF
of 0.1971 which is slightly worse than official baseline (EER = 9.87 and t-DCF =0.1953).
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Table 5.21: Comparing VAE and C-VAE performance on the ASVspoof 2017
dataset using the log power spectrograms as input features.
Dev Eval
Model EER t-DCF EER t-DCF
VAE 32.12 0.8037 36.92 0.9426
C-VAE 22.81 0.5219 29.52 0.7302
both the bonafide and spoof VAE models display decent reconstructions, they
lack the ability to retain discriminative information in the latent space when
trained in isolation from each other. Further, remembering that VAE training
optimises only a lower bound of the log-likelihood function, it might happen
that the detection score formed as a difference of these ‘inexact’ log-likelihoods
either under or overshoots the true log-likelihood ratio — but there is no way
of knowing which way it is.
The C-VAE model, however, shows encouraging results compared with all
the other VAE variants considered. This suggests that conditioning both the en-
coder and decoder with class labels during VAE training is helpful. Supposedly
a shared, conditional C-VAE model yields ‘more compatible’ bonafide and spoof
scores when we form the detection score. The C-VAE model shows comparable
detection performance to the GMM baseline on the development set, though it
performs poorly on the evaluation set.
The VAE variants with an auxiliary classifier outperform the naive VAE
but are behind C-VAE: both AC-VAE1 and AC-VAE2 shows slightly degraded
performance over C-VAE on the evaluation set. While AC-VAE1 and AC-VAE2
show comparable performance on the evaluation set, on the development set AC-
VAE2 outperforms all other VAE variants in both the metrics. This suggests
overfitting on the development set: adding an auxiliary classifier increases the
model complexity as the number of free parameters to be learned increases
substantially. Apart from having to learn optimal model parameters from a
small training dataset, another challenge is to find an optimal value for the
control parameters α and β in Equation 5.2.
On the ASVspoof 201921 dataset our C-VAE model now outperforms the
naive VAE and the GMM baseline. By conditioning the encoder and decoder
networks with class labels, we observe an absolute improvement of about 10%
over the naive VAE on both the development and the evaluation sets. Unlike
in the ASVspoof 2017 dataset, the auxiliary classifier VAE now offers some
improvement on the evaluation set. This might be due to the much larger
21We would like to stress that we do not use the original training and development protocols
for model training and validation. Instead, we use our custom protocol described in Section
5.2.3 that helped to improve generalisation during the ASVspoof 2019 challenge. However,
during testing, we report test results on the standard development and evaluation protocols.
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Figure 5.8: Latent space visualisation for 10 phrases S01-S10 (see Table 3.1) of
the ASVspoof 2017 training set by C-VAE with bonafide-class conditioning.
number of training examples available in the ASVspoof 2019 dataset (54000
utterances) in comparison to the ASVspoof 2017 training set (3014 utterances).
It should be further noted that while training models on the ASVspoof
2019 dataset, we used the hyper-parameters (learning rate, mini-batch size,
control parameters including the network architecture) that were optimised on
the ASVspoof 2017 dataset. This was done to study how well the architecture
and hyper-parameters generalise from one replay dataset (ASVspoof 2017) to
another one (ASVspoof 2019).
The results in Table 5.20 with the CQCC features indicate that the C-VAE is
the most promising variant for further experiments. While adding the auxiliary
classifier improved performance in a few cases, the improvements are modest
relative to the added complexity. Therefore, in the remainder of this paper, we
focus on the C-VAE unless otherwise stated. Also, we focus testing our ideas on
the ASVspoof 2017 replay dataset for computational reasons. Next, to confirm
the observed performance improvement of the C-VAE over the naive VAE, we
further train both models using raw log power-spectrogram features. The results
in Table 5.21 confirm the anticipated result in terms of both metrics.
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Conditioning VAEs beyond class labels
The results so far confirm that the C-VAE outperforms the naive VAE by a wide
margin. We now focus on multi-class conditioning using C-VAEs. To this end,
our possible conditioning variables could include speaker and sentence identi-
fiers. However, speakers are different across the training and test sets in both
ASVspoof 2017 and ASVspoof 2019, preventing the use of speaker conditioning.
Further, the phrase identities of the ASVspoof 2019 PA dataset are not publicly
available. For these reasons we restrict our focus on the 10 common passphrases
(S01 through S10) in the ASVspoof 2017 dataset shared across training, devel-
opment and evaluation data. The contents of these phrases are provided in
Table 3.1. The numbers of bonafide and spoof utterances for these passphrases
in the training and development sets are equally balanced. We therefore use a
20-dimensional one-hot vector to represent multi-class conditioning. The first 10
labels correspond to bonafide sentences S01 through S10 and the remaining 10
to spoofed utterances. Everything else about training and scoring the C-VAE
remains the same as before, except for the use of the 20-dimensional (rather
than 2-dimensional) one-hot vector.
We first visualise how the latent space is distributed across the 10 differ-
ent phrases of the ASVspoof 2017 training set. Fig. 5.8 shows the 2D latent
space visualisation for these utterances using the t-SNE [Maaten and Hinton,
2008] algorithm. The clear distinction between different phrases suggests that
the latent space preserves the structure and identity of different sentences of
the dataset. This suggests that choosing the sentence identity for conditioning
the VAE might be beneficial towards improving performance; such a model is
expected to learn phrase-specific bonafide-vs-spoof discriminatory cues.
Table 5.22 summarises the results. Shown results are on the ASVspoof
2017 v2.0 dataset using CQCC and spectrogram inputs. The C-VAE trained
on spectrogram features with multi-class conditioning shows a substantial im-
provement over two-class conditioning. This suggests that the network now ben-
efits from exploiting relevant information present across different passphrases,
which may be difficult from binary class conditioning. For the CQCC features,
however, we have the opposite finding: while the EER is slightly decreased
on the evaluation set with multi-class conditioning, overall it shows degraded
performance. One possible interpretation is that CQCCs are a compact feature
representation optimised specifically for anti-spoofing. CQCCs may lack phrase-
specific information relevant for anti-spoofing which is retained by the richer and
higher-dimensional raw spectrogram. To sum up, the C-VAE trained on raw
spectrograms with multi-class conditioning offers substantial improvement over
two-class conditioning in comparison to CQCC input features.
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Table 5.22: Comparing the performance of the C-VAE model trained using
binary and multi-class conditioning.
CQCC Spectrogram
Dev Eval Dev Eval
Conditioning EER t-DCF EER t-DCF EER t-DCF EER t-DCF
Two-class 18.1 0.4635 28.1 0.7020 22.81 0.5219 29.52 0.7302
Multi-class 19.77 0.4961 27.88 0.7390 19.65 0.4324 25.48 0.6631
Qualitative results
A relevant question is whether or not the latent space features z have some clear
meaning in terms of human or spoofed speech parameters, or any other relevant
information that helps us derive some understanding about the underlying data.
To this end, we analyse the latent space through 2D visualisations using the t-
SNE algorithm. We aim to understand how the latent space is distributed
across different speakers and between genders. We do this on the ASVspoof
2019 dataset, as the 2017 dataset only has male speakers. Fig. 5.9 shows t-SNE
plots for 5 male and 5 female speakers on the ASVspoof 2019 PA training set
chosen randomly.
The subfigures in the first row of Fig. 5.9 suggest that the latent space has
learned quite well to capture speaker related information, but it does not seem
to clearly capture gender specific information as evident from the overlapping
clusters (top right figure). We further analyse bonafide and different attack
conditions per gender, taking PA 0082 and PA 0079 — one male and female
speaker randomly from the pool of 10 speakers we considered. Fig. 5.9, second
row illustrates this. We use letters A-I to indicate the bonafide class and 9
different attack conditions whose original labels are as follows. A: bonafide,
B: ‘BB’, C: ‘BA’, D: ‘CC’, E: ‘AB’, F: ‘AC’, G: ‘AA’, H: ‘CA’, I: ‘CB’, J:
‘BC’. These labels refer to the combination of different factors involved in a
replay attack. For example, an attacker to ASV microphone distance, quality
of recording device, room acoustics, quality of playback device etc. As we do
not use them further in this work, their in-depth details are not provided here.
Rather, we point the reader to see [Todisco et al., 2019.] for more details. From
Fig. 5.9, we observe overlapping attacks within a cluster, and spread of these
attacks across different clusters. The bonafide audio examples, denoted by letter
A are heavily overlapped by various spoofed examples. This gives an intuition
that the latent space is unable to preserve much discriminative information due
to the nature of the task, and rather, it might be focusing on generic speech
attributes such as acoustic content, speaker speaking style to name a few, to be
able to generate a reasonable reconstruction — as depicted in Fig 5.7.
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Figure 5.9: 2D visualisation of the latent space learned by the C-VAE. Top left :
10 different speaker identities. Top right : 5 male and 5 female clusters. Bottom
left : distribution of bonafide and attack conditions for a male speaker PA 0082.
Bottom right : same as in (c) but for a female speaker PA 0079.
Table 5.23: Effectiveness of VAE residual features in spoofing detection.
Dev Eval
Features Model EER t-DCF EER t-DCF
Spectrogram C-VAE 22.81 0.5219 29.52 0.7302
VAE residual CNN 13.16 0.3438 17.32 0.4293
Spectrogram CNN 10.82 0.2877 16.03 0.4461
VAEs as feature extractors
Table 5.23 summarises the results. Results shown are on the ASVspoof 2017
v2.0 dataset. Numbers in the second row correspond to our proposed approach
of using VAE residual features and training a separate classifier. We also in-
clude C-VAE results from our initial approach (C-VAE as a back-end) from the
third row of Table 5.20 for comparison. For contrastive purposes we train an-
other CNN classifier with the same architecture using the original spectrogram
as its input. The results for this is shown in the third row of the table. Using
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VAE residuals and training a separate classifier outperforms the back-end ap-
proach on both metrics and on both the development and evaluation sets. The
residual approach, however, remains behind the CNN trained directly on the
original spectrogram, on the development set. On the evaluation set, it achieves
the lowest t-DCF and displays a comparable EER. The small performance gap
(in relative terms) between the development and evaluation sets for the VAE
residual approach suggests good generalisation.
Although the proposed VAE residual approach did not outperform the raw-
spectrogram CNN, the results obtained are encouraging and show potential for
further investigation. In fact, given the similar performance of the original and
VAE residual spectrogram features, we interpret the results to mean that most
of the relevant information for discriminating bonafide and replay utterances
(on this data) lies in the residual or ‘noise’ part of the spectrogram. It is
noteworthy that heuristic ideas inspired directly by simple visualisations such
as Figs. 5.8 and 5.7 lead to boosted performance. Finally, recalling our initial
motivations, the VAE leads to a generative model (unlike CNN) that allows data
sampling and obtaining uncertainty of the latent space representation. These
favorable properties of VAEs suggest further studies towards more versatile
spoofing countermeasure solutions where the semantics, sanity and stability of
the learned feature representation can be easily explored.
5.5.5 Discussion
Inspired by the successful use of GMMs, a classical generative model, as a
backend in spoofing detection for ASV, this section performed an initial study
on exploring the potential of VAEs, a deep generative model in audio spoofing
detection. Subsection 5.5.2 described our proposed methods of using VAEs as
classifiers, and as a feature extractor. In terms of backend classifier, different
VAE variants: vanilla VAE, C-VAE and C-VAE with an auxiliary classifier were
investigated. Subsection 5.5.4 described the evaluation of our methods.
Our first study using two separate VAEs suggests that it is difficult to cap-
ture discriminative information when the models are trained using only one-
class data. Both the bonafide and spoof VAEs seem to focus on retaining in-
formation relevant for data reconstruction while giving less attention on class-
discriminative information. As a result, the latent space in both bonafide and
spoof VAEs appears to capture common prominent characteristics of bonafide
and spoofed speech, making the detection task difficult. Nonetheless, our qual-
itative results indicate that both our bonafide and spoof VAEs yield reasonable
reconstruction of the input data. Our second approach of training a single con-
ditional VAE (C-VAE) by conditioning the encoder and decoder networks by
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class-label vectors shows far more encouraging results. The performance of our
C-VAE models on both the ASVspoof 2017 and ASVspoof 2019 datasets show
remarkable improvement in comparison to the naive VAE approach. Our third
approach of augmenting an auxiliary classifier with the C-VAE did not help
much. We did not observe substantial improvement in detection performance
on the ASVspoof 2017 dataset, though we observed some performance gain on
the ASVspoof 2019 dataset, suggesting the importance of training set size for
improved generalisation. Finally, our proposed approach of using C-VAE as
a front-end (VAE residual features), demonstrated a substantial improvement
over the VAE back-end use case.
Despite the different dataset sizes in the ASVspoof 2017 and ASVspoof 2019
datasets, we find that the model hyper-parameters tuned on the ASVspoof 2017
dataset worked quite well when applied on the 2019 dataset, showing consistency
of our findings with C-VAE models. However, the optimisation of network archi-
tecture and model hyper-parameters has not been fully explored in the present
study, leaving scope for further improvements. To sum up, based on both the ob-
served detection performance and architecture complexity considerations, from
the three VAE back-end variants considered (Fig. 5.5), the authors recommend
potential future work to focus on conditional VAEs (C-VAEs). In fact, we
obtained promising results by further conditioning C-VAEs using pass-phrase
labels. This warrants future studies with other conditioning variables such as
speaker identity, gender, and channel.
5.6 Summary
This chapter presented several novel methods for the design of countermeasures
for replay spoofing detection while focussing on model robustness and avoiding
potential biases in the datasets used for training and inference. Proposed meth-
ods were evaluated on two benchmark spoofing datasets: ASVspoof 2017 v2.0
and ASVspoof 2019 PA. The work reported in this chapter has been published
(and is under review) in international peer-reviewed conferences and journals.
In Section 5.2, an ensemble model and a dataset partition was proposed
for better generalisation. Its effectiveness was evaluated on a latest benchmark
dataset (ASVspoof 2019 PA) demonstrating good performance on the test set.
Artefacts in this dataset was discovered that provided substantial contribu-
tions in model predictions, and a method to mitigate this issue was proposed
subsequently. Extending the findings from Section 4.6, the chapter proposed
a method towards building reliable and trustworthy countermeasures on the
ASVspoof 2017 v2.0 dataset. The method involved speech endpoint detection
as a step before feature extraction to remove audio samples before and after
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the actual speech utterance. The effectiveness of the proposed method was
demonstrated by evaluating countermeasures (trained with and without end-
point detection) on manipulated test signals. Experimental results confirmed
that countermeasures trained using the proposed method helped mitigate the
impact substantially (Section 5.3).
The chapter then proposed a joint subband modeling framework (Section 5.4)
designed to exploit information across different subbands independently. This
method is evaluated on both the 2017 and 2019 PA benchmark datasets using
the proposed data preprocessing steps removing the confounders in them. Fur-
thermore, the proposed method is also evaluated in a cross-dataset test scenario
using the ASVspoof 2019 real PA test set (described in Section 3.3.3). Although
the experimental results confirmed the superiority of the proposed method over
conventional method of training countermeasures on the fullband spectrum, the
findings obtained on one dataset did not generalise across others indicating that
the current datasets do not reflect real world replay conditions suggesting a need
for careful dataset design.
Finally, the chapter proposed the use of VAE, a deep generative model,
for replay spoofing detection in two different settings. First, as an alternative
backend classifier, and as a feature extractor. However, unlike the traditional
approaches used in the literature that use the latent space as a learned feature,
this thesis used a different approach. The proposed feature, so called VAE resid-
ual, is obtained by taking the absolute difference between the original input and
the model reconstruction. The proposed methods were evaluated on both the
2017 and 2019 PA datasets with the proposed preprocessing steps (Section 5.5).
Experimental results demonstrated that training a single VAE with class condi-
tioning (C-VAE) offered substantial improvement in comparison to training two
separate VAEs for each class. Furthermore, the proposed frontend approach
augmented with a CNN classifier demonstrated substantial improvement over
the VAE backend use case.
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Chapter 6
Conclusions and future
work
This thesis aimed at the analysis and design of existing and novel methods for
replay spoofing detection for secure voice biometrics. Towards achieving these
objectives, several methods have been studied and proposed, and presented in
two major chapters: Chapter 4 and 5. While Chapter 4 mostly focussed on the
analysis part, Chapter 5 aimed at the design of novel spoofing countermeasures.
Most of the work reported in the two chapters was published in peer-reviewed in-
ternational journals and conferences as summarised in Section 1.5. This chapter
provides a summary of the main contributions made from the thesis in Section
6.1, and discusses the potential future work for replay spoofing detection in
Section 6.2.
6.1 Summary
6.1.1 Analysis of countermeasures
Chapter 4 aimed at serving as the basis towards understanding the replay spoof-
ing attack problem. For this, a series of studies towards analysing replay spoof-
ing countermeasures was presented by exploring existing methodologies and
techniques from the literature.
The chapter first investigated the generalisability of signal processing fron-
tends, which showed promising results in detecting converted and synthetic
speech, for the task of replay spoofing detection using the ASVspoof 2017 (v1.0)
benchmark dataset. Experimental results showed that obtaining the same level
of generalisation is difficult due to the acoustically different task under consid-
eration. Through the analysis of the best performing GMM countermeasure,
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it was found that initial zero-valued silence, present in some of the bonafide
recordings but missing from spoof class recordings, provided cues for class dis-
crimination. Using this knowledge it was further demonstrated how easy it was
to compromise countermeasure predictions. Though such data-intrinsic behav-
ior may not appear in real-world scenarios, this work demonstrated the severe
impact it can have on countermeasure performance on this dataset (Section 4.2).
Next, a detailed study on replicating a state-of-the-art deep model (LCNN)
reported on the ASVspoof 2017 v1.0 dataset was performed, and it was shown
that using only the published system details, reproducing this model was dif-
ficult. It was further shown that despite investigating various deep model ar-
chitectures from the literature, achieving performance close to the one reported
by the LCNN authors on the evaluation set was difficult. These models would
often overfit on the validation data, resulting in a higher performance gap be-
tween the development and evaluation sets. Experimental results also showed
that a 32 mini-batch size and ReLU non-linearity (which also outperformed
the MFM activation used in the LCNN model) were optimal hyper-parameter
choices among others to train deep models on this dataset (Section 4.3).
Afterwards, a performance analysis of several countermeasures under var-
ied spoofing conditions was carried out using the updated version (2.0) of this
dataset. Experimental results demonstrated that MFCCs were better at de-
tecting low quality attacks while IMFCCs showed better results for high quality
attacks. However, gaining an in-depth insight on what is causing such behaviour
was difficult as the meta-data: acoustic environment - AE, recording devices -
RD for the bonafide class was unavailable. This also suggests that “high-quality
spoofing conditions” may actually be low quality since the bonafide files were
of low quality and vice-versa. Therefore, on this dataset it was found that
analysing factors (AE, RD, playback device and their interactions) influencing
replay attacks in a controlled condition and providing a substantial conclusion
whether reverberation noise or some device-specific (recording or playback) at-
tributes provide a cue for replay spoofing detection was difficult (Section 4.4).
Next, a deep CNN countermeasure model was developed following guidelines
from Section 4.3. It was found that batch normalisation was a key factor for
model generalisation, which helped the CNN achieve performance closer to the
state-of-the-art LCNN. The SLIME algorithm for generating local interpretable
explanations was then applied on this model (trained on v2.0 of the dataset)
to understand which part of the input highly influenced its prediction. Results
showed that the CNN was giving high weights to the first few milliseconds of
the audio signal to make class predictions. The significance of this analysis
was further demonstrated by preprocessing the test signals which led to a pre-
dictable change in the system error rate, raising questions about the integrity
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and trustworthiness of countermeasures trained on this dataset (Section 4.5).
Following this, the chapter then performed an in-depth analysis of audio
recordings in the training and development sets (and bonafide recordings in the
evaluation set) of the ASVspoof 2017 v2.0 dataset, identified artefacts (see Sub-
section 3.2.3) and investigated their impact on machine learning countermeasure
decisions. Among different artefacts, burst click sound (BCS) was found to pro-
vide strong cues for the bonafide class. Interestingly, DTMF sounds showed
no influence on model decisions (Subsection 4.6.3). Furthermore, zero-valued
samples (silence) were still found to provide a potential cue for the bonafide
class on the v2.0 of this dataset.
Our in-depth analysis of this dataset and experimental results from dif-
ferent interventions confirmed the presence of a “horse” in machine learning
[Hernandez-Orallo, 2019, Sturm, 2014] for anti-spoofing applied to the ASVspoof
2017 dataset. Furthermore, none of the research results published in this dataset
(more than 60 papers) have accounted for these artefacts, further indicating that
the countermeasures showing impressive results may not be fully reliable and
trustworthy [Sturm, 2016] as their decision process involved the contribution of
these artefacts which are not related to the actual problem (Section 4.6).
6.1.2 Design of novel countermeasures
Replay spoofing attack detection, a binary classification problem, in general is a
difficult task to solve. As explained in Subsection 2.9.1, confounders or artefacts
in a dataset can affect a wide range of machine learning tasks including anti-
spoofing systems (see Sections 4.2, 4.6 and Subsection 5.2.5). Such confounders
are often overlooked in research studies. We consider two reasons for this. First,
the figures of merit used in assessing performance (typically a scalar) do not ac-
count for confounders and their influence in learning algorithms. Second, they
often offer gains in performance (see Subsection 2.9.1 for related background).
Due to these reasons we often do not care towards the accountability of such
ML models trained on data containing artefacts. But, impressive performance
reported by such untrustworthy models can be costly as they may fail with high
likelihood when used in practical real-world scenarios. Therefore, ensuring reli-
able performance estimates is important to truly assess the ability of proposed
features/classifiers for a given machine learning task.
In this direction, Chapter 5 proposed novel methods towards design of coun-
termeasures for replay spoofing attack detection while also focusing on model
robustness and avoiding dataset biases. Firstly, in Section 5.2 an ensemble model
and dataset partitions for better model generalisation and robustness were pro-
posed and evaluated on a latest benchmark spoofing dataset (ASVspoof 2019).
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The ensemble combined several deep and shallow models employing different
features and training techniques for increased diversity leading to a powerful
model. Although the proposed partition involved discarding a lot of spoofed
data points in the training and validation sets, the experimental results demon-
strated improved model robustness, which helped achieve good performance on
the PA task and 3rd ranking on the LA task of the ASVspoof 2019 challenge.
Another key contribution included a demonstration of how countermeasures
trained on the PA dataset can become somewhat of a “horse” [Sturm, 2014],
where solving the actual problem is unintentionally avoided by exploiting “si-
lence” as trivial cues, for which a simple pre-processing approach was proposed
to mitigate the issue.
Then Section 5.3 proposed a method to mitigate the impact of artefacts
identified in the ASVspoof 2017 v2.0 benchmark dataset (Section 4.6) and build
robust CM models. For this, use of speech endpoint detection module before
feature extraction was proposed to discard audio samples before and after the
actual speech utterance. This ensures that both classes of audio now have a
similar pattern, forcing learning algorithms to now focus exploiting factors of
interest — for example channel characteristics, in solving the replay spoofing
attack problem, thus producing reliable performance estimates. Manual speech
endpoint annotations were developed and used during training and validation
of model parameters to ensure the correctness of our proposed method. During
testing, a robust voice activity detection algorithm was applied to obtain au-
tomatic endpoint annotations that showed satisfactory results when compared
with manual annotations. Several new benchmark results (both frame-level and
utterance-level countermeasures) are provided showcasing the true performance
estimates when these confounders are taken into account. Finally, the robustness
of countermeasures trained with and without endpoint detection was evaluated
by manipulating test utterances with signal artefacts, and the proposed method
was found to be more resilient confirming its robustness over countermeasures
trained without endpoint detection on this dataset (Subsection 5.3.3).
In the next Section 5.4, a joint subband modelling framework was proposed
and evaluated on the ASVspoof 2017 v2.0 and ASVspoof 2019 PA benchmark
datasets. Signal preprocessing methods proposed in Section 5.2 and Section 5.3
were applied on both datasets to avoid biases during the training and testing (see
Subsections 4.6.3 and 5.2.5). The proposed framework employed n sub-networks
to learn subband specific features which were later combined and passed to a
classifier, and the whole network weights were updated during training. Re-
sults on the ASVspoof 2017 dataset demonstrated that the first and the last 1
kHz frequency bands carried the most discriminative information, and the joint
model trained on these two subbands showed the best performance outperform-
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ing the baselines (trained on fullband spectra) by a large margin. However,
these findings did not generalise on the ASVspoof 2019 PA dataset. Further-
more, models trained on the ASVspoof 2017 and 2019 PA datasets showed poor
cross-dataset performance on the ASVspoof 2019 real PA test set, indicating
that these datasets do not reflect real world replay conditions, suggesting a
need for careful design and validation of replay spoofing datasets.
Finally, motivated from the widespread use of GMMs as a backend clas-
sifier, the chapter (Section 5.5) proposed VAEs as an alternative backend for
replay attack detection, via three alternative models that differ in their class-
conditioning. The first approach (vanilla VAE) was similar to that of tradi-
tional GMMs involving training of two separate VAEs — one for each class.
The second approach trained a single conditional model (C-VAE) by injecting
a one-hot class label vector to the encoder and decoder networks. The third
approach involved integrating an auxiliary classifier to guide the learning of the
latent space.
Quantitative results for the vanilla VAE suggested that it was difficult to
capture discriminative information when the VAEs were trained using only one-
class data. It was shown that both the bonafide and spoof models focused
on retaining prominent characteristics of the speech signal relevant for data
reconstruction while giving less attention on class-discriminative information.
Nonetheless, the qualitative results indicated that both bonafide and spoof VAEs
yielded a reasonable reconstruction of the input data. Quantitative results of the
C-VAE model conditioning both the encoder and decoder networks by class-label
vectors showed far more encouraging results. The performance of this model
on both the ASVspoof 2017 and ASVspoof 2019 datasets showed remarkable
improvement in comparison to the vanilla VAE models. The third approach of
augmenting an auxiliary classifier with the C-VAE did not help much. Although
this model offered some performance gains on the ASVspoof 2019 dataset, no
substantial improvement was found on the ASVspoof 2017 dataset, suggesting
the importance of training set size for improved generalisation.
Finally, this chapter proposed the use of VAE residuals — the absolute
difference of the original input and the reconstruction — as a novel feature for
replay spoofing detection and demonstrated substantial improvement over the
VAE backend use case.
6.2 Future work
This section provides a summary of potential research directions that could be
explored towards extending the work presented in this thesis, along with key
issues and challenges in building trustworthy countermeasures for replay spoof-
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ing attacks.
Analysis: on the reliability and trustworthiness of countermeasures
• Towards the interpretability of spoofing countermeasures. It would be
interesting to apply the SLIME algorithm (Subsection 4.5.3) and other
interpretability methods to investigate: how explanations vary across dif-
ferent phrases; how explanations vary across different types of replay
conditions/configurations; and whether speaker information (for exam-
ple, fundamental frequency, prosody) influences spoofing detection per-
formance. As ASVspoof 2019 phrase IDs are not available, an automatic
speech recognition system can be used to first decode the utterance ID
and perform the study on phrase-based analysis. Another method from
interpretable machine learning we aim to study towards understanding
a deep countermeasure model is ‘feature inversion’ [Mishra et al., 2018]
which helps derive a broader understanding of what information different
hidden layers have captured about the bonafide and spoofed classes.
• Studies on fooling ML model decisions using adversarial inputs is an active
research topic [Nguyen et al., 2015, Heaven, 2019, Szegedy et al., 2014].
Adversarial examples are carefully-crafted samples that are as real as the
original input samples, imperceptible to humans, and are capable of easily
manipulating model’s trustworthiness [Yuan et al., 2017]. Therefore, it is
important to ensure robustness of ML models against adversarial attacks.
Spoofing countermeasures are primarily designed to enhance trustworthi-
ness of voice biometrics to end-users. This also indicates that robustness
of such systems in the face of adversarial attacks is of prime importance
in achieving the goal of trustworthiness. Although there are a few recent
works on adversarial attacks on anti-spoofing systems [Liu et al., 2019b],
but these works are primarily focussed on countermeasures for LA attacks
(speech synthesis and voice conversion). Investigating the robustness of
replay spoofing countermeasures against adversarial attacks would be an-
other research avenue we look forward to.
• To mitigate the issues identified on the ASVspoof 2019 PA dataset, we
proposed a simple solution to remove the first block of zero-valued sam-
ples before and after spoofed utterances. However, near-silent segments
and silences between words within the recording might remain providing
potential cues for spoofing detection. While it is desirable to have ML
models exploit them for discrimination but we also need to ensure that
they do not leave loop-holes for manipulation by a simply copy-paste of
silences as we demonstrated in this thesis (Subsections 4.2.3 and 5.2.5).
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To this end, we also aim to investigate the tradeoff between robustness
and accuracy by incorporating a voice activity detector to discard all non-
speech/silence frames from the whole utterance. We aim to extend this
study on the ASVspoof 2017 v2.0 dataset as well.
On the design of Countermeasures
• The ASVspoof 2017 dataset comprises ten different phrases (see Table 3.1).
It would be interesting to analyse how different phrases and words relate
to the detection performance of countermeasure models. To this end,
deep CM models can be trained by conditioning the sentence ID to derive
phrase-specific models. An alternative to this would be to incorporate
multi-task learning [Caruana, 1997] with phrase ID detection being the
secondary task and spoofing detection as the primary task to be learned
simultaneously.
• To gauge the importance of each subband, Section 5.4 can be further
extended by excluding one of the 1 kHz bands (out of 8 uniformly split
bands, each of 1 kHz) at a time and train the model on the remaining 7
bands and test the performance, and repeating the process altering the
band to be discarded. In this kind of ablation study, a high increase in
EER (relative to the use of the fullband spectrum for training) will indicate
the importance of that subband. Likewise, if the performance is almost
the same, this would indicate the specific band is less useful for the task.
• As described in Section 5.5, the optimisation of network architecture and
model hyper-parameters for the ASVspoof 2019 PA dataset has not been
fully explored in the present study (as it used parameters optimised on
the 2017 dataset), leaving scope for further improvements. We found
promising results by conditioning VAEs using phrase IDs; this warrants
future studies with other conditioning variables such as speaker identity,
gender, and channel.
• Exploring the newly released ReMASC dataset (Subsection 3.4.1). Build-
ing new countermeasure models on this dataset and performing cross-
dataset performance evaluation with the ASVspoof 2017 and 2019 PA
datasets. Further analysing different attack conditions of the ReMASC
evaluation set is one potential research avenue.
• As a future work we aim to extend our study using VAEs (Section 5.5)
for the detection of synthetic and voice-converted speech on the ASVspoof
2015 and the ASVspoof 2019 LA datasets.
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• Feature learning from raw data. The experimental results from this thesis
suggested that data driven models or end-to-end models are a potential
direction to pursue for replay spoofing detection due to the nature of
the task. One potential future direction includes investigating end-to-end
models to learn frame-level discriminative features from raw audio.
• In Section 5.2, we studied an ensemble model combining models at the
score-level. It would be interesting to extend this work by combining
information at the feature level. The idea is to combine learned features
from deep models with hand-crafted features and train a DNN on these
features. Deep models can be trained on different inputs (eg. spectrograms
or raw audio) to learn diverse features which may potentially help during
feature fusion. These can be further combined through late fusion (score-
level fusion). This approach can be studied on both benchmark datasets.
ASVspoof challenges and dataset design. Having participated in the two
editions of the ASVspoof challenges in 2017 and 2019 we identified reliabil-
ity, robustness and reproducibility as key factors that need attention, which
in-turn directly relate to dataset design issues that we identified on both the
datasets. We make the following recommendations that can be incorporated
in future ASVspoof and other related challenges to promote trustworthiness in
anti-spoofing research and development.
First, controlled dataset design and model validation to ensure they are free
from artefacts and confounders as we have identified in this thesis. One simple
approach for this would be to analyse the frame-wise log-likelihood score dis-
tribution of few confidently classified audio examples by a GMM baseline (see
Subsection 4.2.3). Alternatively, a baseline deep model could be trained using
utterance-level feature representations and the method we adopted in Subsec-
tion 4.5.3 can be applied to validate if there are potential cues/artefacts in the
dataset that models are exploiting to form predictions. These simple approaches
can help ensure that the challenge datasets are clean and models trained on them
would be free from dataset biases.
Second, reproducibility of the top performing systems for transparency should
be promoted in future challenges. This could be incorporated by imposing com-
pulsory code submission of top ranking systems, or a separate track for repro-
ducibility could be introduced. Incorporating such constraints will of course
introduce additional work, however, these recommendations will also help avoid
additional work towards reproducing a model that is hard to do so by follow-
ing missing details of the reported systems, thereby promoting transparency
and trustworthiness in anti-spoofing research. For example, the popular LCNN
model that demonstrated the best results in the ASVspoof 2017 challenge is a
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mystery that no research group has been able to reproduce until to this date.
Such mysteries can be avoided and research results can become more fruitful
with the introduction of reproducibility guidelines.
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Appendix A
Deep model architectures
This appendix describes the architecture details of the deep models that were
used in Chapters 4 and 5 of the thesis. More precisely, descriptions of the
original LCNN architecture from Lavrentyeva et al. [2017] is provided for ref-
erence, a description of the adapted version of LCNN model referred as CNN1
is provided, and the description of two additional deep architectures that was
proposed in this thesis is also provided. In each of the architectures described
below the abbreviations: Conv, Dense, MFM, and MP denotes convolutional,
full connected, max feature map and max pooling, respectively.
Table A.1 summarises the LCNN model architecture that was used in [Lavren-
tyeva et al., 2017]. This architecture has been used in Sections 4.2, 4.3, and 4.4
with different input dimensions (defined in time (T ) and frequency (F )). The
original LCNN uses T = 400 and F = 864.
Table A.2 summarises the CNN1 model architecture which is adapted from
LCNN (Table A.1), and is used in Sections 4.5, 4.6 and in all the sections of
Chapter 5. CNN1 applies a batch normalisation and ReLU nonlinearity after
every Conv and Dense layers unlike LCNN that uses MFM nonlinearity without
batch normalisation. A dropout layer with 50% drop ratio is applied before the
Dense1 layer and dense2 layer applies sigmoid nonlinearity.
Table A.3 summarises the CNN2 model architecture that is used in Sec-
tions 4.6 and 5.3. And, Table A.4 summarises the frame-based DNN model
architecture that is used in Section 5.3.
207
Table A.1: The generalised LCNN architecture that operates on the input of
shape F ×T × 1. The original LCNN [Lavrentyeva et al., 2017] implementation
uses T = 400 and F = 864.
Layer
Input Filter Stride # Filters/ Output
shape size size neurons shape
Conv1 F × T × 1 5× 5 1× 1 32 F × T × 32
MFM1 F × T × 32 - - - F × T × 16
MP1 F × T × 16 2× 2 2× 2 - F/2× T/2× 16
Conv2a F/2× T/2× 16 1× 1 1× 1 32 F/2× T/2× 32
MFM2a F/2× T/2× 32 - - - F/2× T/2× 16
Conv2b F/2× T/2× 16 3× 3 1× 1 48 F/2× T/2× 48
MFM2b F/2× T/2× 48 - - - F/2× T/2× 24
MP2 F/2× T/2× 24 2× 2 2× 2 - F/4× T/4× 24
Conv3a F/4× T/4× 24 1× 1 1× 1 48 F/4× T/4× 48
MFM3a F/4× T/4× 48 - - - F/4× T/4× 24
Conv3b F/4× T/4× 24 3× 3 1× 1 64 F/4× T/4× 64
MFM3b F/4× T/4× 64 - - - F/4× T/4× 32
MP3 F/4× T/4× 32 2× 2 2× 2 - F/8× T/8× 32
Conv4a F/8× T/8× 32 1× 1 1× 1 64 F/8× T/8× 64
MFM4a F/8× T/8× 64 - - - F/8× T/8× 32
Conv4b F/8× T/8× 32 3× 3 1× 1 32 F/8× T/8× 32
MFM4b F/8× T/8× 32 - - - F/8× T/8× 16
MP4 F/8× T/8× 16 2× 2 2× 2 - F/16× T/16× 16
Conv5a F/16× T/16× 16 1× 1 1× 1 32 F/16× T/16× 32
MFM5a F/16× T/16× 32 - - - F/16× T/16× 16
Conv5b F/16× T/16× 16 3× 3 1× 1 32 F/16× T/16× 32
MFM5b F/16× T/16× 32 - - - F/16× T/16× 16
MP5 F/16× T/16× 16 2× 2 2× 2 - F/32× T/32× 16
FC6 F/32× T/32× 16 - - 64 32× 2
MFM6 32× 2 - - 32 32
FC7 32 - - 2 2
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Table A.2: CNN1 model architecture which is adapted from Table A.1. This
model has 188, 875 free parameters. * indicates batch normalisation and ReLU
non-linearity. A dropout layer with 50% drop ratio is applied before the Dense1
layer. The Dense2 layer uses sigmoid non-linearity.
Layer
Input Filter Stride # Filters/ Output
shape size size neurons shape
Conv1 865× 400× 1 5× 5 1× 1 16 865× 400× 16
MP1 865× 400× 16 2× 2 2× 2 - 432× 200× 16
Conv∗2 432× 200× 16 3× 3 1× 1 16 432× 200× 16
Conv∗3 432× 200× 16 3× 3 1× 1 24 432× 200× 24
MP2 432× 200× 24 2× 2 2× 2 - 216× 100× 24
Conv∗4 216× 100× 24 3× 3 1× 1 32 216× 100× 32
Conv∗5 216× 100× 32 3× 3 1× 1 32 216× 100× 32
MP3 216× 100× 32 2× 2 2× 2 - 108× 50× 32
Conv∗6 108× 50× 32 3× 3 1× 1 32 108× 50× 32
Conv∗7 108× 50× 32 3× 3 1× 1 16 108× 50× 16
MP4 108× 50× 16 2× 2 2× 2 - 54× 25× 16
Conv∗8 54× 25× 16 3× 3 1× 1 16 54× 25× 16
Conv∗9 54× 25× 16 3× 3 1× 1 16 54× 25× 16
MP5 54× 25× 16 2× 2 2× 2 - 27× 12× 16
Flatten 27× 12× 16 - - - 5184
Dense∗1 5184 - - 32 32
Dense2 32 - - 1 1
Table A.3: CNN2 model architecture. This model has only 36,174 free param-
eters. * has the same meaning as in Table A.2. A dropout layer with 50%
drop ratio is applied before the Dense1 layer, and Dense2 applies sigmoid non-
linearity.
Layer
Input Filter Stride # Filters/ Output
shape size size neurons shape
Conv∗1 257× 300× 1 3× 3 1× 1 20 257× 300× 20
MP1 257× 300× 20 3× 3 1× 1 - 85× 100× 20
Conv∗2 85× 100× 20 3× 3 1× 1 15 85× 100× 15
MP2 85× 100× 15 3× 3 1× 1 - 28× 33× 15
Conv∗3 28× 33× 15 3× 3 1× 1 10 28× 33× 10
MP3 28× 33× 10 3× 3 1× 1 - 9× 11× 10
Flatten 9× 11× 10 - - - 990
Dense∗1 990 - - 32 32
Dense2 32 - - 1 1
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Table A.4: Frame-based DNN architecture. ReLU non linearity is applied in
all dense layers except Dense4, the output layer that uses sigmoid non linearity.
A batch normalisation is applied to every layer before applying non linearity.
Furthermore, a dropout layer is applied before every dense layer with 30% to
the inputs of Dense1 and 50% to the other three dense layer inputs.
Layer
Input
# Neurons
Output
shape shape
Flatten 1× 257× 1 - 257
Dense1 257 256 256
Dense2 256 128 128
Dense3 128 32 32
Dense4 32 1 1
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Jakub Ga lka. Audio Replay Attack Detection Using High-Frequency Features.
In Proc. Interspeech 2017, pages 27–31, 2017.
234
Xiang Wu, Ran He, Zhenan Sun, and Tieniu Tan. A Light CNN for Deep Face
Representation with Noisy Labels. arXiv preprint arXiv:1511.02683, 2015a.
Zhanghao Wu, Shuai Wang, Yanmin Qian, and Kai Yu. Data Augmentation
Using Variational Autoencoder for Embedding Based Speaker Verification.
In Proc. Interspeech 2019, pages 1163–1167, 2019. doi: 10.21437/Interspeech.
2019-2248. URL http://dx.doi.org/10.21437/Interspeech.2019-2248.
Zhizheng Wu, Sheng Gao, Eng Siong Cling, and Haizhou Li. A study on re-
play attack and anti-spoofing for text-dependent speaker verification. In Sig-
nal and Information Processing Association Annual Summit and Conference
(APSIPA), 2014 Asia-Pacific, pages 1–5, Dec 2014a.
Zhizheng Wu, Sheng Gao, Eng Siong Cling, and Haizhou Li. A study on replay
attack and anti-spoofing for text-dependent speaker verification. In Asia-
Pacific Signal and Information Processing Association, 2014 Annual Summit
and Conference (APSIPA), pages 1–5. IEEE, 2014b.
Zhizheng Wu, Nicholas Evans, Tomi Kinnunen, Junichi Yamagishi, Federico
Alegre, and Haizhou Li. Spoofing and countermeasures for speaker veri-
fication: A survey. Speech Communication, 66:130 – 153, 2015b. ISSN
0167-6393. doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.specom.2014.10.005. URL http:
//www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167639314000788.
Zhizheng Wu, Tomi Kinnunen, Nicholas Evans, Junichi Yamagishi, Cemal
Hanilci, Mohammad Sahidullah, and Aleksandr Sizov. ASVspoof 2015: the
First Automatic Speaker Verification Spoofing and Countermeasures Chal-
lenge. In Proc. Interspeech 2015, 2015c.
Zhizheng Wu, Junichi Yamagishi, Tomi Kinnunen, Cemal Hanilçi, Mohammed
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